Summary

What is this post?

The intermediate goals we considered, and our tentative bottom line beliefs on them

Some high-level takeaways and observations

0. Introduction & why this post may be useful

Epistemic status

How to engage with this post

Acknowledgements

1. Reduce the odds of nuclear conflict or other non-test nuclear detonations

1.1 Reduce the odds of nuclear conflict that’s preceded by non-nuclear armed conflict

1.1.1 Reduce the odds of (initially non-nuclear) armed conflicts involving at least one nuclear-armed state

1.1.1.1 Reduce the odds of armed conflict in general

1.1.1.2 Reduce the odds of (initially non-nuclear) armed conflict, with a focus on those involving at least one nuclear-armed state

1.1.1.3 Reduce proliferation

1.1.1.4 Promote complete nuclear disarmament

1.1.2 Reduce the odds of escalation from a non-nuclear armed conflict to a nuclear conflict

1.1.2.1 Promote no first use (NFU) policies/pledges

1.1.2.2 Promote other policies/pledges limiting the scenarios under which nuclear weapons would be used

1.1.2.3 Remove sole nuclear launch authority (or prevent states from adopting it)

1.1.2.4 Reduce nuclear entanglement

1.1.2.5 Reduce the odds that, given a non-nuclear conflict, there’d be one or more attacks perceived as attacks against a state’s nuclear forces/capabilities

1.1.2.6 Increase decision time

1.1.2.6.i Promoting de-alerting and/or preventing increases in alert levels

1.1.2.6.ii Eliminating short-range nuclear weapons near tense borders

1.1.2.6.iii Improving early warning systems

1.1.2.7 Move away from escalate to deescalate or similar

1.1.2.8 Eliminate or reduce (or avoiding increasing) numbers of silo/land-based ICBMs, and possibly SLBMs

1.1.2.9 Decrease (or reduce the chance of increase in) number of warheads per missile, probably just for ICBMs

1.1.2.10 Reduce the number, prominence, or likelihood of usage of tactical nuclear weapons

1.1.2.11 Store strategic and nonstrategic (i.e., tactical) warheads separately

1.1.2.12 Prevent the deployment of the long range standoff (LRSO) air launched cruise missile

1.1.2.13 Prevent reckless/unilateral development/deployment of missile defense systems

1.1.2.14 Increasing or decreasing the accuracy of nuclear weapons

1.1.2.15 Getting heads of state to not make inflammatory threats

1.1.2.16 Reduce nuclear accident odds

1.1.2.17 Reduce odds of inadvertent nuclear strikes

1.1.2.18 Reduce odds of nuclear (or non-nuclear) terrorism

1.1.2.19 Reduce odds that nuclear (or non-nuclear) accidents or terrorism leads to nuclear attacks by states

1.1.2.20 Establishing hotlines between all nuclear powers

1.2 Reduce the odds of nuclear conflict that’s not preceded by non-nuclear armed conflict

1.3 Reduce the odds of a non-test nuclear detonation that’s not intentional or not by a state

1.3.1 Promote partial nuclear disarmament

1.3.2 Reduce the odds or size of increases in numbers of nuclear weapons in already-nuclear-armed states