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I'm really excited to read this, Teo, congratulations on publishing it.
New Book: “Minimalist Axiologies: Alternatives to ‘Good Minus Bad’ Views of Value”
5 min read · Jul 19, 2024
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I'm really excited to read this, Teo, congratulations on publishing it.
The term “minimalist axiologies” specifically refers to minimalist views of value: views that essentially say “the less this, the better”.
I wonder, why did you go for the term "minimalist"?
Wouldn't "minimizing axiologies" work better?
I think both terms have their advantages. The same question has actually come up before. Here is what I replied the first time it came up:
I think 'minimalist' does also work [in the other sense as well], because it seems to me that offsetting axiologies add further assumptions on top of those that are entailed by the offsetting and the minimalist axiologies. For example, my series tends to explore welfarist minimalist axiologies that assume only some single disvalue (such as suffering, or craving, or disturbance), with no second value entity that would correspond to a positive counterpart to this first one (cf. Vinding, 2022). By comparison, offsetting axiologies such as classical utilitarianism are arguably dualistic in that they assume two different value entities with opposite signs. And monism is arguably a theoretically desirable feature given the problem of value incommensurability between multiple intrinsic (dis)values.
For me, this aspect of value commensurability and theoretical parsimony is a major reason to favor purely minimalist axiologies over 'negative-leaning' ones. So the descriptor 'minimalist' can refer to minimalism regarding how many fundamental assumptions a theory requires.
I should add that we ultimately decided to reduce the emphasis on value commensurability in this book, because the value commensurability argument for minimalist views was not so centrally relevant here, wasn't laid out in sufficient detail yet, and might work better as its own separate argument at some point. But the book still refers to it in a few places.
Additionally, we reduced the emphasis on monism because many of the book's main points apply just as well to pluralist minimalist views which assume multiple intrinsic disvalues. Relatedly, I think the descriptor 'minimizing' sounds good and makes sense for consequentialist minimalist views in particular, but I imagine it might also sound too married to the kind of optimizing or systematizing mindset that may be typical of consequentialist thinking, at least to some people who might instead favor views like minimalist virtue ethics or minimalist care ethics without making consequentialism the centrally relevant component of their ethical views. (Thus, I suppose that 'minimalist' is a more neutral descriptor of the axiology / value theory part, without [so much] sounding as if a minimalist axiology would necessarily need to be combined with a strongly consequentialist view at the normative level.)
Thanks for the reply.
One of the issue I had with the term minimalist is that it has another meaning. But as you said "the descriptor 'minimalist' can refer to minimalism regarding how many fundamental assumptions a theory requires", so basically the other meaning actually applies.
I should add that we ultimately decided to reduce the emphasis on value commensurability in this book, because the value commensurability argument for minimalist views was not so centrally relevant here, wasn't laid out in sufficient detail yet, and might work better as its own separate argument at some point. But the book still refers to it in a few places.
I'm not exactly sure what you mean in this paragraph.
EDIT: now I get it
And I agree that the word 'minimizing' might be easily associated with typical consequentialism thinking so it might indeed not be the best.
I have just published a book version of my essay collection titled Minimalist Axiologies: Alternatives to ‘Good Minus Bad’ Views of Value. You can now read it in your format of choice, including paperback, free Kindle, or free paperback PDF. You can also download a free EPUB version from Smashwords or the Center for Reducing Suffering (CRS) website.
To briefly explain what the book is about, below are some blurbs, the Preface, and an abridged Table of Contents.
“Teo Ajantaival’s new book is an important, original, and tremendously valuable contribution to value theory, and a badly needed corrective to alternative theories that assume that moral goods and bads are simply additive. Even those who, in the end, may have reservations about a thoroughgoing ‘minimalist’ theory of value will benefit from Ajantaival’s careful and persuasive presentation of this under-appreciated alternative.”
— Clark Wolf, Director of Bioethics, Professor of Philosophy, Iowa State University
“The idea that happiness and suffering have similar value, just with opposite signs, is so intuitive that it is often accepted without question. Only when we think more deeply about the meaning of intrinsic value does this intuition unravel – and along with it, the flawed notion that extreme suffering is always tolerable if there is enough bliss to compensate for it. In this volume, Teo Ajantaival strings together six standalone essays on what he terms “minimalist” theories of value, describing a range of views from philosophers who reject the “plus-minus” notion of value. A welcome contribution to the field of ethics, and to the rational justification for giving suffering the prominence it deserves.”
— Jonathan Leighton, Executive Director of the Organisation for the Prevention of Intense Suffering (OPIS), author of The Battle for Compassion and The Tango of Ethics
Can suffering be counterbalanced by the creation of other things?
Our answer to this question depends on how we think about the notion of positive value.
In this book, I explore ethical views that reject the idea of intrinsic positive value, and which instead understand positive value in relational terms. Previously, these views have been called purely negative or purely suffering-focused views, and they often have roots in Buddhist or Epicurean philosophy. As a broad category of views, I call them minimalist views. The term “minimalist axiologies” specifically refers to minimalist views of value: views that essentially say “the less this, the better”. Overall, I aim to highlight how these views are compatible with sensible and nuanced notions of positive value, wellbeing, and lives worth living.
A key point throughout the book is that many of our seemingly intrinsic positive values can be considered valuable thanks to their helpful roles for reducing problems such as involuntary suffering. Thus, minimalist views are more compatible with our everyday intuitions about positive value than is usually recognized.
This book is a collection of six essays that have previously been published online. Each of the essays is a standalone piece, and they can be read in any order depending on the reader’s interests. So if you are interested in a specific topic, it makes sense to just read one or two essays, or even to just skim the book for new points or references. At the same time, the six essays all complement each other, and together they provide a more cohesive picture.
Since I wanted to keep the essays readable as standalone pieces, the book includes significant repetition of key points and definitions between chapters. Additionally, many core points are repeated even within the same chapters. This is partly because in my 13 years of following discussions on these topics, I have found that those key points are often missed and rarely pieced together. Thus, it seems useful to highlight how the core points and pieces relate to each other, so that we can better see these views in a more complete way.
I will admit upfront that the book is not for everyone. The style is often concise, intended to quickly cover a lot of ground at a high level. To fill the gaps, the book is densely referenced with footnotes that point to further reading. The content is oriented toward people who have some existing interest in topics such as philosophy of wellbeing, normative ethics, or value theory. As such, the book may not be a suitable first introduction to these fields, but it can complement existing introductions.
I should also clarify that my focus is broader than just a defense of my own views. I present a wide range of minimalist views, not just the views that I endorse most strongly. This is partly because many of the main points I make apply to minimalist views in general, and partly because I wish to convey the diversity of minimalist views.
Thus, the book is perhaps better seen as an introduction to and defense of minimalist views more broadly, and not necessarily a defense of any specific minimalist view. My own current view is a consequentialist, welfarist, and experience-focused view, with a priority to the prevention of unbearable suffering. Yet there are many minimalist views that do not accept any of these stances, as will be illustrated in the book. Again, what unites all these views is their rejection of the idea of intrinsic positive value whose creation could by itself counterbalance suffering elsewhere.
The book does not seek to present any novel theory of wellbeing, morality, or value. However, I believe that the book offers many new angles from which minimalist views can be approached in productive ways. My hope is that it will catalyze further reflection on fundamental values, help people understand minimalist views better, and perhaps even help resolve some of the deep conflicts that we may experience between seemingly opposed values.
All of the essays are a result of my work for the Center for Reducing Suffering (CRS), a nonprofit organization devoted to reducing suffering. The essays have benefited from the close attention of my editor and CRS colleague Magnus Vinding, to whom I also directly owe a dozen of the paragraphs in the book. I am also grateful to the donors of CRS who made this work possible.
Part I: Varieties of Minimalist Views
1. Minimalist Views of Wellbeing
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Reasons to Doubt the Offsetting Premise: A Brief Overview
1.3 The Variety of Minimalist Views
Appendix 1: Expanding the Epicurean Notion of Freedom From All Pain
2. Varieties of Minimalist Moral Views: Against Absurd Acts
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Nonconsequentialist Reasons Against Absurd Acts
2.3 Consequentialist Reasons Against Absurd Acts
Part II: Minimalist Views in Theory and Practice
3. Minimalist Axiologies and Positive Lives
3.1 What Is Axiology?
3.2 What Are Minimalist Axiologies?
3.3 How Do Minimalist Views Help Us Make Sense of Population Ethics?
3.4 What Are We Comparing When We Make the Assumption of “All Else Being Equal”?
3.5 What Do These Views Imply in Practice?
3.6 Without the Concept of Intrinsic Positive Value, How Can Life Be Worth Living? A More Complete View
4. Minimalist Extended Very Repugnant Conclusions Are the Least Repugnant
4.1 Are Repugnant Implications Inevitable?
4.2 Comparable XVRCs for Offsetting and Minimalist Views
4.3 Sources of Repugnance
4.4 Comparative Repugnance
4.5 Conclusions
Appendix 4: Rollercoaster Lives and the Extended Very Repugnant Conclusion (XVRC)
5. Peacefulness, Nonviolence, and Experientialist Minimalism
5.1 Overview and Scope
5.2 The Hypothetical Side: Cessation Versus Creation of an Imperfect World
5.3 The Practical Side: Why We Should Not Seek to Create an Empty World
Part III: Positive Roles in the Real World
6. Positive Roles of Life and Experience in Suffering-Focused Ethics
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Possible Misconceptions About Instrumental Value
6.3 Life and Diversity
6.4 Valuable Experiences
Chapter Summaries
Recommended Resources
Acknowledgments
References
Notes
Update: I just finished this book. It was as advertised: a concise, technical and sometimes challenging experience of moral philosophy, at the edge of my non-specialist understanding, but I really appreciated it. A couple of really important takeaways for me:
Thank you for writing this, Teo, and well done again! I hope to write a longer-form summary of the ideas, both for myself and others, as I think there's a great deal of value here.
Thank you, that's great to hear!
Just to clarify on #2: To "bite the bullet" in the case of the RRC (Figure 4.7) does not entail reducing unbearable suffering. Instead, it entails reducing mild discomfort for many lives at the cost of adding unbearable suffering for others. When it comes to the question of how to prioritize between mild vs. severe harms, accepting these kinds of (Archimedean) tradeoffs is just one option. As you allude to in #1, the other options include looking into lexical views, such as those that would - all else equal - prioritize the reduction of unbearable suffering over any amount of mild (or wholly bearable) discomfort.
Thanks for correcting me! I've reviewed my notes, and made some additional points to ensure I don't make the mistake again.
Cool, no problem! I admit that it was often left quite abstract what the different parts of the diagrams symbolize.