Some of these terms are not used consistently in the literature. In particular, what the taxonomy above calls 'practical uncertainty' is referred to as 'normative uncertainty' by some authors (MacAskill & Ord 2020: 328),authors,[1] and as 'moral uncertainty' by other (and sometimes even the same) authors (MacAskill, Bykvist & Ord 2020: 2-3; cf. Bykvist 2017: 6-7; Podgorski 2020: 43).authors.[2][3][4]
Bykvist, Krister (2017)
Moraldecision-theoretic uncertainty, Philosophy Compass, vol. 12, pp. 1–8. | moral uncertainty
MacAskill, William, Krister Bykvist & Toby Ord (2020)
MacAskill, William & Toby Ord (2020) Why maximize expected choice-worthiness?, Noûs, vol. 54, pp. 327–353.353, p. 328.
MacAskill, William, Krister Bykvist & Toby Ord (2020) Moral Uncertainty, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cf. Bykvist, Krister (2017) Moral uncertainty, Philosophy Compass, vol. 12, pp. 1–8.
Podgorski, Abelard (2020) Normative uncertainty and the dependence problem, Mind, vol. 129, pp. 43–70.
MacAskill, William, Krister Bykvist & Toby Ord (2020) Moral uncertaintyUncertainty, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Normative uncertainty is uncertainty about how to act given lack of certainty in any one normative theory, as well as the study of how one ought to act given this uncertainty.
At the most basic level, uncertainty can be either descriptive or normative. Normative uncertainty can itself be either theoretical or practical. Within theoretical uncertainty, a further subdivision can be made between epistemological uncertainty and decision-theoretic uncertainty. And practical uncertainty can be subdivided into moral uncertainty and prudential uncertainty, while theoretical uncertainty can be subdivided into epistemological uncertainty and decision-theoretic uncertainty.
Some of these terms are not used consistently in the literature. In particular, what the taxonomy above calls 'practical uncertainty' is referred to as 'normative uncertainty' by some authors (MacAskill & Ord 2020: 328), and as 'moral uncertainty' by other (and sometimes even the same) authors (MacAskill, Bykvist & Ord 2020: 2-3; cf. Bykvist 2017: 6-7; Podgorski 2020: 43).
Bykvist, Krister (2017) Moral uncertainty, Philosophy Compass, vol. 12, pp. 1–8.
MacAskill, William, Krister Bykvist & Toby Ord (2020) Moral uncertainty, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
MacAskill, William & Toby Ord (2020) Why maximize expected choice-worthiness?, Noûs, vol. 54, pp. 327–353.
Podgorski, Abelard (2020) Normative uncertainty and the dependence problem, Mind, vol. 129, pp. 43–70.
Some of these terms are not used consistently in the literature. In particular, what the taxonomy above calls
'practical uncertainty'"practical uncertainty" is referred to as'normative uncertainty'"normative uncertainty" by some authors,[1] and as'moral uncertainty'"moral uncertainty" by other (and sometimes even the same) authors.[2][3][4]Further reading
MacAskill, William, Krister Bykvist & Toby Ord (2020) Moral Uncertainty, Oxford: Oxford University Press.