A recurring sub-theme across multiple of my research interests this year have been various forms of deception checking, particularly automated deception checking.
I've gotten pretty disappointed in the space. Not all the time (eg Pangram is great), but consistently they can be bad, and bad in ways that are not obvious to outsiders or low-information buyers.
If you're a deception checking company, there's a consistent tradeoff for what you can invest your resources in:
1. You can invest in better deception checking
2. You can invest in better deception. Specifically, you can invest in more and more elaborate lies about how your product totally works.
Across the board[1], it seems like many companies (perhaps correctly?) decided that the profit-maximizing move is #2.
This doesn't work forever -- eventually people wise up and are suspicious of the, ahem, AI Snake Oil that the deception detectors sell. And in fields where actual detectors do work (say Pangram for AI text detection), I think they eventually rise above the noise. This is probably not a field that you can keep lying forever, particularly when better alternative exist. But the lying lie detectors and the scamming scam detectors can keep lying and scamming for a long time. Every new form of deception can create a secondary grift window.
The existence proof and commonality of this dynamic so far should make us be suspicious of and guard against this dynamic continuing to happen as we enter new domains in AI epistemics, and the need for novel forms of deception detection.
Consider the first wave of superhumanly enhanced persuasive text and videos in the future. Afterwards, we might see an overflow of "detector" companies for superhuman manipulation, that don't work but will try to persuade low-information buyers that they totally do work (possibly with superhumanly enhanced arguments in their own favor).
In the long run humanity can probably figure out which detectors actually work vs are fake, but a