I am a rising junior at the University of Chicago (co-president of UChicago EA and founder of Rationality Group). I am mostly interested in philosophy (particularly metaethics, formal epistemology, and decision theory), economics, and entrepreneurship.
I also have a Substack where I post about philosophy (ethics, epistemology, EA, and other stuff). Find it here: https://substack.com/@irrationalitycommunity?utm_source=user-menu.
Reach out to me via email @ dnbirnbaum@uchicago.edu
If anyone has any opportunities to do effective research in the philosophy space (or taking philosophy to real life/ related field) or if anyone has any more entrepreneurial opportunities, I would love to hear about them. Feel free to DM me!
I can help with philosophy stuff (maybe?) and organizing school clubs (maybe?)
Thanks for the comment and good points.
What I meant is that they can be MORE politically charged/mainstream/subject to motivated reasoning. I definitely agree that current incentives around AI don't perfectly track good moral reasoning.
Yea, unclear if these self-reports will be reliable, but I agree that this could be true (and I briefly mention something like it: "Broadly, AW has high tractability, enormous current scale, and stronger evidence of sentience—at least for now, since future experiments or engineering relevant to digital minds could change this."
This seems to assume that EA funds ought to be distributed “democratically” by people who identify as EAs or EA leaders. I don’t buy that.
If the goal is good resource allocation, we want funding decisions to track competence about cause prioritization, not representativeness. Randomly sampled EAs—many of whom haven’t spent much time thinking seriously about cause prioritization—don’t seem like the right decision-makers.
And it’s also not obvious that “EA leaders,” as such, are the right allocators either. The relevant property isn’t status or identity, but judgment, track record, and depth of thinking about cause prioritization.
I think one can reasonably ask this question of consciousness/welfare more broadly: how does one have access to their consciousness/welfare?
One idea is that many philosophers think one, by definition, has immediate epistemic access to their conscious experiences (though whether those show up in reports is a different question, which I try to address in the piece). I think there are some phenomenological reasons to think this.
Another idea is that we have at least one instance where one supposedly has access to their conscious experiences (humans), and it seems like this shows up in behavior in various ways. While I agree with you that our uncertainty grows as you get farther from humans (i.e. to digital minds), I still think you're going to get some weight from there.
Finally, I think that, if one takes your point too far (there is no reason to trust that one has epistemic access to their conscious states), then we can't be sure that we are conscious, which I think can be seen as a reductio (at least, to the boldest of these claims).
Though let me know if something I said doesn't make sense/if I'm misinterpreting you.
I agree this is a super hard problem, but I do think there are somewhat clear steps to be made towards progress (i.e. making self reports more reliable). I am biased, but I did write this piece on a topic that touches on this problem a bit that I think is worth checking out.
Why don’t EA chapters exist at very prestigious high schools (e.g., Stuyvesant, Exeter, etc.)?
It seems like a relatively low-cost intervention (especially compared to something like Atlas), and these schools produce unusually strong outcomes. There’s also probably less competition than at universities for building genuinely high-quality intellectual clubs (this could totally be wrong).