The problem with all wefare estimates is their inherent imprecision, as well as the oversight that in any altruistic project—such as that of the EA community—the key factor is the motivation of the altruistic agents. Calculating any objectively altruistic action means ignoring the subjective element of the altruistic act.
The only effective calculation is one that prioritizes the motivation of the altruistic agents. Appealing to mere altruistic principles based on a cognitive understanding is insufficient. Hence the twenty-year failure of the EA community in its unsuccessful attempt to rationalize altruism. Altruism cannot be rationalized outside of a cultural conception of the altruistic agent's motivation.
One contribution in this regard is that altruism can be cultivated as a necessary element within the development of a culture of benevolence, which might be sufficiently motivating to generate altruistic acts consistent with conventional welfare estimates.
But this is just one contribution among many others that could be made.
When an obvious principle demands a behavioral change that you do not carry out, you are failing to live up to your principles.
The point at which "effective altruism" transcends the triviality of choosing "more over less" is precisely when principles depend on behavior. A "behavioral ideology" is something that has not yet come into being.
However, it becomes even more trivial when the principles of human behavior are detached from the idea of virtue or lifestyle.
How am I going to maintain resolve to do good, to avoid life style creep, to reduce animal product consumption, etc., if I don't have other people to show me the way, to encourage me, and to mentor?
It's trivial to worry about how to spend resources on certain charities when one doesn't have them.
The non-trivial consequence of an ideology centered on prosocial behavior patterns (financial charity, but not only) is the belief that the primary effort of such a movement should be to increase the number of people practicing charity. This requires effective psychological strategies that make a lifestyle based on cultivating benevolence (of which charity is a necessary consequence) appealing. For example, one hundred years ago, the founders of "Alcoholics Anonymous" had a very good idea.
What you mean is that there is a psychological mechanism—a consequence in your "thought experiment" of the monastic practice—that internalizes an "identification" between two members of the same group. What I don't see is a sharp distinction between "identification" between members of the same group and "loyalty" within the group.
This phenomenon of "identification," when differentiated from "affect," requires a peculiar psychological construct. It occurs to me that it could be an abstraction of affection, which doesn't require personal proximity between those who share an ideology of affection, if such an ideology could exist. I find it difficult to believe that an "identification" not equivalent to "loyalty" can occur without an affective element (one can be loyal to communism or to Christianity, but I cannot identify with Jesus, whom I love, in the same way as with the historical figure of Lenin).
We can love all our fellow human beings within an affective ideology (our faith is limited to believing in a life governed by patterns of affective and caring behavior), but at the same time, we only personally identify with those who share this belief in universal love.
Is it possible to construct such an ideology? It has never been done, but some Christians have claimed that "God is Love"... which some might interpret as meaning that God does not exist, but that Love does exist as an affective abstraction, which can be symbolized and therefore also psychologically internalized within a context of shared belief (ideology).
So far, no one has undertaken such an experiment. Believing in "Love" (or its equivalent behavioral pattern of benevolence) would imply believing in a personal learning process to achieve a model of behavior at all levels (at the economic level, this would involve altruistic behavior).
From a utilitarian perspective, the priority of altruistic action should be that which can simultaneously reduce immediate human suffering and expand altruistic behavior (proselytizing a lifestyle, since the basis of altruism is altruistic motivation).
Human instincts don't arise from randomness however, they are designed by evolution. Therefore I think the answer in altruism doesn't rely on negating humanity but rather balancing it with our conscious free will
Sigmund Freud wrote that "civilization is the control of instinct." If we adhere simply to genetic evolution, Homo sapiens would still be living a prehistoric existence as a "hunter-gatherer." But Homo sapiens is a "cultural animal." In a sense, it is the only cultural animal, since it makes cumulative use of cultural creativity throughout its historical trajectory.
Tribalism, supernaturalism, male dominance, and, above all, aggression, are human instincts that the civilizing process also tries to control in an evolutionary way, but not biologically, rather culturally.
The idea of a civilization in which altruism would be the general expression of economic relations may seem as unthinkable to us today as commercial air travel might have seemed to the wise Aristotle. But it is perfectly logical and in accordance with human nature as a cultural being.
An ideological movement based on improving behavior in the sense of benevolence and altruism (the conditions that give rise to human relationships of maximum trust and consequent effective cooperation) could be an extraordinary opportunity for social progress.
It is understandable that nationalism is a response to discrimination and aggression against minorities defined by ethnic markers. But it is a mistake to assume the aggressor's premise that such ethnic markers are humanly significant.
Tribalism or ingroupism is a human instinct. Any human group tends to create bonds based on arbitrary markers—practically anything can become "ethnic"—to defend the in-group from the perceived threat of the outside group. This has been observed even in the simplest societies.
An altruistic conception of human life must eliminate all forms of ingroupism, as it subordinates the individual (human) to the group (non-human). Nationalism, patriotism, ingroupism... no one should be deceived by the supposed goodness of "bonds of solidarity"... it is a form of superstition, necessarily aggressive and irrational.
It is a shame that in recent decades many prestigious authors have spoken out against the irrationalism of beliefs in the supernatural, but almost none against groupistic tendencies that are responsible for far more wars and violence than religion.
caring about others’ well-being. It shifts your attention away from anxious self-monitoring and toward concrete tasks: helping, building. That alone is often a relief. When you are absorbed in a task and have forgotten yourself, that’s often when the most profound happiness arises
It seems fairly well established that, for example, caring for pets provides a certain solace. However, altruism toward human beings in general is much more complex because it depends on cultural conditioning.
Caring for pets (and, of course, one's own offspring) provides well-being on a universal level, in all cultures. But extrapolating this fact to a lifestyle based on altruism is of little help when facing the reality of the human problem. This is an element to consider. If one relies on Buddhist wisdom, one must consider the fact that this wisdom evolved because a viable altruistic formulation did not exist in the traditional lifestyle until then.
Murder is rightly illegal, and conscription should be illegal for the same reasons.
For something to be "illegal," it must be sanctioned by coercive law. Therefore, to declare conscription "illegal," you would need executive authority. You might even need to raise your own army if a political conflict arises between supporters and opponents of your legislative initiative.
The situation would be different if you were a pacifist (non-violent). In that case, you would have to face the consequences in all areas.
Even to those otherwise sympathetic to SFE, its orientation toward subtraction can be demotivating.
It would not be wrong to assert that the entire process of civilization consists of controlling innate human aggression and, therefore, that all moral efforts to ultimately improve society have a subtractive structure: do not aggress, do not harm, do not tolerate suffering.
Compassionate religious philosophies have thus attempted to develop "positive" abstract concepts capable of emotionally engaging the believer in an ideology of altruism and benevolence. The best known in the West are those of Christianity, such as "Love" ("Agape"), "Charity," "Holy Spirit," "Grace"... These terms undergo a process of symbolization, can be psychologically internalized, and act as motivating and guiding forces. Traditionally, they have been associated with the "numinous" or supernatural.
For those interested today in an effective reformulation of altruism as an ideology, it would be very useful to analyze these past strategies and adapt them to our current knowledge and experience of human behavior and its potential for social improvement.
Our moral imagination likes vivid, dramatic acts of sacrifice better than slow, structural work.
Even considering this reality, ethical dilemmas arise because we don't always have time to change the circumstances of the environment (slow, structural work) in which they occur.
However, I venture to suggest that there is a very positive point in your perspective: the observation regarding "drama." Cultural shifts related to ethics have much to do with the emotional impact of events with moral content. This is the basis, for example, of the historical relevance of the evolution of mythologies.
If we consider moral evolution to be the fundamental factor in the advancement of civilizations (less aggression, more benevolence, more rationality, and more efficient cooperation), when faced with many ethical dilemmas, we must lean toward the capacity to influence moral evolution. A dilemma that predates the trolley problem is that of torture: if I don't torture the al-Qaeda terrorist, I won't be able to eliminate Bin Laden, and he will commit mass crimes again. But torture is wrong (moral evolution).
I believe the EA movement is part of a civilizational moral evolution. Therefore, it should always prioritize decisions that promote moral evolution as a long-term goal.
The problem with all wefare estimates is their inherent imprecision, as well as the oversight that in any altruistic project—such as that of the EA community—the key factor is the motivation of the altruistic agents. Calculating any objectively altruistic action means ignoring the subjective element of the altruistic act.
The only effective calculation is one that prioritizes the motivation of the altruistic agents. Appealing to mere altruistic principles based on a cognitive understanding is insufficient. Hence the twenty-year failure of the EA community in its unsuccessful attempt to rationalize altruism. Altruism cannot be rationalized outside of a cultural conception of the altruistic agent's motivation.
One contribution in this regard is that altruism can be cultivated as a necessary element within the development of a culture of benevolence, which might be sufficiently motivating to generate altruistic acts consistent with conventional welfare estimates.
But this is just one contribution among many others that could be made.
The point at which "effective altruism" transcends the triviality of choosing "more over less" is precisely when principles depend on behavior. A "behavioral ideology" is something that has not yet come into being.
However, it becomes even more trivial when the principles of human behavior are detached from the idea of virtue or lifestyle.
It's trivial to worry about how to spend resources on certain charities when one doesn't have them.
The non-trivial consequence of an ideology centered on prosocial behavior patterns (financial charity, but not only) is the belief that the primary effort of such a movement should be to increase the number of people practicing charity. This requires effective psychological strategies that make a lifestyle based on cultivating benevolence (of which charity is a necessary consequence) appealing. For example, one hundred years ago, the founders of "Alcoholics Anonymous" had a very good idea.
What you mean is that there is a psychological mechanism—a consequence in your "thought experiment" of the monastic practice—that internalizes an "identification" between two members of the same group. What I don't see is a sharp distinction between "identification" between members of the same group and "loyalty" within the group.
This phenomenon of "identification," when differentiated from "affect," requires a peculiar psychological construct. It occurs to me that it could be an abstraction of affection, which doesn't require personal proximity between those who share an ideology of affection, if such an ideology could exist. I find it difficult to believe that an "identification" not equivalent to "loyalty" can occur without an affective element (one can be loyal to communism or to Christianity, but I cannot identify with Jesus, whom I love, in the same way as with the historical figure of Lenin).
We can love all our fellow human beings within an affective ideology (our faith is limited to believing in a life governed by patterns of affective and caring behavior), but at the same time, we only personally identify with those who share this belief in universal love.
Is it possible to construct such an ideology? It has never been done, but some Christians have claimed that "God is Love"... which some might interpret as meaning that God does not exist, but that Love does exist as an affective abstraction, which can be symbolized and therefore also psychologically internalized within a context of shared belief (ideology).
So far, no one has undertaken such an experiment. Believing in "Love" (or its equivalent behavioral pattern of benevolence) would imply believing in a personal learning process to achieve a model of behavior at all levels (at the economic level, this would involve altruistic behavior).
From a utilitarian perspective, the priority of altruistic action should be that which can simultaneously reduce immediate human suffering and expand altruistic behavior (proselytizing a lifestyle, since the basis of altruism is altruistic motivation).
Sigmund Freud wrote that "civilization is the control of instinct." If we adhere simply to genetic evolution, Homo sapiens would still be living a prehistoric existence as a "hunter-gatherer." But Homo sapiens is a "cultural animal." In a sense, it is the only cultural animal, since it makes cumulative use of cultural creativity throughout its historical trajectory.
Tribalism, supernaturalism, male dominance, and, above all, aggression, are human instincts that the civilizing process also tries to control in an evolutionary way, but not biologically, rather culturally.
The idea of a civilization in which altruism would be the general expression of economic relations may seem as unthinkable to us today as commercial air travel might have seemed to the wise Aristotle. But it is perfectly logical and in accordance with human nature as a cultural being.
An ideological movement based on improving behavior in the sense of benevolence and altruism (the conditions that give rise to human relationships of maximum trust and consequent effective cooperation) could be an extraordinary opportunity for social progress.
It is understandable that nationalism is a response to discrimination and aggression against minorities defined by ethnic markers. But it is a mistake to assume the aggressor's premise that such ethnic markers are humanly significant.
Tribalism or ingroupism is a human instinct. Any human group tends to create bonds based on arbitrary markers—practically anything can become "ethnic"—to defend the in-group from the perceived threat of the outside group. This has been observed even in the simplest societies.
An altruistic conception of human life must eliminate all forms of ingroupism, as it subordinates the individual (human) to the group (non-human). Nationalism, patriotism, ingroupism... no one should be deceived by the supposed goodness of "bonds of solidarity"... it is a form of superstition, necessarily aggressive and irrational.
It is a shame that in recent decades many prestigious authors have spoken out against the irrationalism of beliefs in the supernatural, but almost none against groupistic tendencies that are responsible for far more wars and violence than religion.
It seems fairly well established that, for example, caring for pets provides a certain solace. However, altruism toward human beings in general is much more complex because it depends on cultural conditioning.
Caring for pets (and, of course, one's own offspring) provides well-being on a universal level, in all cultures. But extrapolating this fact to a lifestyle based on altruism is of little help when facing the reality of the human problem. This is an element to consider. If one relies on Buddhist wisdom, one must consider the fact that this wisdom evolved because a viable altruistic formulation did not exist in the traditional lifestyle until then.
For something to be "illegal," it must be sanctioned by coercive law. Therefore, to declare conscription "illegal," you would need executive authority. You might even need to raise your own army if a political conflict arises between supporters and opponents of your legislative initiative.
The situation would be different if you were a pacifist (non-violent). In that case, you would have to face the consequences in all areas.
It would not be wrong to assert that the entire process of civilization consists of controlling innate human aggression and, therefore, that all moral efforts to ultimately improve society have a subtractive structure: do not aggress, do not harm, do not tolerate suffering.
Compassionate religious philosophies have thus attempted to develop "positive" abstract concepts capable of emotionally engaging the believer in an ideology of altruism and benevolence. The best known in the West are those of Christianity, such as "Love" ("Agape"), "Charity," "Holy Spirit," "Grace"... These terms undergo a process of symbolization, can be psychologically internalized, and act as motivating and guiding forces. Traditionally, they have been associated with the "numinous" or supernatural.
For those interested today in an effective reformulation of altruism as an ideology, it would be very useful to analyze these past strategies and adapt them to our current knowledge and experience of human behavior and its potential for social improvement.
Even considering this reality, ethical dilemmas arise because we don't always have time to change the circumstances of the environment (slow, structural work) in which they occur.
However, I venture to suggest that there is a very positive point in your perspective: the observation regarding "drama." Cultural shifts related to ethics have much to do with the emotional impact of events with moral content. This is the basis, for example, of the historical relevance of the evolution of mythologies.
If we consider moral evolution to be the fundamental factor in the advancement of civilizations (less aggression, more benevolence, more rationality, and more efficient cooperation), when faced with many ethical dilemmas, we must lean toward the capacity to influence moral evolution. A dilemma that predates the trolley problem is that of torture: if I don't torture the al-Qaeda terrorist, I won't be able to eliminate Bin Laden, and he will commit mass crimes again. But torture is wrong (moral evolution).
I believe the EA movement is part of a civilizational moral evolution. Therefore, it should always prioritize decisions that promote moral evolution as a long-term goal.