I think one simple and effective idea is tying EA to marginal decreasing utility. Decreasing marginal utility is often a Econ-101 topic as it explains the downward sloping nature of demand curves. It is also a fundamental part of why donating money overseas rather than domestically is more impactful (a foundational EA insight).
People living in the West are most likely in the top 10% of global incomes, and because of that a single $/Ā£/Euro will be purchase significantly less wellbeing than for someone in a low-income country. This is basically the 'drowning-child' argument in a nutshell, tied to a 101 Econ principle, and a good starting point before exploring more contentious/less intuitive EA ideas.Ā
I think another topic that can springboard into EA type ideas is the idea of discount rates, as this brings up the subject of how much we should care about the future. The question of discounting is central to Longtermism, and a ongoing discussion within economics, with plenty of different perspectives to consider.Ā
I think that social movements are most effective when they have face-to-face interactions, which build solidarity, facilitate discussion, and prevent value drift (as well as reducing burnout and increasing subjective well-being). However, outside of EAGs I donāt see many opportunities to socialise with other EAs in London. This is despite London being the second largest EA city after SF (or so Iāve been told). Am I missing something?
I completely agree with your comment. However my interpretation of what Professor Jones is trying to do is slightly different from straightforward cause prioritisation in the EA sense.
I think he is trying to frame AI risk reduction in a way that is compelling to policymakers, by focusing on standard benchmark values (Value of a Statistical Life), and limiting his analysis in space (only āvaluingā lives of American citizens) and time (only the next 20 years). This puts the report in line with standard government Cost Benefit Analyses, which may make it more convincing for those who have access to policy levers.
Very interesting article. I agree that nutrition as a vegan is tricky- there can be limits to supplementation (although relatively cheap b vitamins and vegan omega-3 supplements are available online in my experience). Iād mildly disagree with you that gaining muscle as a vegan is āmuch harderā, pea-isolate protein powder and tofu (if you know where to get it) can be a nutritionally complete protein source, price competitive with even with chicken.
I do have a few issues with your list of (potentially) ethical aninal products:
Eggs: I think itās hard to know if an egg is ethically produced or not, given how poorly enforced and vague a lot of āfree rangeā standards are in reality. Also, without in-ovo sexing consumption of eggs necessarily involves a lot of killing male chicks which doesnāt sit right with me.
Additionally, Iām not entirely convinced of the argument that vegans have worse mental health because of their nutrition. I think itās as likely that vegans are more likely to be neurotic, self-critical, and politically liberal, all of which are highly correlated with anxiety and depression.
Completely agree with this analysis. For readers interested in a high impact career in the UK civil service I recommend checking out Impactful Government Careers. We offer 1:1 discussions and a weekly job mailing list of high impact roles in government.
Hello- first of all I think you verbalised a bunch of very interesting and useful ideas about EA, its role and strategy. However as someone who currently donates 10% of my salary to addressing farmed animal welfare, I have some criticisms of your conclusions. I know that youāre not ruling out donating to animal charities, but requiring people to donate >10% of their salaries to charity is just putting the bar insanely high for the vast vast majority of people. So in effect your proposal means ceasing support to farmed animal welfare in favour of global poverty focused charities
One of the issues with this argument to my mind is that the same basic form can be made compatible with nationalistic rhetoric. āBefore we donate a single dollar/pound of aid, we need to make sure no child is hungry in our own country, etc.ā If we accept an argument for partiality towards some strangers over other strangers (beyond questions of effectiveness)- why draw the line to contain all humans rather than humans of a specific nationality, ethnicity, eye colour etc.Ā
I completely get the āopticsā rationale for not prioritising nematode welfare, but I think saying that we need to solve all major causes of human sufffering before addressing factory farming is too conservative. Quite a lot of people are against factory farming in a way which is not true about wild animal suffering (or farmed invertebrates suffering for that matter). After all it is fear of public opinion which makes farmed animal welfare charity campaigns so unreasonably effective (particularly caged hen corporate campaigns).Ā This is why factory farming and wild invertebrate suffering are in different leagues as far as optics are concerned. In essence - I agree that emphasising certain āfar outā aspects of EA can be off-putting, but I donāt think that factory farming is so beyond the Overton window.Ā
Also- the Overton window is malleable, Ā many ideas (abolitionism, womenās suffrage, AI safety) sounded completely nutty when they were first floated - not to mention āimmoralā. One of the historic missions that EA is currently fulfilling is pushing this circle outward, not by solving all issues for people within the circle first, but by challenging where most people draw the boundary in the first place. It canāt be done all at once (weāre not going to convince most people about shrimp anytime soon) but we can move the line inch by inch over decades- which is pretty much how all moral progress has worked up till this point. Iām fairly confident it will continue working this way (barring future existential catastrophes)