It isn't sufficient in my view merely that a positive EV action exists, you also need to be able to identity at least one such action, or else you are in the situation where longtermism is only theoretical and doesn't actually recommend certain actions. This makes the difficulty of modeling the future more of an issue that your post suggests because in realistic situations you need to estimate these EVs, you don't just know them.
The relevant uncertainty is in the estimated EV of a specific actions or intervention, it isn't sufficient for your argument merely to know that positive EV actions exists, or even that one is in some class of interventions (like those that plausibly reduce extinction risk), for longtermism to suggest a specific action is good. It requires considering the EV of that specific action, estimation error included. The difficulty of performing that estimation is therefore a difficulty for longtermism.
While the future is very hard to predict, it would be very surprising if there was no possible action which benefitted the long-term future in expectation. And if there are actions like that, then they swamp the expected value of other actions. It is an error to infer from the fact that the future is very unpredictable that we’re totally in the dark about which actions can make it better.
I think this needs additional assumptions to make it go through in realistic situations. There is a bit of an errors-in-variables problem. I think as stated, the argument only works if we assume actual knowledge of expected values, but in realistic situations these would need to be estimated. For reasons similar to what is discussed here and here, I think you can have a situation where there are actions that have positive EV on the future, but your estimation + intervention selection process can't reliably identify them, and integrating out this estimation/selection based uncertainty can change the overall dynamic. Basically, your expected outcome isn't the population expected value of a given action, the expected value you realize needs to take into account estimation/selection.
This doesn't mean that there aren't positive EV estimation/selection procedures, just that the existence of positive EV actions isn't sufficient for the arugment to go through.
On the bad faith/"truth seeking" point, I've also noted some issues in the way "truth seeking" is used in a previous post, and thinking about this case gave me an idea. It seems like there is a general phenomenon in EA/rationalist discourse where intent gets obscured or ignored somehow. Perhaps not surprising for intellectual communities that are very into consequentialism?
I think the effect of using the "truth seeking" terminology is to confuse multiple possibilities around intent:
Lying: intentional
Insufficient rigor/evidence/etc.: can be an unintentional mistake
Callousness about the truth: I think people often feel like even if someone isn't lying, they can demonstrate a disregard for truth that feels like its intentionally misleading
Being "insufficiently truth seeking" could refer to any of these, and thus using the phrase fails my principle of clarity. It also becomes strongly subject to motivate reasoning or motte/bailey dynamics because the meaning can shift among these different meanings.
I feel like something similar has happened here with the whole "hard to dispell misunderstandings" thing. Tskeen laterally, it doesn't make a whole lot of sense to soft ban someone for this. Is the implicict message that only easy to dispell misunderstandings are allowed? Surely not. But it makes more sense if you imagine its implicitly standing in for a spectrum of actions based on intention:
Bad faith: intentionally obscuring your real views, often with the goal of making them harder to respond to.
Genuine mistake: unintentional, even of hard to dispell
Game playing: being coy or cagey about what your views really are or in some way deliberately making your position confusing or hard to respond to.
The last one I think is kind of what Said was being accused of in the post referenced above? But IMO its extremely clear that you haven't been doing anything intentionally misleading. I think this is an instance of concerns about "epistemics" being used in an unproductive way that creates a lack of clarity around intent.
Moderators have a hard job, I think it can't be entirely on moderation to drive the culture of a website. A lot of the work has to be on the users. Starting with moderation issues though, I have a couple ideas:
Clarity: I think moderation benefits from simplicity and clarity. It isn't a good sign when you are taking mod action against someone but can't really explain why because its too difficult or would take too long. I feel like that indicates that the underlying rules/principles aren't really clear or simple enough. It is hard for people to adapt to comply with complicated and unclear rules and the road to motivated reasoning is also paved in vague principles that are easily applied differently to different stituations.
Proportionality: This one goes in both directions. I think sometimes it would be better for mods to step in early but with a lighter touch, something like "this seems to be getting a bit heated/unproductive, friendly reminder to everyone to keep it civil". An ounce of prevention and all that.
For what users can do:
Stick to the topic/don't go meta: Stay grounded in the discussion, try not to import assumptions based on previous arguments with people vaguely on the same "side" as who you are talking to, focus on their arguments. Try to make the discussion more specific rather than more general. Try not to take your argument in a meta direction, don't talk about what arguments are good in the abstract or focus too much on claiming that the other person's arguments are an example of a general phenonemon, try to respond to their claims specifically.
Try to stay calm: It is common that people feel a bit uncomfortable when faced with strong disagreements, including that the person they are talking to is being unfair or mean in some way. The problem is that if both people go along with this feeling it often leads to a bad place. If one person temporarily lapses into a less friendly tonw but the other person stays calm, sometimes the conversation is salvagable. Try to be that calm person sometimes in hopes that when you are the one who isn't calm, the person who you are talking to can cover for you a little.
You never have an obligation to respond: I think some of the stress in arguing online comes from a feeling of being trapped, like you will be judged if the person you are talking to gets the last word. We should try to cultivate a culture where it is okay to respond within your own time limitations. If you get the sense the person you are talking to is feeling tapped out, you can openly raise this issue or try to take the peddle off the gas a little.
An idea
I will also take this chance to float an idea I've been thinking about recently. I've been calling this "epistolary debates" in my head. The idea is inspired by legal briefs in courts, where the parties submit sequences of written statements that respond to each other.
I think this format, where the "debaters" write longer form content over an extended period of time would be an improvement in a lot of ways. I imagine this as follows:
Partipants message each other privately to align on a topic and definitions, agreeing in advance on the general parameters of what they would like to discuss, who will write first, and timelines/length goals.
First person writes an essay/"opening statement" laying out there position.
Second person starts writing their response, aiming for a write within a certain time frame (e.g. a week, a month).
First person writes their response to the second person's response.
Repeat as desired.
I think a benefit of this format is that extending the time over which the discussion occurs cuts down on stress and helps people set aside snarkier bits that feel right in the moment but aren't a good idea on further reflection. It also lets people work a little more on explaining their views more fully and clearly, and potentially cuts down on the conversation wondering off from the main topic.
ETA: I also agree with your last paragraph that for the specific case of people interested in AI safety/related issue, it is very important to have openness to discussing the topic in a way that isn't dismissive and takes seriously engages with the arguments, even if you sometimes feel frustrated with how these conversations play out.
Yeah, I'm trying to maintain openness to different possibilities on the time issue to an extent since I don't really know what happened. If I had to venture a guess (which could obviously be wrong), I'd say something like this:
Other forum users who got frustrated with your posts/comments reach out to the mod team privately, mod team has extended discussions amongst themselves, decides on the soft ban, and then reaches out to you to tell you. If this is what happened, I can imagine that it did take a reasonable amount of time and also its understandable that the mod team would want to incorporate feedback from users, but I would say this is a mistake on the part of the mod team if that's what happened. If you're talking here about the value of being able to reach out privately, wouldn't this be the time to do that, before going to the soft ban? If you're not making the decision lightly and discussing a lot and writing google docs, couldn't you copy some examples of problematic comments or posts from these documents fairly easily?
I think a prcess where there is a lot of back channelling has a siginificant risk of filter bubble/echo chamber issues as you mention, similar to what Habryka calls the "linkedin attractor" in the post linked above.
I'm generally of the belief that people should work on hashing out their own disagreements more rather than escalating to meta/moderation issues. Taking moderation actions because someone writes a lot of "hard to dispel misunderstandings" seems like it is extremely likely to be filtered through the lens of what a mod already agrees/disagrees with, and so is likely to be unevenly applied against critics.
Although I think you and I would have several disagreements on the AI topic, I will put my vote in, to the extent anyone cares, that a ban was not justified in this case. There are things you've written that annoy me or that I'd have said differently, but in general I don't think these are anywhere close to warranting a ban (or frankly the level of downvotes some of your comments have gotten). I also think in several discussions you've been involved in that went unproductively, the people you were responding to or who responded to you are at least equally to blame and sometimes have behaved worse, including clearly uncivil behave (e.g. clearly intentionally insulting phrasing, unreasonable accusations of bad faith etc.).
One section from that post raises the concept of 'Asymmetric effort ratios'. This is definitely part of our moderation decision. At one point, if I remember correctly, you wrote almost a fifth of the words on the Forum in a week. You are very productive of long comments, which are often packed with difficult to dispel misunderstandings. This is part of why a rate-limit was the solution we arrived at. In small doses, you can be a valuable contributor, but without limit, it becomes unfairly taxing on your interlocutors.
I feel like the issue addressed in the Said Saga is somewhat the opposite of what it seems like Yarrow does. A paradigmatic example of the bad bahavior attributed to Said was posting extremely short comments, such as just saying "examples?". Its obviously extremely easy to type a one word comment, and the possibility of adding additional examples of something a poster describes isn't exactly a deep insight. The asymetry is that it is very easy for Said to post a comment like that but would take a lot of effort for the original poster to respond providing examples, giving rise to the complaint that Said wasn't willing to put in equal effort.
This doesn't seem to be true at all of Yarrow, and producing a large quantity of words on the forum seems like it is actually contrary to the type of behavior that Said was alleged to have engaged in. Part of the issue is that lots of Said's comments were super brief! Yarrow also seems to write plenty of top level posts and many of their comments are on their own posts, again this is the exact opposite of part of the issue identified with Said, where a critical part of thbe asymetry is about the dynamic of commenting vs posting.
Yarrow also doesn't seem to do the "just asking questions" style that Habryka claims to identify in Said's comments, which I think is also a big part of why karma might not be sufficient. People may be hesitant to downvote comments on a post that are just a question, thus creating a possibility of negative behavior that systematically evades the karma system. But Yarrow seems to be pretty open in their criticism and often writes extended comments (not just one or two sentence questions), and you identify that the issue seems to be present in many of their downvoted comments. Why is the karma system not sufficient in that case? If the concern is posters feeling the need to respond to comments, I think that is mitigated strongly when those comments are downvoted.
In general, it seems like Yarrow actually does many of the things that supposedly would have improved Said's commenting, and the issues is essentially the opposite (writing too much rather than too little).
In both cases it seems like lots of moderator effort was devoted towards a specific user, which I definitely think is a reasonable thing for moderators to react too. At a certain point moderators can't just be expending infinite time and effort just devoted to stuff that is going on with one user.
At the same time, it does seem to me that there is another asymetry present here, where the voting/moderator attention/banning etc. is being deployed more harshly towards someone who is a critic/disagrees with popular ideas in the community vs people who express popular ideas or aren't critical. I think reviewing the context of Yarrow's posts/comments and the reactions/responses to them on the forum strongly suggests this. There are definitely times when Yarrow reacts in ways that I don't see as ideal and which I can understand people having issues with, but many times this is in response to other forum users also behaving questionably, often in a more egregiously than Yarrow. It seems likely to me that Yarrow being critical of popular ideas in the community is an important factor in the different responses.
Why I care
I feel like I semi-frequently find myself defending people who I probably have significant disagreements with (such as in this case with Yarrow) on here/lesswrong because it seems like there is a tendency within the EA/rationality community to make convoluted meta-arguments for why critics are doing something bad/"insuffciently truthseeking"/"burning the commons"-y and I think this is bad and not productive. These communities are indeed much more open to criticism than a lot of online communities (where disagreeing with popular ideas with just get you instantly insulted and/or banned), but I still think a more sophisticated defense mechanism against critics is alive and well.
I'm particularly interested/concerned about this because I believe that we will need pretty substantial policy actions on AI, and that this will likely require convincing people who have very different worldviews of certain things about AI. I view conversations on places like the EA forum or lesswrong as good testing grounds for how this might go, but in a place where it should be substanially easier than it would be in the policy arena. In my mind, if people are struggling to have conversations about AI with Yarrow (who is likely going to be more pleasant to discuss this issue with than 90% of people who don't already agree), I don't think that is a good sign for how this community is approaching that challenge of getting a diverse coalition on-side on the AI issue.
I'm somewhat confused by what people mean by "strategic" in these discussions. It seems to me like there are aspects of communication that I would call "stategic" but are uncontroversial. I would suggest the "grown not crafted" idea from IABIED. I think this is a extremely succinct and effective way to communicate the underlying technical idea, but of course expressing the idea in more technical language would also be truthful (arguably even more so). The difference isn't that the "grown not crafted" way of communicating the idea is more truthful, but (I would infer) that it is predicted ot be more helpful in allowing others to understand the idea, even if they aren't already famiiar with relevant technical knowledge. In other words, it is a more strategic way of communicating the idea.
I don't think that example is particularly controversial, but I think these discussions are meant to also apply to statements that are highly contentious and subject to adversarial dynamics. When we consider statements that are more in those domains, I think we enter a kind of "messy middle" where the truthfulness of a statement is much more contested and it isn't necessarily as easy to seperate the core content from the communication strategy.
Let's take the "DEFUND THE POLICE" example from the post. I definitely believe that some people engage in the "window-stretching" as you describe. But I could also imagine proponents of the slogan saying something like this:
"I genuinely believe that current policing practices are so unjust that the police deserve to be defunded. It would be better for policing to be reformed to correct these injustices while still carrying out legitimate policing functions. But saying I want to "defund the police" is genuinely true under the current system. If I only advocated for more centrist reforms that would actually be misleading about what I believe and trying to fit my beliefs into the overton window, not the other way around. Its extremely important to use slogans like "DEFUND THE POLICE" when you actually believe in them because the powerful simply ignore centrist calls for reform. They need to know how strongly we actually feel about this. Calling for measures such as defunding is the only way to have our voices heard".
I think such a view lives in this messy middle. People who agree are likely to see it as genuine while critics will be tempted to claim inappropriate use of stategy. The issue of whether the person who holds this view is being "truthful" essentially collapses back into the underlying object-level issues. Those who agree on the object-level will also agree of the meta question of whether what the person is doing is acceptable, and the reverse for someone who disagrees.
As I allude to here I think the best approach is to simply argue over the object-level question, and leave aiside the dicussions about whether someone is being stategic, how truth-seeking they are, if they are "gaslighting" etc.
Good post. I have two general themes I'd like to comment on:
Analogies for cause prioritization
Your analysis covers several perspectives on this phenomenon, if we focus on the "actual performance" perspective, this is pretty similar to multi-armed bandits. One pattern that I think is present in strategies for these types of problems is the idea of spreading out actions across the different possibilities (explore vs exploit and all that). It wouldn't necessarily make sense to commit to one "arm" (or cause) early on when information is low. This "spreading out" across options is one way of dealing with uncertainty.
A similar idea comes up in another potential anology for cause prioritization, financial investing. We can think about optimizing a portfolio and its allocation to achieve good returns relative to risk, rather than trying to pick the single highest return asset. Thus we get concepts like disversification.
I find this stock-picking analogy helpful for thinking about how "neglectedness" is often treated in practice. I've often found myself skeptical of arguments for and from neglectedness, and I feel the way it is applied in practice doesn't really align with the classic "diminishing returns" conception. I think the way neglectedness is treated in practice ends up being more like how an investor with a high risk tolerance might view a risky asset. Riskier assets are expected to have higher returns, investors with lower risk tolerance would staturate low-risk/high-return options quickly, leaving risker investments "neglected". Thus an investor with high risk tolerance can find good opportunities that would be unappealing to other less risk tolerant investors by going to higher risk assets. I think this captures the spirit of what "neglected" cause areas have often looked like in EA, more speculative but where some EAs have a strong feeling that they caould have outsized impact.
If I can read between the lines a bit, under this anology EA pivoting more into AI is kind of like an investor who wants higher returns putting more of their portfolio in small cap growth stocks that are risker but which the investor thinks will result in higher return. One downside of this is decreased diversification. Another possible option would be to hold a more diversified portfolio but use leverage.
In-model vs Out-of-model robustness
The problem is not limited to cases with trials and noisy statistics, because the error does not have to arise from random chance. Problems with assumptions, bad guesses, even math errors will equally get you cursed. If anything, I would expect causes that lack empirical experimental data to be more cursed, not less.
I think this gets at a distinction that is worth calling out, in-model vs out-of-model robustness.
In my experience with cost-benefit analysis, both reading EA related ones and in industry, it is fairly common to propose a "median" scenario and also a "pessimistic" scenario, and provide estimates for these cases. The point is usually that since even the pessimistic scenario looks good, the analysis shows that the proposed intervention is robustly beneficial. This has a two-fold problem:
First, usually the reason to think that the "pessimistic" scenario is 'pessimistic is just that it uses parameter values that reduce the estimated benefit below the "median" scenario. It's unclear sometimes why that means the estimate is robustly lower than the actual benefit. This is the in-model robustness.
Despite the fact that I think this is an issue, sometimes it may be perceived as (or actually be) a somewhat unfair critique. All models are wrong, we have to use what we have to make estimates. This can result in polarized views of what an estimate shows. For a person who likes the intervention and has a gut feeling it is good, the "median" estimate makes a ton of sense and this seems like a very reasonable approach. For a skeptic, it seems prone to over-estimation for the reasons you highlight in the post. Moving the parameters so that your estimate is 25% lower doesn't turn garbage into non-garbage.
However, there is another source of error lurking in the background. What about costs that you haven't included? The potential for the intervention to backfire that isn't considered in any scenario? The hidden assumption that hasn't been tested in the "pessimistic" scenario? This is out-of-model robustness.
I think the polarization when it comes to in-model robustness causes proponents or fans of an idea or intervention to over-estimate robustness even when in-model robustness is high, because they implicitly credit the (perceived) in-model robustness to the out-of-model robustness.
In my view, the whole "rule high stakes in, not out" idea in practice will result in systematically doing this a lot, which I think makes it a bad heuristic for approaching these types of situations. One way to think about this is it encourages us to focus on specific high-volatility "assets" and thus lacks diversification.
It isn't sufficient in my view merely that a positive EV action exists, you also need to be able to identity at least one such action, or else you are in the situation where longtermism is only theoretical and doesn't actually recommend certain actions. This makes the difficulty of modeling the future more of an issue that your post suggests because in realistic situations you need to estimate these EVs, you don't just know them.
The relevant uncertainty is in the estimated EV of a specific actions or intervention, it isn't sufficient for your argument merely to know that positive EV actions exists, or even that one is in some class of interventions (like those that plausibly reduce extinction risk), for longtermism to suggest a specific action is good. It requires considering the EV of that specific action, estimation error included. The difficulty of performing that estimation is therefore a difficulty for longtermism.
I think this needs additional assumptions to make it go through in realistic situations. There is a bit of an errors-in-variables problem. I think as stated, the argument only works if we assume actual knowledge of expected values, but in realistic situations these would need to be estimated. For reasons similar to what is discussed here and here, I think you can have a situation where there are actions that have positive EV on the future, but your estimation + intervention selection process can't reliably identify them, and integrating out this estimation/selection based uncertainty can change the overall dynamic. Basically, your expected outcome isn't the population expected value of a given action, the expected value you realize needs to take into account estimation/selection.
This doesn't mean that there aren't positive EV estimation/selection procedures, just that the existence of positive EV actions isn't sufficient for the arugment to go through.
Thanks for your kind words.
On the bad faith/"truth seeking" point, I've also noted some issues in the way "truth seeking" is used in a previous post, and thinking about this case gave me an idea. It seems like there is a general phenomenon in EA/rationalist discourse where intent gets obscured or ignored somehow. Perhaps not surprising for intellectual communities that are very into consequentialism?
I think the effect of using the "truth seeking" terminology is to confuse multiple possibilities around intent:
Lying: intentional
Insufficient rigor/evidence/etc.: can be an unintentional mistake
Callousness about the truth: I think people often feel like even if someone isn't lying, they can demonstrate a disregard for truth that feels like its intentionally misleading
Being "insufficiently truth seeking" could refer to any of these, and thus using the phrase fails my principle of clarity. It also becomes strongly subject to motivate reasoning or motte/bailey dynamics because the meaning can shift among these different meanings.
I feel like something similar has happened here with the whole "hard to dispell misunderstandings" thing. Tskeen laterally, it doesn't make a whole lot of sense to soft ban someone for this. Is the implicict message that only easy to dispell misunderstandings are allowed? Surely not. But it makes more sense if you imagine its implicitly standing in for a spectrum of actions based on intention:
Bad faith: intentionally obscuring your real views, often with the goal of making them harder to respond to.
Genuine mistake: unintentional, even of hard to dispell
Game playing: being coy or cagey about what your views really are or in some way deliberately making your position confusing or hard to respond to.
The last one I think is kind of what Said was being accused of in the post referenced above? But IMO its extremely clear that you haven't been doing anything intentionally misleading. I think this is an instance of concerns about "epistemics" being used in an unproductive way that creates a lack of clarity around intent.
Here are some random thoughts on the topic.
Moderators have a hard job, I think it can't be entirely on moderation to drive the culture of a website. A lot of the work has to be on the users. Starting with moderation issues though, I have a couple ideas:
Clarity: I think moderation benefits from simplicity and clarity. It isn't a good sign when you are taking mod action against someone but can't really explain why because its too difficult or would take too long. I feel like that indicates that the underlying rules/principles aren't really clear or simple enough. It is hard for people to adapt to comply with complicated and unclear rules and the road to motivated reasoning is also paved in vague principles that are easily applied differently to different stituations.
Proportionality: This one goes in both directions. I think sometimes it would be better for mods to step in early but with a lighter touch, something like "this seems to be getting a bit heated/unproductive, friendly reminder to everyone to keep it civil". An ounce of prevention and all that.
For what users can do:
Stick to the topic/don't go meta: Stay grounded in the discussion, try not to import assumptions based on previous arguments with people vaguely on the same "side" as who you are talking to, focus on their arguments. Try to make the discussion more specific rather than more general. Try not to take your argument in a meta direction, don't talk about what arguments are good in the abstract or focus too much on claiming that the other person's arguments are an example of a general phenonemon, try to respond to their claims specifically.
Try to stay calm: It is common that people feel a bit uncomfortable when faced with strong disagreements, including that the person they are talking to is being unfair or mean in some way. The problem is that if both people go along with this feeling it often leads to a bad place. If one person temporarily lapses into a less friendly tonw but the other person stays calm, sometimes the conversation is salvagable. Try to be that calm person sometimes in hopes that when you are the one who isn't calm, the person who you are talking to can cover for you a little.
You never have an obligation to respond: I think some of the stress in arguing online comes from a feeling of being trapped, like you will be judged if the person you are talking to gets the last word. We should try to cultivate a culture where it is okay to respond within your own time limitations. If you get the sense the person you are talking to is feeling tapped out, you can openly raise this issue or try to take the peddle off the gas a little.
An idea
I will also take this chance to float an idea I've been thinking about recently. I've been calling this "epistolary debates" in my head. The idea is inspired by legal briefs in courts, where the parties submit sequences of written statements that respond to each other.
I think this format, where the "debaters" write longer form content over an extended period of time would be an improvement in a lot of ways. I imagine this as follows:
I think a benefit of this format is that extending the time over which the discussion occurs cuts down on stress and helps people set aside snarkier bits that feel right in the moment but aren't a good idea on further reflection. It also lets people work a little more on explaining their views more fully and clearly, and potentially cuts down on the conversation wondering off from the main topic.
ETA: I also agree with your last paragraph that for the specific case of people interested in AI safety/related issue, it is very important to have openness to discussing the topic in a way that isn't dismissive and takes seriously engages with the arguments, even if you sometimes feel frustrated with how these conversations play out.
Thanks!
Yeah, I'm trying to maintain openness to different possibilities on the time issue to an extent since I don't really know what happened. If I had to venture a guess (which could obviously be wrong), I'd say something like this:
Other forum users who got frustrated with your posts/comments reach out to the mod team privately, mod team has extended discussions amongst themselves, decides on the soft ban, and then reaches out to you to tell you. If this is what happened, I can imagine that it did take a reasonable amount of time and also its understandable that the mod team would want to incorporate feedback from users, but I would say this is a mistake on the part of the mod team if that's what happened. If you're talking here about the value of being able to reach out privately, wouldn't this be the time to do that, before going to the soft ban? If you're not making the decision lightly and discussing a lot and writing google docs, couldn't you copy some examples of problematic comments or posts from these documents fairly easily?
I think a prcess where there is a lot of back channelling has a siginificant risk of filter bubble/echo chamber issues as you mention, similar to what Habryka calls the "linkedin attractor" in the post linked above.
I'm generally of the belief that people should work on hashing out their own disagreements more rather than escalating to meta/moderation issues. Taking moderation actions because someone writes a lot of "hard to dispel misunderstandings" seems like it is extremely likely to be filtered through the lens of what a mod already agrees/disagrees with, and so is likely to be unevenly applied against critics.
Although I think you and I would have several disagreements on the AI topic, I will put my vote in, to the extent anyone cares, that a ban was not justified in this case. There are things you've written that annoy me or that I'd have said differently, but in general I don't think these are anywhere close to warranting a ban (or frankly the level of downvotes some of your comments have gotten). I also think in several discussions you've been involved in that went unproductively, the people you were responding to or who responded to you are at least equally to blame and sometimes have behaved worse, including clearly uncivil behave (e.g. clearly intentionally insulting phrasing, unreasonable accusations of bad faith etc.).
I feel like the issue addressed in the Said Saga is somewhat the opposite of what it seems like Yarrow does. A paradigmatic example of the bad bahavior attributed to Said was posting extremely short comments, such as just saying "examples?". Its obviously extremely easy to type a one word comment, and the possibility of adding additional examples of something a poster describes isn't exactly a deep insight. The asymetry is that it is very easy for Said to post a comment like that but would take a lot of effort for the original poster to respond providing examples, giving rise to the complaint that Said wasn't willing to put in equal effort.
This doesn't seem to be true at all of Yarrow, and producing a large quantity of words on the forum seems like it is actually contrary to the type of behavior that Said was alleged to have engaged in. Part of the issue is that lots of Said's comments were super brief! Yarrow also seems to write plenty of top level posts and many of their comments are on their own posts, again this is the exact opposite of part of the issue identified with Said, where a critical part of thbe asymetry is about the dynamic of commenting vs posting.
Yarrow also doesn't seem to do the "just asking questions" style that Habryka claims to identify in Said's comments, which I think is also a big part of why karma might not be sufficient. People may be hesitant to downvote comments on a post that are just a question, thus creating a possibility of negative behavior that systematically evades the karma system. But Yarrow seems to be pretty open in their criticism and often writes extended comments (not just one or two sentence questions), and you identify that the issue seems to be present in many of their downvoted comments. Why is the karma system not sufficient in that case? If the concern is posters feeling the need to respond to comments, I think that is mitigated strongly when those comments are downvoted.
In general, it seems like Yarrow actually does many of the things that supposedly would have improved Said's commenting, and the issues is essentially the opposite (writing too much rather than too little).
In both cases it seems like lots of moderator effort was devoted towards a specific user, which I definitely think is a reasonable thing for moderators to react too. At a certain point moderators can't just be expending infinite time and effort just devoted to stuff that is going on with one user.
At the same time, it does seem to me that there is another asymetry present here, where the voting/moderator attention/banning etc. is being deployed more harshly towards someone who is a critic/disagrees with popular ideas in the community vs people who express popular ideas or aren't critical. I think reviewing the context of Yarrow's posts/comments and the reactions/responses to them on the forum strongly suggests this. There are definitely times when Yarrow reacts in ways that I don't see as ideal and which I can understand people having issues with, but many times this is in response to other forum users also behaving questionably, often in a more egregiously than Yarrow. It seems likely to me that Yarrow being critical of popular ideas in the community is an important factor in the different responses.
Why I care
I feel like I semi-frequently find myself defending people who I probably have significant disagreements with (such as in this case with Yarrow) on here/lesswrong because it seems like there is a tendency within the EA/rationality community to make convoluted meta-arguments for why critics are doing something bad/"insuffciently truthseeking"/"burning the commons"-y and I think this is bad and not productive. These communities are indeed much more open to criticism than a lot of online communities (where disagreeing with popular ideas with just get you instantly insulted and/or banned), but I still think a more sophisticated defense mechanism against critics is alive and well.
I'm particularly interested/concerned about this because I believe that we will need pretty substantial policy actions on AI, and that this will likely require convincing people who have very different worldviews of certain things about AI. I view conversations on places like the EA forum or lesswrong as good testing grounds for how this might go, but in a place where it should be substanially easier than it would be in the policy arena. In my mind, if people are struggling to have conversations about AI with Yarrow (who is likely going to be more pleasant to discuss this issue with than 90% of people who don't already agree), I don't think that is a good sign for how this community is approaching that challenge of getting a diverse coalition on-side on the AI issue.
(crossposting my comment from lesswrong)
I'm somewhat confused by what people mean by "strategic" in these discussions. It seems to me like there are aspects of communication that I would call "stategic" but are uncontroversial. I would suggest the "grown not crafted" idea from IABIED. I think this is a extremely succinct and effective way to communicate the underlying technical idea, but of course expressing the idea in more technical language would also be truthful (arguably even more so). The difference isn't that the "grown not crafted" way of communicating the idea is more truthful, but (I would infer) that it is predicted ot be more helpful in allowing others to understand the idea, even if they aren't already famiiar with relevant technical knowledge. In other words, it is a more strategic way of communicating the idea.
I don't think that example is particularly controversial, but I think these discussions are meant to also apply to statements that are highly contentious and subject to adversarial dynamics. When we consider statements that are more in those domains, I think we enter a kind of "messy middle" where the truthfulness of a statement is much more contested and it isn't necessarily as easy to seperate the core content from the communication strategy.
Let's take the "DEFUND THE POLICE" example from the post. I definitely believe that some people engage in the "window-stretching" as you describe. But I could also imagine proponents of the slogan saying something like this:
"I genuinely believe that current policing practices are so unjust that the police deserve to be defunded. It would be better for policing to be reformed to correct these injustices while still carrying out legitimate policing functions. But saying I want to "defund the police" is genuinely true under the current system. If I only advocated for more centrist reforms that would actually be misleading about what I believe and trying to fit my beliefs into the overton window, not the other way around. Its extremely important to use slogans like "DEFUND THE POLICE" when you actually believe in them because the powerful simply ignore centrist calls for reform. They need to know how strongly we actually feel about this. Calling for measures such as defunding is the only way to have our voices heard".
I think such a view lives in this messy middle. People who agree are likely to see it as genuine while critics will be tempted to claim inappropriate use of stategy. The issue of whether the person who holds this view is being "truthful" essentially collapses back into the underlying object-level issues. Those who agree on the object-level will also agree of the meta question of whether what the person is doing is acceptable, and the reverse for someone who disagrees.
As I allude to here I think the best approach is to simply argue over the object-level question, and leave aiside the dicussions about whether someone is being stategic, how truth-seeking they are, if they are "gaslighting" etc.
Good post. I have two general themes I'd like to comment on:
Analogies for cause prioritization
Your analysis covers several perspectives on this phenomenon, if we focus on the "actual performance" perspective, this is pretty similar to multi-armed bandits. One pattern that I think is present in strategies for these types of problems is the idea of spreading out actions across the different possibilities (explore vs exploit and all that). It wouldn't necessarily make sense to commit to one "arm" (or cause) early on when information is low. This "spreading out" across options is one way of dealing with uncertainty.
A similar idea comes up in another potential anology for cause prioritization, financial investing. We can think about optimizing a portfolio and its allocation to achieve good returns relative to risk, rather than trying to pick the single highest return asset. Thus we get concepts like disversification.
I find this stock-picking analogy helpful for thinking about how "neglectedness" is often treated in practice. I've often found myself skeptical of arguments for and from neglectedness, and I feel the way it is applied in practice doesn't really align with the classic "diminishing returns" conception. I think the way neglectedness is treated in practice ends up being more like how an investor with a high risk tolerance might view a risky asset. Riskier assets are expected to have higher returns, investors with lower risk tolerance would staturate low-risk/high-return options quickly, leaving risker investments "neglected". Thus an investor with high risk tolerance can find good opportunities that would be unappealing to other less risk tolerant investors by going to higher risk assets. I think this captures the spirit of what "neglected" cause areas have often looked like in EA, more speculative but where some EAs have a strong feeling that they caould have outsized impact.
If I can read between the lines a bit, under this anology EA pivoting more into AI is kind of like an investor who wants higher returns putting more of their portfolio in small cap growth stocks that are risker but which the investor thinks will result in higher return. One downside of this is decreased diversification. Another possible option would be to hold a more diversified portfolio but use leverage.
In-model vs Out-of-model robustness
I think this gets at a distinction that is worth calling out, in-model vs out-of-model robustness.
In my experience with cost-benefit analysis, both reading EA related ones and in industry, it is fairly common to propose a "median" scenario and also a "pessimistic" scenario, and provide estimates for these cases. The point is usually that since even the pessimistic scenario looks good, the analysis shows that the proposed intervention is robustly beneficial. This has a two-fold problem:
First, usually the reason to think that the "pessimistic" scenario is 'pessimistic is just that it uses parameter values that reduce the estimated benefit below the "median" scenario. It's unclear sometimes why that means the estimate is robustly lower than the actual benefit. This is the in-model robustness.
Despite the fact that I think this is an issue, sometimes it may be perceived as (or actually be) a somewhat unfair critique. All models are wrong, we have to use what we have to make estimates. This can result in polarized views of what an estimate shows. For a person who likes the intervention and has a gut feeling it is good, the "median" estimate makes a ton of sense and this seems like a very reasonable approach. For a skeptic, it seems prone to over-estimation for the reasons you highlight in the post. Moving the parameters so that your estimate is 25% lower doesn't turn garbage into non-garbage.
However, there is another source of error lurking in the background. What about costs that you haven't included? The potential for the intervention to backfire that isn't considered in any scenario? The hidden assumption that hasn't been tested in the "pessimistic" scenario? This is out-of-model robustness.
I think the polarization when it comes to in-model robustness causes proponents or fans of an idea or intervention to over-estimate robustness even when in-model robustness is high, because they implicitly credit the (perceived) in-model robustness to the out-of-model robustness.
In my view, the whole "rule high stakes in, not out" idea in practice will result in systematically doing this a lot, which I think makes it a bad heuristic for approaching these types of situations. One way to think about this is it encourages us to focus on specific high-volatility "assets" and thus lacks diversification.