I haven't read most of GPI's stuff on defining longtermism, but here are my thoughts. I think (2) is close to what I'd want for a definition of very strong longtermism - "the view on which long-run outcomes are of overwhelming importance"
I think we should be able to model longtermism using a simpler model than yours. Suppose you're taking a one-off action , and then you get (discounted) reward Then I'd say very strong longtermism is true iff the impact of each decisions depends overwhelmingly on their long-term impact.
where is some large number.
You could stipulate that the discounted utility of the distant future has to be within a factor , where . If you preferred, you could talk about the differences between utilities for all pairs of decisions, rather than the utility of each individual decision. Or small deviations from optimal. Or you could consider sequential decision-making, assuming that later decisions are made optimally. Or you assumed a distribution over D (e.g. the distribution of actual human decisions), and talk about the amount of variance in total utility explained by their long-term impact. But these are philosophical details - overall, we should land somewhere near your (2).
It's not super clear to me that we want to formalise longtermism - "the ethical view that is particularly concerned with ensuring long-run outcomes go well". If we did, it might say that sometimes is big, or that it can sometimes outweigh other considerations.
Your (1) is interesting, but it doesn't seem like a definition of longtermism. I'd call it something like safety investment is optimal, because it pertains to practical concerns about how to attain long-term utility.
Rather, I think it'd be more interesting to try to prove that follows from longtermism, given certain model assumptions (such as yours). To see what I have in mind, we could elaborate my setup. Setup: let the decision space be , where represents the fraction of resources you invest in the long-term. Each is an increasing function of and each is a decreasing function of . Then we could have a conjecture: Conjecture: if strong longtermism is true (for some and ), then the optimal action will be (or , some function of ). Proof: since we assume that only long-term impact matters, then the action with the best longterm impact is best overall.
Perhaps a weaker version could be proved in an economic model.
Do you have any notion as to the solution to this model (for some reasonable parameter values)? I've tried to solve models like this one and haven't succeeded, although I'm not good at differential equations.
It looks to me like it's unsolvable without some nonzero exogenous extinction risk, because otherwise there will be multiple parameter choices that result in infinite utility, so you can't say which one is best. But it's not clear what rate of exogenous x-risk to use, and our distribution over possible values might still result in infinite utility in expectation.
Perhaps you could simplify the model by leaving out the concept of improving technology, and just say you can either spend on safety, spend on consumption, or invest to grow your capital. That might make the model easier to solve, and I don't think it loses much explanatory power. (It would still have the infinity problem.)
Christian Tarsney has done a sensitivity analysis for the parameters in such a model in The Epistemic Challenge to Longtermism for GPI.
There's also the possibility that the space we would otherwise occupy if we didn't go extinct will become occupied by sentient individuals anyway, e.g. life reevolves, or aliens. These are examples of what Tarsney calls positive exogenous nullifying events, with extinction being a typical negative exogenous nullifying event.
There's also the heat death of the universe, although it's only a conjecture.
There are some approaches to infinite ethics that might allow you to rank some different infinite outcomes, although not necessarily all of them. See the overtaking criterion. These might make assumptions about order of summation, though, which is perhaps undesirable for an impartial consequentialist, and without such assumptions, conditionally convergent series can be made to sum to anything or diverge just by reordering them, which is not so nice.
My model here is riffing on Jones (2016); you might look there for solving the model.
Re infinite utility, Jones does say (fn 6): "As usual, ρ must be sufficiently large given growth so that utility is finite."