@EoL Competition
Emma J. Curran’s Longtermism and the Complaints of Future People confront one of the deepest fractures in moral philosophy: whether future people can have moral status comparable to those alive today. The essay zeroes in on the conflict between consequentialist reasoning, which gives longtermism its force, and contractualist critiques, which resist grounding obligations in the claims of individuals who do not yet exist. This clash is more than theoretical—it touches on moral intuition, political legitimacy, and the foundations of ethical responsibility itself.
Aggregation and the Strength of Longtermism
Longtermism derives much of its appeal from aggregationist reasoning. Consequentialist frameworks, such as utilitarianism, treat all lives—present and future—as equally valuable. On this view, humanity’s greatest moral duty lies in shaping the far future: reducing existential risks, safeguarding civilization, and enabling trillions of potential lives. Even small improvements in reducing risks or promoting flourishing seem to carry astronomical weight when aggregated across countless future generations. This is why longtermism often argues for prioritizing existential risk reduction above other causes.
The Contractualist Critique
Curran challenges this foundation by applying contractualist ethics, which emphasizes fairness, integrity, and justification to existing individuals rather than hypothetical future ones. From this perspective, it is problematic to sacrifice the rights or well-being of present people for the sake of individuals who do not yet exist and cannot demand reasons from us. Contractualism resists the sweeping aggregations that drive longtermist urgency, asking instead what can be justified to those alive now. This reorientation sharply limits longtermism’s boldest claims, potentially shifting focus away from speculative future risks and toward immediate distributive justice.
The Non-Identity Problem and Moral Standing
At the heart of this debate lies the non-identity problem. Future people’s identities depend on present choices—policies on climate, reproduction, or technology determine not only the conditions of their lives but whether they exist at all. This makes it difficult to claim that any specific future individual has been wronged. Non-aggregationist theories, such as contractualism and rights-based ethics, struggle here: if future people cannot claim rights, demand reasons, or participate in justification, can they meaningfully have moral standing today? Critics argue that projecting rights forward risks stretching moral reasoning into incoherence, while ignoring future people altogether seems morally arbitrary.
Practical and Policy Implications
Curran’s critique has real stakes for policy. If contractualism holds, longtermism narrows in scope. Existential risk reduction would still matter, but mainly insofar as it protects the survival of present and near-term generations. Redistribution of resources would favor alleviating poverty, inequality, and injustice today, since diverting them toward distant futures cannot be justified to current claimants. Political legitimacy, too, would shift: democratic representation rests on consent, and future people cannot participate in that process. Activism would therefore gain stronger moral authority when tied to present marginalized groups rather than hypothetical future populations. This reframing challenges longtermism’s most radical prescriptions while reinforcing fairness, rights, and legitimacy in policymaking.
Philosophical Discomfort and Intuitive Resistance
Despite these arguments, many ethicists remain deeply uncomfortable with denying future people moral status. Intuitively, it feels wrong to worsen climate change or recklessly develop dangerous technologies when these choices will harm future generations. Dismissing the moral significance of such harms fosters a short-sighted, present-oriented ethic that weakens stewardship and intergenerational responsibility. At the same time, granting moral standing to non-existent individuals pushes moral theory toward incoherence. This tension generates one of the most contentious debates in longtermist ethics, where reason and intuition pull in opposite directions.
The Clash of Moral Theories
The debate thus crystallizes into a clash between consequentialism and contractualism. Consequentialists argue that excluding future lives is arbitrary and undermines rational planning. Contractualists counter that including those compromises fairness and integrity by extending moral reasoning beyond the scope of identifiable claimants. Each position carries radical implications: if contractualism prevails, longtermism loses its transformative urgency; if consequentialism prevails, we inherit obligations to prioritize the future on a scale many find politically and morally demanding.
Conclusion
Curran’s essay exposes the fractures at the heart of longtermism. It shows how the moral status of future people is not a peripheral concern but a decisive battleground for the movement’s legitimacy. The tension between aggregationist and contractualist reasoning reveals both the radical promise and the fragility of longtermist ethics. Denying future people moral standing feels morally inadequate; granting it risks theoretical incoherence. The debate is unlikely to resolve cleanly, but its persistence underscores the enduring importance of future generations in ethical reasoning and the urgent need to reconcile moral theory with our intuitive sense of intergenerational responsibility.
