I think this would be a really good idea. As you hint at, it could allow people to better calibrate re the importance/significance of evidence, which is weaker than in the case of human adults. I also expect a model that gives more plausible results for newborns/infants to also give more plausible results for chickens.

Perfect! 

It's more or less similar. I do not focus that much on the moral dubiousness of "happy servants". Instead, I try to show that standard alignment methods or preventing near-future AIs with moral patienthood from taking actions they are trying to take, causes net harm to the AIs according to desire satisfactionism, hedonism and objective list theories.

Yes I saw this, thanks!

It's great to see this topic being discussed. I am currently writing the first (albeit significantly developed) draft of an academic paper on this. I argue that there is a conflict between AI safety and AI welfare concerns. This is so basically because (to reduce catastrophic risk) AI safety recommends implementing various kinds of control measures to near-future AI systems which are (in expectation) net-harmful for AI systems with moral patienthood according to the three major theories of well-being. I also discuss what we should do in light of this conflict. If anyone is interested in reading or giving comments on the draft when it is finished, send me a message or an e-mail ([email protected]).

Thanks for this! I would be curious to know what you think about the tension there seems to be between allocating resources to Global health & development (or even prioritizing it over Animal Welfare) and rejecting speciesism given The Meat eater problem.

Thank you Seb!

Thank you for writing this!