1. Bentham's Bulldog's post ascribes some consequences to moral anti-realism, but does not give an argument to show why they follow, and there appears to be no such implication. There are plenty of versions of anti-realism. Also, there is a conflation of moral anti-realism and rationality anti-realism, which are not the same. That said, I agree that moral realism is true - at least, if properly defined; the definition in the OP is open to different interpretation about what counts as "thinks about it".
2. Moral realism says nothing about whether it is wrong to hit a baby with great force with a hammer, for example. Moral realism takes no stance on the matter. In fact, I would say that that depends of course on the circumstances: If Alice hits the baby with great force with a hammer in order to kill him instantly and save him from a far worse experience that Alice knows awaits him if she does not do it (e.g., being slowly dissolved alive in acid until death, suffering the excruciating pain that goes with it, etc.), that would not be wrong.
I will point out that moral realism does not preclude that whether an action is morally wrong - and how wrong it is - depends on facts about the mind of the agent, in particular the intent of the agent and perhaps the information available to them, knowledge, etc.
For example, reading the arguments in Street's papers (see for example, "Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Rethink It", or the reply to Copp), one can say that any version of moral realism that is not committed to the claim that immoral behavior is necessarily irrational, is not targeted (it is not even considered a form of realism by Street, but it is by the definition in the other thread, at least as I think is property interpreted).
In my assessment, there are morally wrong behaviors, and whether a behavior is immoral is a matter of fact, but while immoral (i.e., morally wrong, unethical, etc.; those are synonyms) behavior is nearly always irrational, it is not always so (probably not even in the actual world). The DD isn't even targeting any view with those properties
I have in mind any form of moral realism that just meets the definition, but it is not a form of what Street calls "realism about normativity" - e.g., see her paper "REPLY TO COPP: NATURALISM, NORMATIVITY, AND THE VARIETIES OF REALISM WORTH WORRYING ABOUT" (I do not agree with calling that "realism about normativity", but that is another matter)-
But the paper in question does outline a distinction clearly enough for this context I hope; in particular, she says "I have concluded that Copp’s view is not normative realist in the sense targeted by the Darwinian Dilemma.". Now, I do not think Copp's view is correct, either, but the point is that there are kinds of realism not targeted by the Darwinian Dilemma (DD). Granted, Street goes on to say that the kinds of realism not targeted fail to "vindicate moral requirements as objectively binding." I would say that while I do not think 'objectively binding' is the right term (as in somehow suggests that not having that is a failure of some sort), what she describes as 'objectively binding' seems to be non-existent - but that is still not a problem for moral realism as defined above (and in the other thread).
Now, Street correctly points out that many leading moral realist philosophers do defend a kind of realism that the DD targets, and I would agree that that form does not exist. But I do not think this is a problem for realism, again in the sense described above, which I think is also the sense that is defined in the other thread (though as I mentioned, there is some ambiguity in the definition therein).
I would say that moral realism is true, but it is of a kind that is vastly different from what realist philosophers usually posit (and not my idea, but I got it from a wiser person).
But to avoid some difficulties, I think we need to be more clear about what moral realism is. Let us consider the definition in the other thread (in support of moral realism):
"So, in short, moral realism is the idea that there are things that you should or shouldn’t do and that this fact doesn’t depend on what anyone thinks about them."
That is somewhat ambiguous, but I would go with the following sufficient conditions:
1. There are morally wrong behaviors.
2. Whether a (specific) behavior is morally wrong is a matter of fact, not of opinion, in the colloquial sense of the words. Alternatively, given a certain (specific) behavior, there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether it is morally wrong - just as there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether, say, the intention by the agent who carries out the behavior in question was to, say, eat an apple.
If the above is not clear enough, the following is an example: If agent A says 'Doing X is morally wrong', and agent B says 'Doing X is not morally wrong', and both A and B mean the exactly same by 'X', then they cannot both be correct. This would have to happen generally at least for moral statements, and some of the statements of the form 'Doing X is morally wrong' would have to be correct (this is not necessary for realism, because language - and then statements - are not necessary, either; but I hope the example gives the right idea).
In this context, what Street means by 'moral realism' seems to have a lot more ontological baggage attached to it. So, for example, I believe moral realism is true, but what Street defines as 'moral realism' is not true. And moral realism - as defined above - is not even targeted by evolutionary debunking arguments - for example.
Also, for moral realism to be true, there is no need for other intelligent species to have moral language, follow moral norms, or care about morality at all. Of course, evolution would probably result in smart aliens' not having moral language, etc., though if they are social animals they might have a more or less similar analogue.
I would also like to challenge what appears to be an implication that evolution leads to all moral beliefs being "geared towards survival" as in "believing having many kids is obligatory.", or a lack of belief in transitivity, etc. In the OP, that is said to be a consequence of anti-realism, but it seems to be written as a consequence of evolution by the mechanisms studied by science - i.e., not including a guiding will, or force, or creator, etc.
That is not what evolution would lead to. For example, consider monkeys or apes, say capuchins. They have species-wide rules (and some that are common to other species too, but that aside), and a motivation for punishing rule-breakers (I'd say morality, but let's leave that aside). But they do not have a rule 'have many monkey kids'. Sure, they do not know the connection between sex and reproduction, so it would be hard to enforce. But capuchins do not have a rule 'have a lot of sex', either. No, what was conducive to reproductive success was to punish those who behave in certain manners. And of course, it was not conducive to punish monkeys who did not have a lot of sex. And then, feelings of avoidance of rule-breaking - like guilt - were also conducive to reproductive success. And so on. The point is that rules do not need to involve a direct connection to reproductive success.
As for belief in transitivity, or things like that, that is a belief that requires theoretical thinking about morality. What evolution gave us is morality on the one hand, and the ability for high-order thinking on the other hand. Applying the latter to the former we can get beliefs not connected to reproductive success, at least not in any obvious manner.
A couple of side points:
1. Bentham's Bulldog's post ascribes some consequences to moral anti-realism, but does not give an argument to show why they follow, and there appears to be no such implication. There are plenty of versions of anti-realism. Also, there is a conflation of moral anti-realism and rationality anti-realism, which are not the same. That said, I agree that moral realism is true - at least, if properly defined; the definition in the OP is open to different interpretation about what counts as "thinks about it".
2. Moral realism says nothing about whether it is wrong to hit a baby with great force with a hammer, for example. Moral realism takes no stance on the matter. In fact, I would say that that depends of course on the circumstances: If Alice hits the baby with great force with a hammer in order to kill him instantly and save him from a far worse experience that Alice knows awaits him if she does not do it (e.g., being slowly dissolved alive in acid until death, suffering the excruciating pain that goes with it, etc.), that would not be wrong.
I will point out that moral realism does not preclude that whether an action is morally wrong - and how wrong it is - depends on facts about the mind of the agent, in particular the intent of the agent and perhaps the information available to them, knowledge, etc.
For example, reading the arguments in Street's papers (see for example, "Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Rethink It", or the reply to Copp), one can say that any version of moral realism that is not committed to the claim that immoral behavior is necessarily irrational, is not targeted (it is not even considered a form of realism by Street, but it is by the definition in the other thread, at least as I think is property interpreted).
In my assessment, there are morally wrong behaviors, and whether a behavior is immoral is a matter of fact, but while immoral (i.e., morally wrong, unethical, etc.; those are synonyms) behavior is nearly always irrational, it is not always so (probably not even in the actual world). The DD isn't even targeting any view with those properties
I have in mind any form of moral realism that just meets the definition, but it is not a form of what Street calls "realism about normativity" - e.g., see her paper "REPLY TO COPP: NATURALISM, NORMATIVITY, AND THE VARIETIES OF REALISM WORTH WORRYING ABOUT" (I do not agree with calling that "realism about normativity", but that is another matter)-
But the paper in question does outline a distinction clearly enough for this context I hope; in particular, she says "I have concluded that Copp’s view is not normative realist in the sense targeted by the Darwinian Dilemma.". Now, I do not think Copp's view is correct, either, but the point is that there are kinds of realism not targeted by the Darwinian Dilemma (DD). Granted, Street goes on to say that the kinds of realism not targeted fail to "vindicate moral requirements as objectively binding." I would say that while I do not think 'objectively binding' is the right term (as in somehow suggests that not having that is a failure of some sort), what she describes as 'objectively binding' seems to be non-existent - but that is still not a problem for moral realism as defined above (and in the other thread).
Now, Street correctly points out that many leading moral realist philosophers do defend a kind of realism that the DD targets, and I would agree that that form does not exist. But I do not think this is a problem for realism, again in the sense described above, which I think is also the sense that is defined in the other thread (though as I mentioned, there is some ambiguity in the definition therein).
I would say that moral realism is true, but it is of a kind that is vastly different from what realist philosophers usually posit (and not my idea, but I got it from a wiser person).
But to avoid some difficulties, I think we need to be more clear about what moral realism is. Let us consider the definition in the other thread (in support of moral realism):
"So, in short, moral realism is the idea that there are things that you should or shouldn’t do and that this fact doesn’t depend on what anyone thinks about them."
That is somewhat ambiguous, but I would go with the following sufficient conditions:
1. There are morally wrong behaviors.
2. Whether a (specific) behavior is morally wrong is a matter of fact, not of opinion, in the colloquial sense of the words. Alternatively, given a certain (specific) behavior, there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether it is morally wrong - just as there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether, say, the intention by the agent who carries out the behavior in question was to, say, eat an apple.
If the above is not clear enough, the following is an example: If agent A says 'Doing X is morally wrong', and agent B says 'Doing X is not morally wrong', and both A and B mean the exactly same by 'X', then they cannot both be correct. This would have to happen generally at least for moral statements, and some of the statements of the form 'Doing X is morally wrong' would have to be correct (this is not necessary for realism, because language - and then statements - are not necessary, either; but I hope the example gives the right idea).
In this context, what Street means by 'moral realism' seems to have a lot more ontological baggage attached to it. So, for example, I believe moral realism is true, but what Street defines as 'moral realism' is not true. And moral realism - as defined above - is not even targeted by evolutionary debunking arguments - for example.
Also, for moral realism to be true, there is no need for other intelligent species to have moral language, follow moral norms, or care about morality at all. Of course, evolution would probably result in smart aliens' not having moral language, etc., though if they are social animals they might have a more or less similar analogue.
I would also like to challenge what appears to be an implication that evolution leads to all moral beliefs being "geared towards survival" as in "believing having many kids is obligatory.", or a lack of belief in transitivity, etc. In the OP, that is said to be a consequence of anti-realism, but it seems to be written as a consequence of evolution by the mechanisms studied by science - i.e., not including a guiding will, or force, or creator, etc.
That is not what evolution would lead to. For example, consider monkeys or apes, say capuchins. They have species-wide rules (and some that are common to other species too, but that aside), and a motivation for punishing rule-breakers (I'd say morality, but let's leave that aside). But they do not have a rule 'have many monkey kids'. Sure, they do not know the connection between sex and reproduction, so it would be hard to enforce. But capuchins do not have a rule 'have a lot of sex', either. No, what was conducive to reproductive success was to punish those who behave in certain manners. And of course, it was not conducive to punish monkeys who did not have a lot of sex. And then, feelings of avoidance of rule-breaking - like guilt - were also conducive to reproductive success. And so on.
The point is that rules do not need to involve a direct connection to reproductive success.
As for belief in transitivity, or things like that, that is a belief that requires theoretical thinking about morality. What evolution gave us is morality on the one hand, and the ability for high-order thinking on the other hand. Applying the latter to the former we can get beliefs not connected to reproductive success, at least not in any obvious manner.