Anecdotally, the EA forum skews [...] more Bay Area.
For what it's worth, this is not my impression at all. Bay Area EAs (e.g. me) mostly consider the EA Forum to be very unrepresentative of their perspective, to the extent that it's very rarely worthwhile to post here (which is why they often post on LessWrong instead).
This is not an obscure topic. It's been written about endlessly! I do not want to encourage people to make top-level posts asking questions before Googling or talking to AIs, especially on this topic.
I like Claude's response a lot more than you do. I'm not sure why. I agree that it's a lot less informative than your response.
(The post including "This demographic has historically been disconnected from social impact" made me much less inclined to want this person to stick around.)
I'm glad to hear you are inspired by EA's utilitarian approach to maximizing social impact; I too am inspired by it and I have very much appreciated being involved with EA for the last decade.
I think you should probably ask questions as basic as this to AIs before asking people to talk to you about them. Here's what Claude responded with.
The observation about EA's demographic skew is accurate and widely acknowledged within the community. A few points worth making:
On the historical pattern: The claim that white, male, tech-focused demographics are "historically disconnected from social impact" isn't quite right - these demographics have been heavily involved in philanthropy and social reform movements throughout history (from industrialist philanthropy to the civil rights movement's diverse coalition). But the observation that EA specifically has a particular demographic concentration is valid.
Why this pattern exists: Several factors likely contribute:
- EA grew out of academic philosophy and rationalist communities that had their own demographic patterns
- The movement's early focus areas (AI safety, global poverty, animal welfare) and analytical approach appealed to certain demographics more than others
- Network effects and social clustering naturally amplified initial patterns
- Geographic concentration in places like the Bay Area and Oxford
On diversity efforts: EA organizations have made various attempts to broaden participation, though with mixed results. There are efforts around:
- Outreach to different universities and regions
- Scholarships and programs aimed at underrepresented groups
- Discussion of how framing and culture might inadvertently exclude some people
The harder question: There's ongoing debate about whether demographic diversity is primarily valuable instrumentally (does it improve EA's thinking and impact?) or intrinsically (is it important regardless of instrumental benefits?). Different people in EA would answer this differently, and it connects to deeper questions about EA's core commitments and priorities.
Worth noting that some core EA principles (like cause impartiality and willingness to update beliefs based on evidence) might themselves be culturally specific in ways the movement doesn't always recognize.
An excerpt about the creation of PEPFAR, from "Days of Fire" by Peter Baker. I found this moving.
Another major initiative was shaping up around the same time. Since taking office, Bush had developed an interest in fighting AIDS in Africa. He had agreed to contribute to an international fund battling the disease and later started a program aimed at providing drugs to HIV-infected pregnant women to reduce the chances of transmitting the virus to their babies. But it had only whetted his appetite to do more. “When we did it, it revealed how unbelievably pathetic the U.S. effort was,” Michael Gerson said.
So Bush asked Bolten to come up with something more sweeping. Gerson was already thought of as “the custodian of compassionate conservatism within the White House,” as Bolten called him, and he took special interest in AIDS, which had killed his college roommate. Bolten assembled key White House policy aides Gary Edson, Jay Lefkowitz, and Kristen Silverberg in his office. In seeking something transformative, the only outsider they called in was Anthony Fauci, the renowned AIDS researcher and director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases.
“What if money were no object?” Bolten asked. “What would you do?”
Bolten and the others expected him to talk about research for a vaccine because that was what he worked on.
“I’d love to have a few billion more dollars for vaccine research,” Fauci said, “but we’re putting a lot of money into it, and I could not give you any assurance that another single dollar spent on vaccine research is going to get us to a vaccine any faster than we are now.”
Instead, he added, “The thing you can do now is treatment.”
The development of low-cost drugs meant for the first time the world could get a grip on the disease and stop it from being a death sentence for millions of people. “They need the money now,” Fauci said. “They don’t need a vaccine ten years from now.”
The aides crafted a plan in secret, keeping it even from Colin Powell and Tommy Thompson, the secretary of health and human services. They were ready for a final presentation to Bush on December 4. Just before heading into the meeting, Bush stopped by the Roosevelt Room to visit with Jewish leaders in town for the annual White House Hanukkah party later that day. The visitors were supportive of Bush’s confrontation with Iraq and showered him with praise. One of them, George Klein, founder of the Republican Jewish Coalition, recalled that his father had been among the Jewish leaders who tried to get Franklin Roosevelt to do more to stop the Holocaust. “I speak for everyone in this room when I say that if you had been president in the forties, there could have been millions of Jews saved,” the younger Klein said.
Bush choked up at the thought—“You could see his eyes well up,” Klein remembered—and went straight from that meeting to the AIDS meeting, the words ringing in his ears. Lefkowitz, who walked with the president from the Roosevelt Room to the Oval Office, was convinced that sense of moral imperative emboldened Bush as he listened to the arguments about what had shaped up as a $15 billion, five-year program. Daniels and other budget-minded aides “were kind of gasping” about spending so much money, especially with all the costs of the struggle against terrorism and the looming invasion of Iraq. But Bush steered the conversation to aides he knew favored the program, and they argued forcefully for it.
“Gerson, what do you think?” Bush asked.
“If we can do this and we don’t, it will be a source of shame,” Gerson said.
Bush thought so too. So while he mostly wrestled with the coming war, he quietly set in motion one of the most expansive lifesaving programs ever attempted. Somewhere deep inside, the notion of helping the hopeless appealed to a former drinker’s sense of redemption, the belief that nobody was beyond saving.
“Look, this is one of those moments when we can actually change the lives of millions of people, a whole continent,” he told Lefkowitz after the meeting broke up. “How can we not take this step?”
There's a social and professional community of Bay Area EAs who work on issues related to transformative AI. People in this cluster tend to have median timelines to transformative AI of 5 to 15 years, tend to think that AI takeover is 5-70% likely, tend to think that we should be fairly cosmopolitan in our altruism.
People in this cluster mostly don't post on the EA Forum for a variety of reasons:
To be clear, I think it's a shame that the EA Forum isn't a better place for people like me to post and comment.
You can check for yourself that the Bay Area EAs don't really want to post here by looking up examples of prominent Bay Area EAs and noting that they commented here much more several years ago than they do today.