How are you including necessities in the model? I imagine there are going to be sharp drops in happiness / earnings capacity once you cannot pay rent+utilities and I imagine they will radically change how the graphs should look like for higher %s of donations.

Thank you for writing this post, it made me connect again with the feelings that I had when I took the 10% pledge.

Also do I see 10212? Did we reach 10k then? Cheers!

1. What population are you sampling from? The entire world? No? Where is the data from?
2. What does "normal investing habits" mean?
3. Are you simulating investment outcomes or taking data from actual estates as a proxy for net worth at death?
4. Can you give numbers or code?

Could you please share what assumptions are in the simulation? It's hard to learn from this or give feedback otherwise.

Does the forum have a policy on necro posting (the act of commenting/editing "resurrecting" old material)? I didn't find it in the "how to use the forum" sequence.

Hi, just a small suggestion: could you make a more descriptive title for people that don't know what ALAMIME is?

For example:

Malaria control through R&D: ALAMIME Consortium Webinar

Speaking from what I've personally seen, but it's reasonable to assume it generalizes.

There's an important pool of burned out knowledge workers, and one of the major causes is lack of value alignment, i.e. working for companies that only care about profits.

I think this cohort would be a good target for a campaign:

• Effective giving can provide meaning for the money they make
• Dedicating some time to take on voluntary challenges can help them with burnout (if it's due to meaninglessness)

1. Thank you for pointing out log utility, I am aware of this model (and also other utility functions). Any reasonable utility function is concave (diminishing returns), which can explain insurance to some extent but not lotteries.
2. I could imagine that, for an altruistic actor, altruistic utility becomes "more linear" if it's a linear combination of the utility functions of the recipients of help. This might be defensible, but it is not obvious for me unless that actor is utilitarian, at least in their altruistic actions.

I am in a similar boat as you. I don't feel comfortable being identity-EA because I have some core philosophical disagreements.

However, I have been inspired by EA to the point of making some substantive life changes, and participate in my local EA group. I try to do things that are convincing enough for their own sake, even though I do not necessarily agree with all the premises.

I believe there is value to participation in the whatever-ist party, even if you are not comcortable calling yourself a whatever-ist, not because of ideological purity, but because it doesn't even feel true.

Question: how to reconcile the fact that expected value is linear with preferences being possibly nonlinear?

Example: people are tipically willing to pay more than expected value for a small chance of a big benefit (lottery), or to remove a small chance of a big loss (insurance).

This example could be rejected as a "mental bias" or "irrational". However, it is not obvious to me that linearity is a virtue, and even if it is, we are human and our subjective experience is not linear.