Thanks for the post. I admire your desire to understand and connect with people across the aisle. The inside-outside theory of change was new to me and seems worthy of further analysis.
I do have a few concerns:
1. The framing of the hen suffering study suggests that pursuing truth is futile
You write:
Those who already supported cage-free campaigns hold it up as the best stringent scientific examination of the welfare question; skeptics question the assumptions the study used to score different types of pain or outright reject the notion that suffering can be quantified in this way. These arguments often come down to disagreements on first principles, and it seems to me that no amount of data or debate will lead to a reconciliation.
There is a true answer to the question of whether hens suffer less without cages, and that truth has implications for effective advocacy approaches. We should hope that our convergence increases as scientific data accumulates, as it has for questions like whether obesity is bad for health. Questions of conscious experience are more complex, but should be solvable with sufficient data. Your conclusion that "no amount of data or debate will lead to a reconciliation" is troubling if accurate, as it suggests that people in the movement don't have the ability to recognize scientific authority. If this is the case, it should be clearly identified as a social problem that people consider working to solve. I'm concerned that your post instead frames this as inevitable and unproblematic, and sidesteps the fact that there is a right and a wrong answer to this question. I'm also unconfidently skeptical of your conclusion because society has largely converged on many things we have substantial data about (like the fact that obesity is bad for health, or that the earth is round), although socially controversial ideas like this one might have a lower convergence rate.
2. Natural advocacy inclinations may not result in optimal resource allocation
You state:
Advocates intelligently choose their demands based on their objectives. These objectives, in turn, are a product of their role in the movement ecology.
I don't find this explanation compelling. People's "roles in the movement ecology" largely reflect their personal preferences and interests. Describing this as a "movement ecology" gives it an air of intentional design and effectiveness when it may simply be a random distribution of effort. Even if the inside-outside theory holds, it would be valuable to study whether this organic distribution actually leads to good outcomes.
3. The assumption of a shared abolitionist end goal may not hold
You seem to assume that welfarists and abolitionists share the common goal of eventual abolition. However, some people don't believe abolition is achievable, which, if true, should have implications for effective advocacy (this post explores potential implications). I'm not arguing for or against this position, but it deserves consideration because, if true, it has real consequences. I worry that animal advocates may unconsciously engage in appeals to consequences—avoiding ideas because the implications would be uncomfortable—which prevents clear thinking about this possibility.
Thanks for the post. I admire your desire to understand and connect with people across the aisle. The inside-outside theory of change was new to me and seems worthy of further analysis.
I do have a few concerns:
1. The framing of the hen suffering study suggests that pursuing truth is futile
You write:
There is a true answer to the question of whether hens suffer less without cages, and that truth has implications for effective advocacy approaches. We should hope that our convergence increases as scientific data accumulates, as it has for questions like whether obesity is bad for health. Questions of conscious experience are more complex, but should be solvable with sufficient data. Your conclusion that "no amount of data or debate will lead to a reconciliation" is troubling if accurate, as it suggests that people in the movement don't have the ability to recognize scientific authority. If this is the case, it should be clearly identified as a social problem that people consider working to solve. I'm concerned that your post instead frames this as inevitable and unproblematic, and sidesteps the fact that there is a right and a wrong answer to this question. I'm also unconfidently skeptical of your conclusion because society has largely converged on many things we have substantial data about (like the fact that obesity is bad for health, or that the earth is round), although socially controversial ideas like this one might have a lower convergence rate.
2. Natural advocacy inclinations may not result in optimal resource allocation
You state:
I don't find this explanation compelling. People's "roles in the movement ecology" largely reflect their personal preferences and interests. Describing this as a "movement ecology" gives it an air of intentional design and effectiveness when it may simply be a random distribution of effort. Even if the inside-outside theory holds, it would be valuable to study whether this organic distribution actually leads to good outcomes.
3. The assumption of a shared abolitionist end goal may not hold
You seem to assume that welfarists and abolitionists share the common goal of eventual abolition. However, some people don't believe abolition is achievable, which, if true, should have implications for effective advocacy (this post explores potential implications). I'm not arguing for or against this position, but it deserves consideration because, if true, it has real consequences. I worry that animal advocates may unconsciously engage in appeals to consequences—avoiding ideas because the implications would be uncomfortable—which prevents clear thinking about this possibility.