I think that there is value in telling people with AI psychosis about why their ideas are wrong. It helps to get unstuck (if you think that your idea is good, but nobody tells you why, then you are stuck). That helps both the individual and society, because when a person is stuck on wrong idea, then they pay an opportunity cost (and society pays that too).

I think people might underestimate the value of feedback.

According to my world model, if you want to do maximum good for the world, then... (I might be wrong, so feel free to question me)

Investing all resources (money, time, thinking) charitably (meaning: to the direct benefit of others, for example avoiding investing in AI companies, when you think that the world should slow down AI development) is wrong. Because you can invest resources into getting more resources, and if you invest all your resources charitably while others invest them into getting more resources, then you will end up with nothing compared to them and almost all resources will be invested selfishly. If you invest your resources first, and then use them charitably, you will spend more money charitably overall, because you will have more resources.

Investing all resources into getting more resources is also bad, because if everyone does that, then the world will be bad - because everyone would try to maximize their resources, nobody would invest in what is best for the collective (when it's not the same as what gives the highest return of investment), which ends up with a lot of price of anarchy.

The right thing to do, in my opinion, is to be a little bit better than average in terms of how altruistically you spend your resources, but don't be so altruistic that you prioritize others more than yourself (because if you want to maximize the utility of the collective, then you need to take everyone into account equally, including yourself). If everyone follows that, then people would gradually become more altruistic (because the average would go towards more altruism) until everyone would do what is best for the collective.

The problem is... "be a little bit better than average in terms of altruism" is quite ambiguous. That's the problem that I struggle with. I know that I rather shouldn't go 100% into altruism nor 100% selfishness, and I should rather be better than average. But in terms of what? In terms of results? In terms of effort? In terms of invested money? In terms of invested time? In terms of invested money, time and other stuff overall? How much is "a little bit better"? I don't seem to have a complete clarity about that at the moment. For that reason, I also struggle with how to invest money (and other things) a bit.

Okay.

Why do you assume that if a post is AI-written then it's low-quality? Maybe it's because you assume that AI is not currently capable of coming up with good ideas/discoveries. I don't know if that's true, but even if that's the case, then I used AI for writing because it was able to convey something in words better and the idea/discovery was made by me. If I write it myself, it wouldn't be of higher quality (except for the fact that sometimes AI misses some points and it doesn't represent what I wanted to say perfectly)

There was a mistake in "Empirical verification" section. Part of the suggested question/prompt was missing, and the reasoning didn't make sense because of that. I have now corrected the question/prompt.

I agree that something like that needs to be done. I did something similar myself for EA forum posts, but apparently people didn't like it because it didn't get any upvotes here (I don't know why).

My main question/feedback is: "EA Forum paper links" - what exactly is that? Are these EA posts that link to a paper? If so, then why not include all posts, why only papers?

This is not an accurate summary.

It omits the most important mechanism that I mentioned in my post. The mechanism is to reward rewarding itself. This is really the most important part of my post that has been completely omitted from the summary.

"Epistemic status: This is a speculative, normative proposal relying on assumptions about behavioral adaptation, future technology, and long-term incentives; key uncertainties include whether coordination dynamics will shift as described and whether sufficient adoption can occur."

This is not speculative, it's based on a theoretical justification that makes logical sense. If it doesn't make sense to someone else, please point out why.

It's definitely not normative, in a sense that it doesn't tell people what to do, but it offers a solution.

Key uncertainty, in my opinion:

1. Whether people understand the reasoning behind the solution.
2. Whether people have sufficient observability of people's actions for that to work.

My solution was mostly this: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/7EAwiAopjtAdD8hsn/most-impactful-posts-on-effective-altruism-forum-from-13th

But it didn't work. People didn't upvote that. My problem/frustration continues.

I actually proposed a similar idea in a few places months ago (links below). I plan to post about related topics, e.g. my future posts might help to understand how such deals could be enforced, so if you are interested, then follow me

https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/3rDfScbBNhbsk93gF/how-to-stop-inequality-from-growing

https://theoreticalexplorer.com/Alignment+between+humans/Equality/How+to+stop+inequality+from+growing

My thoughts.

On implications of diminishing marginal utility:

1. I believe that artificial intelligence and other resources will have diminishing marginal utility. If that's the case, then it should be possible to do so that both humans and future digital minds are close to their maximum level of utility/happiness by splitting resources between them. The idea of "both digital minds and humans are important" would be therefore significantly more attractive for humans and realistic to accomplish than the idea of "digital minds are all of what matters".

On moral patience:

1. Morality is subjective.
   1. The criteria for moral patience are subjective. You can say that a human is a moral patient, you can say that AI agent is a moral patient, or you can say that a stone is a moral patient. There's no objective truth about that.
2. However, we can define moral patience as "if I want to maximize my happiness/utility, whose happiness/utility should I care about when choosing my actions"? That is objective.
3. If a human wants to maximize their happiness, who should they care about?
   1. Firstly, we need to answer what are the reasons why a human would have an interest to care about someone/something else.
   2. The reasons are:
      1. Game-theoretic - especially direct and indirect reciprocity.
         1. Importantly, I think that agents have interest to care about weaker agents (ask me if you want to know why).
         2. I also think that it's in the interest of a human to care about other sentient life, at least to some extent, because:
            1. It's a norm that is useful - if we live by that norm, then we have that guarantee that we won't end up terribly, because as long as we are sentient, someone will care about us.
            2. It's a norm that has a historical precedent and it's easier to sustain a norm than to establish a new one. But the historical precedent is that humans care about existing sentient life, not potential sentient life.
            3. If the norm of respecting sentient life implied that humans have to commit all their resources for the benefit of future digital minds / AI agents, then that norm would stop to be useful to humans, so that norm would either become weaker to the point where human lives matter, or humans would stop creating new AI agents.
      2. Emotional - you care about someone because you simply want them to be happy.
   3. I think it's likely that there are game-theoretic and/or emotional reasons why we should care about AI agents / digital beings, but not to the point that they are all that we should care about and that we should ignore other agents or beings.

On number of agents:

1. How to count the number of agents? If we have multiple agents on different computers that cooperate and exchange knowledge, and then we have one agent that is distributed among many computers, then what's the difference between them? Does that count as one agent or many?
2. Let's suppose that we define agents by their goals (i.e. two computers with AI on it are considered different agents, if they aim to achieve different goals). If there are multiple agents with different goals (either human or AIs), then the best thing that they can do is to create one AI agent that will be optimized for the cumulative utility/happiness all of them. So, I expect that there won't be many separate agents with different goals in the future.