The Insect Institute is hiring for a vital, exciting, foundational role: a full-time Program Coordinator or Program Officer (depending on the qualifications of the successful candidate). This is a high-responsibility position where you will have the opportunity to drive real impact for our mission. As our second full-time employee, you will be tasked with helping to carry out the Insect Institute's interventions, including through engagement with policymakers, regulators, NGOs, and potentially media. Suitably qualified candidates may also be asked to contribute to research and report writing. As one of only a few people worldwide working in an extremely important cause area, you will have the potential for enormous counterfactual impact.
Salary: $73,630-$87,694 USD pre-tax
Location: Fully remote
Application Deadline: April 1st, end of day in the EST time zone
The full job description and application is available here. If you know someone else who might be a good fit, a referral form is available here. We offer a $500 bonus for referring the successful candidate. Questions about the role can be directed to info@insectinstitute.org.
More Information:
Key Responsibilities
Requirements:
Preferred:
If you do not meet all of the below criteria, please still consider applying. Please also take an expansive interpretation of the below criteria (e.g., if you are not sure whether your work experience is relevant, err on the side of assuming it might be).
They are separate views, but related: people with person-affecting views usually endorse the asymmetry, people without person-affecting views usually don't endorse the asymmetry, and person-affecting views are often taken to (somehow or other) provide a kind of justification for the asymmetry. The upshot here is that it wouldn't be enough for people at OP to endorse person-affecting views: they'd have to endorse a version of a person-affecting view that is rejected even by most people with person-affecting views, and that independently seems gonzo--one according to which, say, I have no reason at all not to push a button that creates a trillion people who are gratuitously tortured in hell forever.
Very roughly, how this works: person-affecting views say that a situation can't be better or worse than another unless it benefits or harms someone. (Note that the usual assumption here is that, to be harmed or benefited, the individual doesn't have to exist now, but they have to exist at some point.) This is completely compatible with thinking it's worse to create the trillion people who suffer forever: it might be that their existing is worse for them than not existing, or harms them in some non-comparative way. So it can be worse to create them, since it's worse for them. And that should also be enough to get the view that, e.g., you shouldn't create animals with awful lives on factory farms.
Of course, usually people with person-affecting views want it to be neutral to create happy people, and then there is a problem about how to maintain that while accepting the above view about not creating people in hell. So somehow or other they'll need to justify the asymmetry. One way to try this might be via the kind of asymmetrical complaint-based model I mentioned above: if you create the people in hell, there are actual individuals you harm (the people in hell), but if you don't create people in heaven, there is no actual individual you fail to benefit (since the potential beneficiaries never exist). In this way, you might try to fit the views together. Then you would have the view that it's neutral to ensure the awesome existence of future people who populate the cosmos, but still important to avoid creating animals with net-negative lives, or future people who get tortured by AM or whatever.
Now, it is true that people with person-affecting views could instead say that there is nothing good or bad about creating individuals either way--maybe because they think there's just no way to compare existence and non-existence, and they think this means there's no way to say that causing someone to exist benefits or harms them. But this is a fringe view, because, e.g., it leads to gonzo conclusions like thinking there's no reason not to push the hell button.
I think all this is basically in line with how these views are understood in the academic literature, cf., e.g., here.
Generally, people with person-affecting views still want it to be the case that we shouldn't create individuals with awful lives, and probably also that we should prefer the creation of someone with a life that is net-negative by less over someone with a life that is net-negative by more. (This relates to the supposed procreation asymmetry, where, allegedly, that a kid would be really happy is not a reason to have them, but that a kid would be in constant agony is a reason not to have them.) One way to justify this would be the thought that, if you don't create a happy person, no one has a complaint, but if you do create a miserable person, someone does have a complaint (i.e., that person).
Where factory-farmed animals have net-negative lives, I'm not sure person-affecting views would justify neglecting animal welfare, then. (Similarly, re: longtermism, they might justify neglecting long-term x-risks, but not s-risks.)
Hi! There are no specific formal education requirements, though relevant qualifications are desirable, as mentioned in the "preferred" section.