I don't think something as strong as this, but I did think at the time that the work on export controls was bad and likely to exacerbate arms race dynamics, and continue to believe this (and the celebration of export controls as a great success of the EA policy efforts was one of the things that caused me to update on future EA-driven AI policy efforts probably being net harmful, though FTX played a bigger role).

Open Phil’s funding interests and priorities and constraints have drastically changed in the last year or two. I agree they funded many things like this in the past.

A somewhat relevant article that I discovered while researching this: Longtermists Are Pushing a New Cold War With China - Jacobin

The Biden administration’s decision, in October of last year, to impose drastic export controls on semiconductors, stands as one of its most substantial policy changes so far. As Jacobin‘s Branko Marcetic wrote at the time, the controls were likely the first shot in a new economic Cold War between the United States and China, in which both superpowers (not to mention the rest of the world) will feel the hurt for years or decades, if not permanently.

[...]

The idea behind the policy, however, did not emerge from the ether. Three years before the current administration issued the rule, Congress was already receiving extensive testimony in favor of something much like it. The lengthy 2019 report from the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence suggests unambiguously that the “United States should commit to a strategy to stay at least two generations ahead of China in state-of-the-art microelectronics” and

The commission report makes repeated references to the risks posed by AI development in “authoritarian” regimes like China’s, predicting dire consequences as compared with similar research and development carried out under the auspices of liberal democracy. (Its hand-wringing in particular about AI-powered, authoritarian Chinese surveillance is ironic, as it also ominously exhorts, “The [US] Intelligence Community (IC) should adopt and integrate AI-enabled capabilities across all aspects of its work, from collection to analysis.”)

These emphases on the dangers of morally misinformed AI are no accident. The commission head was Eric Schmidt, tech billionaire and contributor to Future Forward, whose philanthropic venture Schmidt Futures has both deep ties with the longtermist community and a record of shady influence over the White House on science policy. Schmidt himself has voiced measured concern about AI safety, albeit tinged with optimism, opining that “doomsday scenarios” of AI run amok deserve “thoughtful consideration.” He has also coauthored a book on the future risks of AI, with no lesser an expert on morally unchecked threats to human life than notorious war criminal Henry Kissinger.

Also of note is commission member Jason Matheny, CEO of the RAND Corporation. Matheny is an alum of the longtermist Future of Humanity Institute (FHI) at the University of Oxford, who has claimed existential risk and machine intelligence are more dangerous than any historical pandemics and “a neglected topic in both the scientific and governmental communities, but it’s hard to think of a topic more important than human survival.” This commission report was not his last testimony to Congress on the subject, either: in September 2020, he would individually speak before the House Budget Committee urging “multilateral export controls on the semiconductor manufacturing equipment needed to produce advanced chips,” the better to preserve American dominance in AI.

Congressional testimony and his position at the RAND Corporation, moreover, were not Matheny’s only channels for influencing US policy on the matter. In 2021 and 2022, he served in the White House’s Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) as deputy assistant to the president for technology and national security and as deputy director for national security (the head of the OSTP national security division). As a senior figure in the Office — to which Biden has granted “unprecedented access and power” — advice on policies like the October export controls would have fallen squarely within his professional mandate.

The most significant restrictions advocates (aside from Matheny) to emerge from CSET, however, have been Saif Khan and Kevin Wolf. The former is an alum from the Center and, since April 2021, the director for technology and national security at the White House National Security Council. The latter has been a senior fellow at CSET since February 2022 and has a long history of service in and connections with US export policy. He served as assistant secretary of commerce for export administration from 2010–17 (among other work in the field, both private and public), and his extensive familiarity with the US export regulation system would be valuable to anyone aspiring to influence policy on the subject. Both would, before and after October, champion the semiconductor controls.

At CSET, Khan published repeatedly on the topic, time and again calling for the United States to implement semiconductor export controls to curb Chinese progress on AI. In March 2021, he testified before the Senate, arguing that the United States must impose such controls “to ensure that democracies lead in advanced chips and that they are used for good.” (Paradoxically, in the same breath the address calls on the United States to both “identify opportunities to collaborate with competitors, including China, to build confidence and avoid races to the bottom” and to “tightly control exports of American technology to human rights abusers,” such as… China.)

Among Khan’s coauthors was aforementioned former congressional hopeful and longtermist Carrick Flynn, previously assistant director of the Center for the Governance of AI at FHI. Flynn himself individually authored a CSET issue brief, “Recommendations on Export Controls for Artificial Intelligence,” in February 2020. The brief, unsurprisingly, argues for tightened semiconductor export regulation much like Khan and Matheny.

This February, Wolf too provided a congressional address on “Advancing National Security and Foreign Policy Through Sanctions, Export Controls, and Other Economic Tools,” praising the October controls and urging further policy in the same vein. In it, he claims knowledge of the specific motivations of the controls’ writers:

BIS did not rely on ECRA’s emerging and foundational technology provisions when publishing this rule so that it would not need to seek public comments before publishing it.

These motivations also clearly included exactly the sorts of AI concerns Matheny, Khan, Flynn, and other longtermists had long raised in this connection. In its background summary, the text of one rule explicitly links the controls with hopes of retarding China’s AI development. Using language that could easily have been ripped from a CSET paper on the topic, the summary warns that “‘supercomputers’ are being used by the PRC to improve calculations in weapons design and testing including for WMD, such as nuclear weapons, hypersonics and other advanced missile systems, and to analyze battlefield effects,” as well as bolster citizen surveillance.

[...]

Longtermists, in short, have since at least 2019 exerted a strong influence over what would become the Biden White House’s October 2022 semiconductor export rules. If the policy is not itself the direct product of institutional longtermists, it at the very least bears the stamp of their enthusiastic approval and close monitoring.

Just as it would be a mistake to restrict interest in longtermism’s political ambitions exclusively to election campaigns, it would be shortsighted to treat its work on semiconductor infrastructure as a one-off incident. Khan and Matheny, among others, remain in positions of considerable influence, and have demonstrated a commitment to bringing longtermist concerns to bear on matters of high policy. The policy sophistication, political reach, and fresh-faced enthusiasm on display in its semiconductor export maneuvering should earn the AI doomsday lobby its fair share of critical attention in the years to come.

The article seems quite biased to me, but I do think some of the basics here make sense and match with things I have heard (but also, some of it seems wrong).

I have no idea what you are advocating for here. I have no inherent interest in trying to convince people that AGI is likely powerful, but it does seem likely true. Should I lie to people? 

Many have chosen the path of keeping their beliefs to themselves. My guess is that wasn't very helpful as the "imminent and powerful" part is kind of obvious as it starts happening.

What is the predictable result here? What is the counterfactual? How does anything better happen if you don't say anything, and why are you falsely claiming that it's been consensus that it's a good idea to publicly talk about the power and capabilities of AI systems? A substantial fraction of the AI safety movement did not do this, and indeed strongly advocated against (again, I think mistakenly), so even if you assign blame, you obviously can't assign blame uniformly.

Yep, the Lightspeed Grants table is part of the SFF table! I also think we should have published our own table, but it seemed lower priority after it was included in the SFF one. 

We might also release a Lightspeed Grants retrospective soon.

Cool, I might just be remembering that one instance. 

IIRC didn’t you somewhat frequently remove sections if the org objected because you didn’t have enough time to engage with them? (which I think was reasonably costly)

The export controls seemed like a pretty central example of hawkishness towards China and a reasonable precursor to this report. The central motivation in all that I have written related to them was about beating China in AI capabilities development.

Of course no one likes a symmetric arms race, but the question is did people favor the "quickly establish overwhelming dominance towards China by investing heavily in AI" or the "try to negotiate with China and not set an example of racing towards AGI" strategy. My sense is many people favored the former (though definitely not all, and I am not saying that there is anything like consensus, my sense is it's a quite divisive topic).

To support your point, I have seen much writing from Helen Toner on trying to dispel hawkishness towards China, and have been grateful for that. Against your point, at the recent "AI Security Forum" in Vegas, many x-risk concerned people expressed very hawkish opinions.

Yep, I agree with this, but it appears nevertheless a relatively prevalent opinion among many EAs working in AI policy.

I think a non-trivial fraction of Aschenbrenner's influence as well as intellectual growth is due to us and the core EA/AI-Safety ideas, yeah. I doubt he would have written it if the extended community didn't exist, and if he wasn't mentored by Holden, etc.