Sorry, could you please just formalize the argument for objective morality because while not everything you say is false, I don’t see how any of it logically leads to moral objectivism as used within the context of moral philosophy.
You haven’t addressed the is-ought gap at all. If there is an objective morality, I’d challenge you to make a moral judgement as an example that logically follows from purely descriptive premises (this is generally considered to be impossible.)
The only thing I can think of that you could do is maybe re-define objective (within the context of moral philosophy) to try to sneak it in there, but that’s all that’ll really be. It’s just logically possible for truly normative (prescriptive) conclusions to be objective, this is something that’s been known for hundreds of years.
Sorry, could you please just formalize the argument for objective morality because while not everything you say is false, I don’t see how any of it logically leads to moral objectivism as used within the context of moral philosophy.
You haven’t addressed the is-ought gap at all. If there is an objective morality, I’d challenge you to make a moral judgement as an example that logically follows from purely descriptive premises (this is generally considered to be impossible.)
The only thing I can think of that you could do is maybe re-define objective (within the context of moral philosophy) to try to sneak it in there, but that’s all that’ll really be. It’s just logically possible for truly normative (prescriptive) conclusions to be objective, this is something that’s been known for hundreds of years.