Consequentialists should be strong longtermists

Disagree on the basis of cluelessness. 

Uncertainty about how to reliably affect the longterm future is much worse than uncertainty over our effects on the near-term.

I find the Hilary Greaves argument that neartermist interventions are just as unpredictable as longtermist interventions unconvincing because you could apply the same reason to treating a sick person (maybe they'll go on to cause disaster), or getting out of bed in the morning (maybe I'll go on to cause disaster). This paralysis is not tenable.

Vote power should scale with karma

Risks groupthink (this is hard to prove). Also bad optics to outsiders (looks liable to groupthink, cultish).
The benefit that it makes sock-puppeteering harder means I'm a little ambivalent

There's a distinction in theory but in practice the vague definition of "sentience" is so tied to moral relevance I don't think you can argue for one without also arguing for the other.

The question "does a worm feel pain" isn't really asking "does the worm have nociceptors and some degree of integration of those nociceptive signals that causes learning and behavioural changes". It's really asking, at the core, "does a worm 'feel pain' in a way that's morally important"

Uncertainty about the net utility of wild animals is also true of human life. It’s an open question whether the average human life is net negative or net positive.

Would you therefore also say that propagating human lives on other planets is “extremely bad”?

You could ask the same question about worms, mites or nematodes.

I think the reductio ad absurdum that if any of these things matter even slightly, then all human moral concerns become completely irrelevant, means we need a high bar for believing this

“it at least somewhat increases the risk of animal life being propagated on more planets. This seems extremely bad, since we have no idea how to ensure that those animals will live good lives.”

Do you assume that wild animal life is net negative?

If given a magic button that instantaneously wiped out all wild animals, ignoring the consequences for humans of doing this, would you press it?

“It’s clear that at least some insects, such as fruit flies and bees, have valenced states. Entomologists test for the presence of these states using cognitive bias tests, which involve training animals to associate one stimulus (like the color red) with a reward and another stimulus (like the color blue) with something aversive. Then, the animals are presented with an ambiguous stimulus (like the color purple). Relative to baseline, bees rewarded before encountering the ambiguous stimulus are more likely to approach it, whereas bees given something aversive are more wary.”

How is it “clear” from this that insect have “sentience” or “valenced states”?

Several similarly long stretches made here

• Maggots and fruit flies reacting to or avoiding painful stimuli = ?evidence for sentience
• Ants using tools = ?evidence for sentience

• Bees showing “play behaviour” (rolling wooden balls around for some reason) = ?evidence for sentience

  
  These results attest that reward/punishment pathways exists. Do they tell us anything else? 

Based on what?

There’s no clear definition of consciousness or suffering so how do you draw a clear line between insects and mites?

This post could just as well be:

"Demodex mites are not moderately important"

or

"Nematodes are not moderately important"

"There are only two options. You can think that the cause of most of the world’s suffering is not very important or you can think that nematode suffering is the biggest issue."

Nah