UK based senior program manager with over 13 years experience at a global e-commerce and technology company, most of that spent in European logistics and fulfilment.
I'd love to hear some of the counter-arguments against what Paul has wrote here. I have started reading up on long termism and I am having problems with the idea of "We cannot count future people in one scenario while treating people saved today as if their influence ends at the moment of rescue." that is mentioned as well as the idea that future people need to be repeatably saved to exist. If you avert a existential extinction level disaster in 2030 that allows future people in 2100 to live and flourish, but a second disaster (of the same or a similar type) needs to be averted in 2050, how do you avoid double counting that life saved? I'm sure this problem has been explored but I'd like to read the counter-arguments.
I'd love to hear some of the counter-arguments against what Paul has wrote here. I have started reading up on long termism and I am having problems with the idea of "We cannot count future people in one scenario while treating people saved today as if their influence ends at the moment of rescue." that is mentioned as well as the idea that future people need to be repeatably saved to exist. If you avert a existential extinction level disaster in 2030 that allows future people in 2100 to live and flourish, but a second disaster (of the same or a similar type) needs to be averted in 2050, how do you avoid double counting that life saved? I'm sure this problem has been explored but I'd like to read the counter-arguments.