I don't think 'having a better reputation' means 'being cool'.
I think 'having a better reputation' means people primarily associating EA with core ideas such as evidence, cost-effectiveness, impact, impartiality, counterfactual thinking (rather than e.g. FTX).
I suspect there are plenty of 'mission-aligned nerds' out there who have been put off EA because they first hear about the bad stuff rather than the good stuff (though I also expect the overwhelming majority of 'mission-aligned nerds' simply haven't heard of EA at all).
What has your approach been over the past 12 months? Has it been consistently hostile towards veganism?
My assumption is that you've previously been targeting people who (1) care about animals and (2) are probably somewhat sympathetic towards the goals of veganism, (3) but want an easier option to help animals than becoming vegan.
This seems like a very promising approach, and I can imagine most of my friends and family falling into this category. Maybe I'm mistaken, but I've not otherwise percevied your approach (before this latest campaign) to be overtly hostile towards veganism.
I'm taking what you said literally under the core idea, that there are no other foundational rules. But perhaps comparison of different actions is not considered foundational. How would the framework compare/rank different outcomes or actions?
For example, how would it compare two actions involving involuntary imposition?
Or if an action involves one involuntary imposition (immoral) but also one voluntary assistance (moral), what does that imply overall? Is it always considered immoral, or does it depend on the extent of the imposition relative to the assistance?
Re alternative proteins - as well as cultivated meat, there is precision fermentation. This could be used to produce a lot of the dairy and egg proteins that are used in food manufacturing, and would be less dependent on consumer acceptance. Precision fermentation also seems to be less technically challenging than cultured meat.
I think it's quite plausible that over the last 10,000 years the benefits have not outweighed the costs.
It's also plausible that the next 10,000 years will be dramatically better - for humans, farmed animals, and wild animals. Further human economic development will be necessary to build the knowledge and resources to fully enable this.
But this doesn't address whether supporting economic development of developing countries right now is a net benefit.
Given the focus here on companies, rather than non-profits, I wonder if this should be framed in terms of investments rather than donations. It seems like the companies mentioned aren't easy to invest in.
One option here is Agronomics. This is an investment company that trades on the London Stock Exchange, and has a portfolio of over 20 companies, including 5 that focus on precision fermentation (as well as several that are 'fermentation derived', and others that work on cultured meat):
I don't know how this compares to donating to the Good Food Institute. I expect GFI's work benefits many more companies working in the sector by influencing government regulation. On the other hand, Agronomics promises a potentially large return on investment.
I don't think we should care about biodiversity inherently. But it could be instrumentally valuable to protect large areas of nature until we have a much more detailed understanding of the species that are out there - and the potential food sources and medicinal compounds etc that could be valuable to humans and animals. My intuition is that the best interventions in this area will fall well short of the best interventions in other cause areas - but would still be a big step up from improving a basketball team!
If vegans do have higher rates of depression, it seems like there are several possible explanations:
1. It is indeed due to diet/nutrients.
2. There is a selection effect - people who go vegan are more likely to suffer from depression, but it's not due to a vegan diet. For example, perhaps people who go vegan are less conformist/willing to go against social norms, and this corresponds to a psychological profile that increases risk of depression.
3. Relatedly, it may be that going vegan is distressing because of seeing other people's animal consumption. This might not just be due to greater awareness of animal suffering, but because it creates a barrier between a vegan and friends/family/rest of society - i.e. the main driver may be social exclusion.
I've not looked at any literature on this - perhaps there are some studies which largely rule out 2 and 3. I expect it may be a combination of the explanations (anecdotally 2 and 3 are both true for me - I was anxious and depressed before going vegan. And veganism makes it harder to connect with some people, particularly e.g. when dating)
"there isn't much reason for many classes of vegans/vegetarians to experience increased rate of depression due to distress about other people's animal consumption: those who would identify health, environment, culture, some forms of religion, etc. as their primary motivation for their diet."
I agree this is likely for those where their own health is the primary motivation. But I could easily imagine that people who intensely care about the environment, culture, or their religion being distressed (to the point of depression) when they are surrounded by a society that widely dismisses and often mocks their values.
This is a good point. I may be misinterpreting the cited research, but if the proposed training increases disclosures of CSA, that will (a) presumably reduce 'costs as a consequence' (which includes a monetised value of the physical and emotional harm suffered) but (b) plausibly increase 'costs in response' (due to increased police, prison, and safeguarding costs)
I don't think 'having a better reputation' means 'being cool'.
I think 'having a better reputation' means people primarily associating EA with core ideas such as evidence, cost-effectiveness, impact, impartiality, counterfactual thinking (rather than e.g. FTX).
I suspect there are plenty of 'mission-aligned nerds' out there who have been put off EA because they first hear about the bad stuff rather than the good stuff (though I also expect the overwhelming majority of 'mission-aligned nerds' simply haven't heard of EA at all).
What has your approach been over the past 12 months? Has it been consistently hostile towards veganism?
My assumption is that you've previously been targeting people who (1) care about animals and (2) are probably somewhat sympathetic towards the goals of veganism, (3) but want an easier option to help animals than becoming vegan.
This seems like a very promising approach, and I can imagine most of my friends and family falling into this category. Maybe I'm mistaken, but I've not otherwise percevied your approach (before this latest campaign) to be overtly hostile towards veganism.
I'm taking what you said literally under the core idea, that there are no other foundational rules. But perhaps comparison of different actions is not considered foundational. How would the framework compare/rank different outcomes or actions?
For example, how would it compare two actions involving involuntary imposition?
Or if an action involves one involuntary imposition (immoral) but also one voluntary assistance (moral), what does that imply overall? Is it always considered immoral, or does it depend on the extent of the imposition relative to the assistance?
This seems pretty deontological to me.
It seems like the core claim implies that genocide is no worse than having a phone stolen.
Re alternative proteins - as well as cultivated meat, there is precision fermentation. This could be used to produce a lot of the dairy and egg proteins that are used in food manufacturing, and would be less dependent on consumer acceptance. Precision fermentation also seems to be less technically challenging than cultured meat.
I think it's quite plausible that over the last 10,000 years the benefits have not outweighed the costs.
It's also plausible that the next 10,000 years will be dramatically better - for humans, farmed animals, and wild animals. Further human economic development will be necessary to build the knowledge and resources to fully enable this.
But this doesn't address whether supporting economic development of developing countries right now is a net benefit.
Given the focus here on companies, rather than non-profits, I wonder if this should be framed in terms of investments rather than donations. It seems like the companies mentioned aren't easy to invest in.
One option here is Agronomics. This is an investment company that trades on the London Stock Exchange, and has a portfolio of over 20 companies, including 5 that focus on precision fermentation (as well as several that are 'fermentation derived', and others that work on cultured meat):
https://www.agronomics.im/portfolio/
I don't know how this compares to donating to the Good Food Institute. I expect GFI's work benefits many more companies working in the sector by influencing government regulation. On the other hand, Agronomics promises a potentially large return on investment.
(disclaimer: I own shares in Agronomics)
I don't think we should care about biodiversity inherently. But it could be instrumentally valuable to protect large areas of nature until we have a much more detailed understanding of the species that are out there - and the potential food sources and medicinal compounds etc that could be valuable to humans and animals. My intuition is that the best interventions in this area will fall well short of the best interventions in other cause areas - but would still be a big step up from improving a basketball team!
If vegans do have higher rates of depression, it seems like there are several possible explanations:
1. It is indeed due to diet/nutrients.
2. There is a selection effect - people who go vegan are more likely to suffer from depression, but it's not due to a vegan diet. For example, perhaps people who go vegan are less conformist/willing to go against social norms, and this corresponds to a psychological profile that increases risk of depression.
3. Relatedly, it may be that going vegan is distressing because of seeing other people's animal consumption. This might not just be due to greater awareness of animal suffering, but because it creates a barrier between a vegan and friends/family/rest of society - i.e. the main driver may be social exclusion.
I've not looked at any literature on this - perhaps there are some studies which largely rule out 2 and 3. I expect it may be a combination of the explanations (anecdotally 2 and 3 are both true for me - I was anxious and depressed before going vegan. And veganism makes it harder to connect with some people, particularly e.g. when dating)
I agree this is likely for those where their own health is the primary motivation. But I could easily imagine that people who intensely care about the environment, culture, or their religion being distressed (to the point of depression) when they are surrounded by a society that widely dismisses and often mocks their values.
This is a good point. I may be misinterpreting the cited research, but if the proposed training increases disclosures of CSA, that will (a) presumably reduce 'costs as a consequence' (which includes a monetised value of the physical and emotional harm suffered) but (b) plausibly increase 'costs in response' (due to increased police, prison, and safeguarding costs)