I develop software tools for the building energy efficiency industry. My background is in architectural and mechanical engineering (MS Penn State, PhD University of Maryland). I know quite a bit about indoor air quality and indoor infectious disease transfer, and closely follow all things related to climate change and the energy transition. I co-organize the local EA group in Denver, Colorado.
It seems like a fundamental problem is the lack of a moral realist foundation, as "human intentions toward sentient beings" and "what is moral" are different things. Can someone recommend some reading on whether alignment is even a coherent ask, either from a moral realist or moral anti-realist perspective?
The salient question for me is how much does reducing extinction risk change the long run experience of moral patients? One argument is that meaningfully reducing risk would require substantial coordination, and that coordination is likely to result in better worlds. I think it is as or more likely that reducing extinction risk can result in some worlds where most moral patients are used as means without regard to their suffering.
I think an AI aligned to roughly to the output of all current human coordination would be net-negative. I would shift to thinking addressing extinction risk is more important if factory farming stopped, humanity was taking serious steps to address wild animal suffering, all sustainable development goals were met within 5 years of the initial timeline, and global inequality was reduced to something like <0.25 GINI coefficient.
The USDA secretary released a strategy yesterday on lowering egg prices. Explained originally as a WSJ opinion (paywall). Summarized here without the paywall.
Five points to the strategy:
Key concerns:
I'm curious where the non-cage free eggs are going. From my naive position, it seems like the grocery stores and restaurant chains listed here should cover a majority of egg use, and are well above 40% cage-free in aggregate. Do non-chain restaurants explain the difference? Hotels? Food manufacturers? Schools and other public places with cafeterias?
"The important question is whether eating meat and donating is morally better than eating meat and not donating. The answer to that seems like a resounding 'yes'"
Offsetting bad moral actions depends on 1) the action being off-settable, 2) the two actions are inseparable, and 3) presuming a rather extreme form of utilitarianism is morally correct.
In the case you provide, I think it fails on all three parts. The action isn't off-settable. Most moral frameworks would look at the two actions separately. Donating to an animal welfare charity doesn't first require you eat meat, and there is no forced decision to donate or not donate if you eat an animal. And if you accept moral offsetting is better in this case, you are upon to all sorts of the standard utilitarian critiques.
There are also separate justice concerns and whether you are benefiting the appropriate reference class (if you eat cow and donate to shrimp welfare in another country, is that appropriate offsetting?).
I think it's fine to promote the endeavor (or at least its morally permissible). But saying it is morally better isn't well-supported. It's similar to the somewhat non-intuitive finding in moral philosophy that if choosing between A) not donating to charity, B) donating to an ineffective charity, and C) donating to an effective charity, choosing A over B may be morally permissible, but choosing B over C is not.
Do you agree with Susan Wolf's claim in Moral Saints that we ought to consider non-moral values in deciding what we do, and those may be a valid reason to not given more to the worst off? I presume you've written about it before on your blog or in a paper.
A related question is: do you think the gap is greater between our actions and what we think we ought to do, or between what we think ought to do and what we ought to do in some realist meta-normative sense? Is the bigger issue that we lack moral knowledge, or that we don't live up to moral standards?
It's difficult to pinpoint a definition of conservatism. Modern politics tends to follow in the Burkean conservatism tradition. One of the animating forces is the belief that hierarchy is necessary for a just an prosperous society. It is to varying degrees a "might makes right" value system, summed up in this quote by Plato: " ...nature herself intimates that it is just for the better to have more than the worse, the more powerful than the weaker; and in many ways she shows, among men as well as among animals, and indeed among whole cities and races, that justice consists in the superior ruling over and having more than the inferior."
Another style is Christian conservatism with dominionism, that believe animals are biblically placed on earth for humans to do with as we please. Many still believe in Descartes Cartesian dualism that humans are distinct from animals in that animals do not have consciousness and even cannot "experience" pain.
These belief systems are unlikely to yield concern for animals, and are usually ambivalent to them. There may be some appeal to a "with great power comes great responsibility" mindset that animals are weak and need our protection.
Another angle is to realize many wear the label of conservative loosely, and can be persuaded to adopt or appreciate other value systems that are much more concerned with the well-being of animals.
I think it is more likely than not that failure to pass this bill as is was net harmful.
Overall, I'm discouraged at the broad EA obsession with Far-UVC instead of coordinating with leading organizations like ASHRAE to promote the uptake of infectious disease control standards and design generally. In this case, that obsession did cause clear harm, with unclear benefit.
I understand you are trying to recast the Christian dominion interpretation, but it is worth mentioning that as an ideology it has long been overwhelming opposed or indifferent to animal welfare. Most popular dominion interpretations are in the mold of Rene Descartes, who thought animals automatons. The dominion framing is so severe that the most popular shocking vegan film is named after it.
Furthermore, the modern animal welfare movement is highly correlated with atheism, or at least skeptical approaches to understanding our relationship with non-human animals. It may be easier to push non-religious framings around animals rather than trying to re-interpret dominionism. I'm not sure how successful that will be depending on the culture where you live.