Sure. Here's a short presentation I did on F-gases a while back.

ITN:

I - F-gases are long-lived climate pollutants that are a source of around 2% of global emissions, and projected to grow as a share of global emissions as the energy sector cleans up and countries get wealthier and hotter and subsequently adopt more cooling and refrigeration equipment.

T - There are existing organizations working to capture and destroy F-gases. The manufacture of the worst offending refrigerants is nearly universally banned, so there is little concern for displacement effects.

N - There is no strong incentive to prevent refrigerant leaks or dispose of old refrigerant responsibly besides climate benefits. Some can be recovered and resold and will eventually end up in the atmosphere absent some intervention. (Think of how few CFLs or electronics are disposed of properly despite laws mandating proper disposal).

It's an offset without the robustness, temporary, displacement, counterfactual or other concerns of the more common and popular forest protection offsets.

If interested in funding to destroy refrigerants, see: https://tradewater.co/

I encourage readers to read the post in full, as I anticipated and covered many of these objections, and reading will give you a full perspective on what claims Johannes is responding to. I reached out to GG but not FP for feedback before publication for reasons I do not think are appropriate to discuss in this public forum.

Some specific asks to Johannes in the post where I think a response would benefit forum readers:

• Create a mistakes page and include errors made in the 2018 CATF cost-effectiveness calculation.
• Retract or otherwise discourage others from using or citing the 2018 CATF cost-effectiveness calculation.
• Refrain from claiming a value at or below $1/ton CO2e in expected emissions reduction, or at least committing to not making claims on cost-effectiveness without a specific, clear, and verifiable explanation of how that calculation was done.

Specific responses:

a) I first drafted this post 2-3 years ago when nuclear power was a clearer target of EA climate philanthropy, but didn't get to publishing it until now, and now nuclear is less of a priority for both FP and GG. The lower threshold (17%) is for nuclear-specific grants. The adjacency includes work for clean firm power generally, which for the typical funded non-profits in the space is for nuclear and geothermal only, or with CSS too. In the post, I discuss several other technologies for resource adequacy that are not covered or included by organizations that FP and GG give to for their clean firm power work. FP and GG could choose to fund other strategies for resource adequacy, but they largely do not.

Regardless, the main contention is that nuclear power advocacy has historically been the most or one of the most funded interventions in the EA climate space. GG does not contest this, and I think the evidence is clear on this point.

b1) Cost is a primary driver of technology selection in all countries. Solar and wind are cheaper than nuclear in the U.S., and the relative difference is similar in other countries. In 2020, China set a goal of 1.2 TW of renewables by 2030. It met that target in 2024, 6 years ahead of schedule Source. Last year it added over 430 GW of renewables, including 300 GW of solar PV [Source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Renewable_energy_in_China. For comparison, China had set a goal for nuclear power of 58 GW by 2020 and 70 GW by 2025. It met the 2020 target in 2024 and will meet the 2025 target several years late. It has a goal of 110 GW by 2030, and 335 GW by 2050. Source. Last year, China added 2 GW of new nuclear capacity, though typically adds 3 GW per year (Source, Source). 430 GW/yr vs. 3 GW/yr.

b2) I don't contest the need for clean firm power, I question the size of the need for new clean firm power resources, especially in the form of baseload resources given other technology solutions for resource adequacy. I covered this in a section in my post discussing the U.S. case and the European case Source. The grid needs resource adequacy. Nuclear is a baseload source. Baseload sources are a subset of clean firm resources. Clean firm resources are a subset of resource adequacy. Conflating these as one thing is source of great confusion and misdirection. Dispatchable, low CAPEX clean firm resources are the ideal fit for firming a largely VRE fit; nuclear power is not that.

b3) I cover the economics of nuclear power extensively in the piece and discuss the pathways to cost reduction in the U.S. nuclear industry. Labor costs are largely set by what other work opportunities are available; engineers and construction workers can get high pay in many industries, which sets the high labor price for nuclear plants.

b4) The responsibility is on funders to make a positive case for how their specific grants can reduce costs enough to make nuclear viable as a clean firm power option, and furthermore why such an intervention is among the best options for climate philanthropy in an ITN framework. It is not possible to prove a negative. The highlighted philanthropic contributions, including "bipartisan ADVANCE Act streamlining NRC licensing, to the COP28 declaration to triple nuclear capacity signed by over 20 countries, to shifting public opinion", have done little to address the economic challenge. I do think the nuclear advocacy work done by EA philanthropy has and will do little to change the economics.

c) If the core case is nuclear could be cheap, philanthropy needs to make an affirmative, specific case for how they think that can happen. The most optimistic cases from National Academies and DOE reports set targets of around $5-8/W and $80/MWh that are above the cost for other firm resources, including geothermal and especially fossil gas, and above many other resource adequacy options. For new nuclear power to compete and displace other sources, there ultimately will need to be some carbon cost through regulation or clean requirements. Otherwise, there is no market incentive to build nuclear power vs. other fossil-based dispatchable options. And even if there is a carbon requirement, nuclear power must compete against other resource adequacy options that are either demonstrated, established tech, or are seeing much faster cost declines and market uptake.

Yes, I think customizing donations would be better. Or donating for (targeted) research.

But I will partially defend a somewhat stronger version too. As I covered in Part 8 of the post, I think the climate funds haven't been particularly effective and, in some cases, harmful. And the reasoning behind the support of nuclear highlights a general lack of expertise and rigor that undermines credibility for other recommendations. I think a lot more research needs to go into selecting interventions before claims like <$10/ton can be made with >50% confidence. Perhaps such confidence levels are impossible; it depends on whether the organizations see their role as coming up with speculative high-impact plays, providing robust evidenced-based impact for donors, or both. But even with a speculative angle, I think the initial cost-effectiveness calculations and justifications to fund nuclear advocacy were particularly poorly done.

IMO the "cash transfers" benchmark for climate change funding is buying banned F-gases recovered from appliances and destroying them at around $20/ton CO2e. (Some F-gases are banned from manufacture, but what exists in appliances can be recaptured and resold, and some of the gas leaks out overtime).

I think the casual climate donor can get similar value to the climate funds at much less risk with the F-gas donation. This will change once the F-gas opportunity gets exhausted, but the amount of EA climate money is far from exhausting it.

To clarify on donations - I think if you still want to give to individual recommended climate charities recommend by Giving Green or to research operations that's fine. The alternative protein space I think is likely the best bet. I just don't think the FP or GG funds are particularly impactful right now.

Can you define TAI in the summary of your post?

Strongly downvoted because of several fundamental errors. The post confuses energy with energy services, and ignores the role that efficiency plays in reducing the demand for energy. It also misunderstands that meat alternatives including cell culture varieties are for more energy efficient today on a primary energy basis than the animal-based meats they replace. There are several other unsupported or incorrect claims on animal advocate intentions and key factors influencing animal agriculture an meat alternative scaling.

A common qualification added to the healthy patient case is that the killing and distribution could be done in a way with plausible deniability, or it is done in a remote setting where the doctor is the only one who would know what happened. The central challenge of the case is on means versus ends, so make whatever adjustments you need to avoid the evasive rejoinder that not killing is in fact the more utilitarian option.

But lets turn to the other case I gave: would you be ok with others engaging in human trafficking if they donated enough to reduce human trafficking elsewhere? Would this absolve the morally blameworthy acts they commit? If not, then you are drawing a distinction not on the quality or quantity suffering, but simply on who is doing the suffering. If you seek to change my mind rather just reaffirming your own position, you are going to need a make a case that the who (human vs. non-human animal) is sufficiently metaphysically different to warrant using beings as means in one case but not the other.

I think the question is quite similar to the case of a doctor killing a healthy patient to use their organs to save five other sick patients.

Or as another comparison, using trafficked people for personal ends but donating enough to reduce human trafficking elsewhere.

People, and non-human animals, are not simply reducible to means to serve utilitarian ends.

Just get a room air filter for your condo. There are different models and they are usually quite quiet unless on the highest setting. I can't hear mine on the two lowest settings (up to 100 CFM). UVC doesn't remove small particulates, which is the most serious air pollutant of concern from a health perspective for most homes.

Commercial buildings have to comply with locally required codes and standards. Code authorities could adopt some or all of ASHRAE Standard 241 in their jurisdiction just like they do with ASHRAE Standard 62.1 (ventilation) and 90.1 (energy).

Far-UVC produces ozone. That's inherent to the technology. That can be managed with ventilation, so places with already high ventilation rates where you don't want the added static pressure in the air supply from greater filtration are a good fit for UVC. In other places, in-room air cleaners tend to be cheaper to operate and maintain. The "best" technology depends on space constraints, ventilation rates, first cost, maintenance, etc. If far-UVC gets cheaper, I expect it will become more widely used. But I don't think it will fully dominate the space.

My position is the same as last year - I think there is enough technology at great enough maturity where it makes more sense to push for ASHRAE 241 adoption. Why doesn't your local grocery store have airborne infection control technology? Is it because lack of sufficient technology development or cost, or more likely, because they don't even know that's a thing they should do?