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Neel Nanda

5460 karmaJoined neelnanda.io

Bio

I lead the DeepMind mechanistic interpretability team

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413

My argument is essentially that "similar income, non impactful job" is as relevant a reference class to the "similar income, impactful job person" as it is as a reference class to the "high income, non impactful job" person. I also personally think reference classes is the wrong way to think about it. If taking a more impactful job also makes someone obliged to take on a lower post donation salary (when they don't have to), I feel like something has gone wrong, and the incentives are not aligned with doing the most good.

This is reasonable. I think the key point that I want to defend is that it seems wrong to say that choosing a more impactful job should mean you ought to have a lower post donation salary.

I personally think of it in terms of having some minimum obligation for doing your part (which I set at 10% by default), plus encouragement (but not obligation) to do significant amounts more good if you want to

Kudos for making the hard decision to cut so many things! This seems the best thing for GWWC's impact

Suppose they're triplets, and Charlotte, also initially identical, earns $1M/year just like Belinda, but can't/doesn't want to switch to safety. How much of Charlotte's income should she donate in your worldview? What is the best attitude for the EA community?

My point is that, even though there's a moral obligation, unless you think that high earning people in finance should be donating a very large fraction of their salary (so their post donation pay is less than the pay in AI safety), their de facto moral obligation has increased by the choice to do direct work, which is unreasonable to my eyes.

I would also guess that at least most people doing safety work at industry labs could get a very well paying role at a top tier finance firm? The talent bar is really high nowadays

My point is that "other people in the income bracket AFTER taking a lower paying job" is the wrong reference class.

Let's say someone is earning $10mn/year in finance. I totally think they should donate some large fraction of their income. But I'm pretty reluctant to argue that they should donate more than 99% of it. So it seems completely fine to have a post donation income above $100K, likely far above.

If this person quits to take a job in AI Safety that pays $100K/year, because they think this is more impactful than their donations, I think it would be unreasonable to argue that they need to donate some of their reduced salary, because then their "maximum acceptable post donation salary" has gone down, even though they're (hopefully) having more impact than if they donated everything above $100K

I'm picking fairly extreme numbers to illustrate the point, but the key point is that choosing to do direct work should not reduce your "maximum acceptable salary post donations", and that at least according to my values, that max salary post donation is often above what they get paid in their new direct role.

My reasoning was roughly that the machine learning skill set is also extremely employable in finance which tends to pay better. though openai salaries do get pretty high nowadays and if you value openai and anthropic equity at notably above their current market value, then plausibly, they're higher paying. Definitely agreed it's not universal.

I disagree and think that b is actually totally sufficient justification. I'm taking as an assumption that we're using an ethical theory that says people do not have an unbounded ethical obligation to give everything up to subsistence and that it is fine to set some kind of a boundary and fraction of your total budget of resources that you spend on altruistic purposes. Many people doing well paying altruistic careers (eg technical AI safety careers) could earn dramatically more money eg at least twice as much, if they were optimising for the highest paying career they could. I'm fairly sure I could be earning a lot more than I currently am if that was my main goal. But I consider the value of my labour from an altruistic perspective to exceed the additional money I could be donating and therefore do not see myself to have a significant additional ethical obligation to donate (though I do donate a fraction of my income anyway because I want to)

By foregoing a large amount of income for altruistic reasons, I think such people are spending a large amount of their resource budget on altruistic purposes, and that if they still have an obligation to donate more money that people in higher paying careers should be obliged to donate far more. Which is a consistent position, but not one I hold

In light of recent discourse on EA adjacency, this seems like a good time to publicly note that I still identify as an effective altruist, not EA adjacent.

I am extremely against embezzling people out of billions of dollars of money, and FTX was a good reminder of the importance of "don't do evil things for galaxy brained altruistic reasons". But this has nothing to do with whether or not I endorse the philosophy that "it is correct to try to think about the most effective and leveraged ways to do good and then actually act on them". And there are many people in or influenced by the EA community who I respect and think do good and important work.

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