Re: bets - I am highly uncertain about AI timelines myself. Amongst the EA/AI community, I think my timelines would be considered "long" - I expect major advancements in robotics will be needed for AI to displace more than about 20% of the current jobs in developed countries, and I don't expect that could happen within the next 10 years. 

The data in this area is pretty shaky. On the graph you have shared specifically:

• Although the graph goes back to 1820, there is actually very limited data before WWI, as most countries didn't have income taxes back then (which is the main source of data). In fact, when you click on the individual countries, most of them do not go back before 1900. The US starts in 1913, China starts in 1979, India in 1923, Indonesia in 1984 and Nigeria in 1985. Japan's series doesn't start until 2008!! Clicking through the countries, it looks like countries with considerably less than half of the current world's population had any data before 1900, and I am not sure what extrapolations they had to make to get the "World" figures they use for teh graph.
• I would also be very sceptical of income data for developing countries, which tend to have large "informal economies".
• China is an interesting case. There is no doubt that China has experienced enormous economic growth since its economy opened up in the late 1970s. But the graph for China shows the income share of the top 10% growing from 28% of China's income to 41.7%! Caveats about data reliability still apply, but that is quite a shocking increase in inequality.

More generally - there is some evidence that median wages have started to decouple from general productivity growth, with the labour share of income declining over the past ~20-30 years. Economists argue about the data, the causes of this, and whether it is a temporary or lasting change. But some think it is because “superstar” firms with low labour shares have taken a greater market share thanks to globalisation and digitsation. See e.g. Autor et al (2020), and this 2018 OECD working paper.

In any case, I don't think we are going to resolve this disagreement by exchanging data because: (1) data is limited; (2) there are so many different ways to interpret the data and experts genuinely disagree on this; and (3) we can also argue over the extent to which the past predicts the future. I think there is only so much we can learn from the past as I am concerned AI can be different in important ways - i.e. I think it is very plausible that the distributional impacts of automating cognitive labour will be quite different to the impacts of automating physical labour or routine, administrative tasks, but I won't be able to prove this with data. 

The main reason I replied wasn't to get into an argument over data as that can go on for days with no resolution. Rather, I replied because I saw this post already had a fair number of "disagree-votes" and only one comment explaining why, so I thought I should at least explain my alternative view.

This argument seems to be based on the view that "jobs" are just tasks that need to be done in the economy, and that it's better if we have AI/robots that can do those tasks more efficiently. But "jobs" have a dual role - for most people, they are also the main pathway for upward social mobility. 

Financial capital follows a power law distribution. Human capital is normally distributed. Jobs are therefore the main mechanism we have in society for those who were not lucky enough to be born into financial capital to nevertheless earn a living and get a share of the vast wealth that "the economy" produces. If that mechanism is obliterated - what other ways are there to ensure people not born into financial capital to get wealth? Will they have to rely on altruism alone? 

I have heard people worry that the new wealth produced by AI will all be concentrated in the hands of, say, five people, and the rest of us will be left to starve.

I think this is a strawman of actual wealth concentration concerns. Most reasonably informed people I know who hold these concerns aren't expecting AI's wealth to be concentrated in the hands of 5 people. But AI's wealth could easily be concentrated in the hands of the people who hold the majority of AI-related capital - say, the top 10% globally - 800 million people (and their descendants) - with few pathways for those not born into capital to get a share of that wealth. Even the top 1% globally is 80 million people. 

If these 80 million people hold the vast majority of wealth and power, it is foolish to think that the rest of society can "just keep doing what they're currently doing", completely unaffected. For example, if the top 80 million people got incredibly wealthy to the point that they each got private jets (according to Google, there are currently only about 25k private jets), that alone could raise air pollution or carbon emissions in a way that definitely impacts the other 99% of the world. 

Good interview. On why there is such vast disagreement about AI's potential economic impacts - I do think Ajeya's hypothesis about different base rates has merit, and I also agree that many economists are simply not entertaining the premise where AI actually can beat the top humans at all cognitive tasks. 

But I think one grossly underrated reason why economists and AI futurists talk past each other on this point is that most futurists don't understand what "economic growth" and "GDP" actually measure. Presumably, when futurists talk about "economic growth", they use it as a shorthand to refer to real output rather than nominal output, since the latter can be increased by simply printing money. However, we don't have ways to directly measure real economic growth — rather, all our measures are based on market transactions at nominal prices, and then we apply some "deflator" to account for inflation. Some adjustments are also attempted to account for changes in quality and consumer tastes (i.e. the consumption basket today is vastly different from the consumption basket 100 years ago), but this is a very messy and imperfect process. 

One of the reasons why GDP is so bad at capturing technological changes is that productivity improvements are, all else equal, deflationary. Consider AI-generated video and art - there is ~infinitely more of this today than there was 10 years ago, but because most of that is generated at such low costs, the amount that that video and art contribute to GDP is trivial. 

At the same time, AI will not eliminate positional and status goods. So even if AI eliminates all physical scarcity, positional goods are likely to then take up more and more of the overall "economy". This suggests that the correlation between GDP and the well-being metrics that people actually care about will weaken, if not decouple entirely. 

I suspect much of the gap between mainstream economists and AI futurists would shrink (though not entirely vanish) if futurists just stopped referring to "economic growth" and instead referred to how they expect physical output or energy usage to change over time. Both the Agricultural and Industrial Revolutions can be explained just as well, if not better, with energy usage as with GDP. I think the same will be true of TAI. Most economists would readily concede that AI could increase energy usage by 1000x or more if AI managed to solve nuclear fusion (for example) - they'd just be (rightly) sceptical of any suggestion that that translates to a 1000x increase in measured GDP. 

Thanks for the post. I generally agree with your arguments but thought I should respond as someone currently doing research on a non-alignment problem. While I want a global pause, I have no idea what I personally can do to help achieve that. Whereas I at least have some idea of actions I can take that might help reduce the "massive increase in inequality/power concentration" problem. 

"Solve philosophy" is not the same thing as "implement the correct philosophy", and we need the AI to bridge that gap. There is a near-consensus among moral philosophers that factory farming is wrong, yet it persists.

This is a great point and I just wanted to call it out. I do think research is most likely to make a difference when it is produced with some thought about implementation - i.e. who the relevant audience is, how to get it to them, whether the actions you are recommending they take are actually within their power, etc. 

Thank you! Appreciate the feedback :)

I sort of see where both criticisms are coming from. The lowest-common-denominator, community-related posts get the highest engagement (including from people like the OP) because they require little context. The high context technical stuff is much harder to parse, and necessarily has a smaller audience, so gets less engagement (perhaps with the exception for AI Safety, which is currently experiencing a "boom"). 

There will naturally be fewer technical posts in the areas I'm interested in and, like Michael_PJ, I have no desire to read long technical posts in areas I'm not interested in, so I end up engaging disproportionately with community-related posts. 

Fiddling with the forum filters helps - I personally have downweighted posts tagged "Community" and "Building effective altruism" - but I suspect few people do this.

Hi Dushan. I cover this at a high level under "But impacts will be uneven" heading. I agree with you that countries in the supply chain will benefit and others less so.

Thank you! Yes, totally fair point. I am not trained in development economics so was very uncertain about this post, and expected there to be large differences between countries that I wouldn't pick up. It's disappointing to hear that the development econ mainstream has not been engaging with this topic.  

I had in mind the lower-income countries (mostly in Africa) when writing most of this. Your point about how, without TAI, these countries might be able to develop export industries and climb the development ladder is an interesting one. I had thought of that briefly, but was unsure how likely that was to happen, given we haven't seen any African country do it yet (to my knowledge). But perhaps it's just something that takes time and can only really happen after the middle-income countries become rich.