The new fund management teams for Animal Welfare, Long-Term Future and EA Meta Funds will be holding AMAs about their grant making on the EA Forum this Thursday, 20th December.

This will be a chance to put any questions you may have about the recent sets of grants they made, how they envision their decision making processes in future rounds and other related topics, directly to the management teams.

Look out for the AMA threads coming online tomorrow, so we will be able to start collecting questions ahead of time. If you do not get to participate in the next couple of days, feel free to use those threads to ask questions for the next few weeks, and they may still be able to get to answering some of those after the "official" period of the AMA finishes.

Edit: The Long-Term Future Fund AMA thread is live. As are the threads for the Animal Welfare and EA Meta Funds.

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In the future, I think it'd make more sense to announce these kinds of AMAs with more advance notice. Most community members wouldn't notice or be prepared for an AMA a day in advance. I've noticed in the last few months many community members, in particular those who'd otherwise be inclined to donate to the EA Funds, are still quite cynical about the EA Funds being worth their money. I appreciate the changes that have been made to the EA Funds, having said as much, and I am fully satisfied the changes made to the EA Funds in light of my requests that such changes indeed be made. So I thought if there was anyone in the EA community whose opinion on how much the EA Funds appear to have improved in the last several months that would be worth something, it'd be mine. There is a lot of cynicism in spite of that. So I'd encourage the CEA and the EA Funds management teams to take their roles very seriously.

On another note, I want to apologize if it comes across as if I'm being too demanding of Marek in particular, who I am grateful to for the singularly superb responsibility he has taken in making sure the EA Funds are functioning to the satisfaction of donors as much as is feasible.

For the record, the AMAs were mentioned as upcoming in the New EA Funds management thread and a few-day window was given on Dec. 5 in the December quick update thread

Is there any chance there will be an AMA for the Global Health & Development EA Fund?

There is a good chance there will be an AMA for the Global Health & Development Fund later in the year, especially if Elie Hassenfeld ends up also forming a team.

Any news about this is likely to come in the second half of 2019.

looking forward to this! Thanks for organising, Marek

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