We used to have Open Threads on this forum. I was hoping someone would bring them back. No one did. So now I'm the change I want to see in the world.

Use this thread to post things that are awesome, but not awesome enough to be full posts. This is also a great place to post if you don't have enough karma to post on the main forum.

Also Happy New Year!

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The EARadio podcast is back on iTunes. (The podcast is an aggregation of publicly available talks relevant to EA, such as those from EA Global.)

It had been delisted for the better part of a year, but I failed to noticed because I don't use iTunes. (The most likely reason for its delisting is that it didn't specify whether it contained explicit language, which is now an Apple requirement.)

Subscription links:

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How hardcore or entry-level is it?

This isn't your first EA podcast. This is not so much because the content is difficult, but because it has relatively low production value (it's just EA conference talks in podcast format). The 80,000 Hours Podcast, Hear This Idea, and The FLI Podcast are more entertaining and polished while still being similarly informative, and I'd recommend listening to those first.

In my ongoing and perhaps quixotic quest to bridge the worlds of EA and arts philanthropy, I have a blog post up at Stanford Social Innovation Review that gives effective altruism a shout-out. I also have a more detailed opinion piece on domain-specific EA coming out in the spring print edition of SSIR.

Do any animal welfare EAs have anything to say on animal products from ethically raised animals, and how to identify such animal products? It seems plausible to me that consumption of such animal products could even be morally positive on net, if the animals are treated well enough to have lives worth living, and raising them does not reduce wild animal populations much more than the production of non-animal-product substitutes. Most animal welfare EAs seem confident that almost all animals raised for the production of animal products do not live lives worth living, and that most claims by producers that their animals are treated well are false. However, there are independent organizations (e.g. the Cornucopia Institute's egg and dairy scorecards) that agree that such claims are often false, but also claim to be able to identify producers that do treat their animals well. Thoughts?

I believe funding work on corporate engagement to improve farm animal welfare probably has much higher expected value than any personal decisions about diet. There are limitations in this area regarding room for more funding, but Compassion in World Farming USA is an effective organization that seems to have room for funding in corporate engagement:

http://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/suggestions-individual-donors-open-philanthropy-project-staff-2016#Compassion_in_World_Farming_USA_

That being said, I personally find these questions interesting, and here are some thoughts.

I believe the average beef cattle in the US has net positive welfare. So in terms of direct effects on farm animal welfare, I believe eating beef increases welfare. There are indirect effects though, and some are presumably negative, including climate change, and mice and birds killed in fields for feed production. Other indirect effects might be positive (i.e. reducing insect suffering). There are other reasons why people might want to avoid beef though, such as the view that killing animals for food is inherently wrong, or the view that unnecessary harm to an animal (i.e. castration without anesthesia) cannot be offset by X number of happy days on pasture.

Beef cattle might be alone in this regard. I thought that the average dairy cow in the US might have net positive welfare but I did some more investigation and now believe their welfare is somewhat net negative. Other potential candidates for animals in the US with net positive welfare may be other small ruminants (sheep, goats) but I couldn't find much evidence on the welfare of these animals.

The overwhelming majority eggs in the US come from hens raised in battery cages, which I believe experience strongly net negative welfare. Moving from conventional eggs to cage-free eggs probably substantially reduces suffering. I believe avoiding eggs completely would eliminate suffering even further though, because cage-free has its own animal welfare problems.

"Organic" in the US probably means at least somewhat improved welfare in some animal products (eggs, pork, dairy), and not in others (chicken, beef). Generally organic in the US prohibits extreme confinement, which is relevant for egg-laying hens (bans battery cages), the mothers of pigs raised for pork (bans gestation crates), and dairy cows (bans tie-stalls which ~10% of dairy cows are housed in). Organic dairy also requires that the cows spend some time on pasture.

I haven't spend much time looking at other animal welfare certifications, but I'm skeptical of most of these. I'd note though that Open Philanthropy has issued a grant to the Global Animal Partnership (GAP) which suggests to me that GAP certifications are meaningful. That doesn't mean, however, that GAP certified animal products are from animals with net positive welfare.

http://www.openphilanthropy.org/focus/us-policy/farm-animal-welfare/global-animal-partnership-general-support

I should note that farmed fish probably have net negative welfare, and eating farmed fish is probably particularly harmful because of how long they live (~20x as long as chickens raised for meat). I believe wild fish is probably similarly harmful, because supply of wild fish seems to be constrained and so demand for wild fish probably mostly just increases supply of farmed fish. I mention this because many people have the impression that eating less meat and more fish would reduce farm animal suffering, and I believe this view is likely very wrong.

"Organic" in the US probably means at least somewhat improved welfare in some animal products (eggs, pork, dairy), and not in others (chicken, beef).

Could you explain why the same factors don't apply to chicken?

Organic prohibits extreme confinement such as battery cages, but all broiler chickens (raised for meat) in the US are free to roam around in a shed. The main welfare issues come from rapid growth, poor lighting, poor air quality, overcrowding, transport, and slaughter. Organic broiler chickens must have outdoor access, but this is probably less important than the other welfare issues, and there are no requirements regarding the size of the outdoor area or that the chickens must use it.

Thanks for this.

Is chickens not going outside a major problem? Their having the option to go outside but choosing not to seems to suggest they prefer inside, and would be worse off if forced to go outside.

It's probably a relatively minor problem. I've read that the chickens often don't go outside because they are afraid of predators and do not like the small barren lots provided, but are more likely to go outside into areas with tall grass and bushes to hide in. I've also heard an anecdote from a friend with pet chickens (rescued egg-laying hens) that the chickens would go outside to a balcony to dustbathe for a few minutes and then quickly come back indoors. (Though in this case, the indoor alternative was a comfortable apartment rather than an uncomfortable shed.)

Thanks for writing this.

How often do people want to see Open Threads? Are they useful?

Monthly or perhaps every 2 months.

I would be happy to see them once every other month or so.

When we did them once a month they got only a few comments, but I'd say that's no problem and they're still helpful. We added that link to them in the sidebar, so that's a reason to keep them up. We should change the intro text to explicitly welcome people new to EA with any sorts of questions or observations.

Standardizing / fixing the intro text sounds good to me.

Is there a way to get the sidebar link to automatically update?

Yes, the .impact team has the details - probably neatest if I don't post it here!

(There's a whole set up procedure for them that they follow, including there being once a month. It's part of their procedure for doing the EA Newsletter to post an open thread with its contents at the same time. What sort of a board member are you not knowing every single detail? :p ;) )

I think it's useful to have a place to post for those who don't have enough karma for a full post. As for "things that are awesome, but not awesome enough to be full posts", isn't the EA facebook group to be a suitable place for this?

META: The EAForum is usually a vehicle for people to launch reasonably well-researched, interesting and informative articles that they've written, typically ones that are relevant to a decent proportion of the EA population.The comments are then used for subtle disagreements, criticisms, and clarifications.

However, some of the recent posts have been of the form "Hey what do you think of X?" or "Do people have links to Y?" or "Should we do Z", which seems more appropriate for reddit or a Facebook group. Ie, treating it like an actual forum rather than a metaphorical forum.

Do people think (like me) that the classical norms governing the EAForum makes more sense? Or should we allow it to organically develop (or encourage it to develop) into more a forum style communication, with short top-level posts and lots of back and forth?

I am hoping that having regular open threads will solve the problem,so that people who want indexable conversations can be satisfied and people who go to EAForum for the long posts will be happy as well.

Agreed, my hope is that Open Threads will allow the "Hey what do you think of X?" or "Do people have links to Y?" or "Should we do Z" conversations to take place in a better location.

I also think there is some demand for less-formal discussion here (such as in Open Threads, like you say) because of the current somewhat-low population at lesswrong.com.

I agree that a subreddit could fill this niche, however i am not aware of any currently existing subreddit for this.

Good Ventures recently announced that it plans to increase its grantmaking budget substantially (yay!). Does this affect anyone's view on how valuable it is to encourage people to take the GWWC pledge on the margin?

A sharper way to put the question would be by how much this news should make us discount GiveWell's claims about a $1000 donation can do. (Also because not everyone's going to take the GWWC pledge of course. The key thing is simply that they donate and donate wisely.)

What is the most pressing healthcare issue in Haiti right now? What can we do to help the situation in Haiti? Is it too late? What is currently being done to help Haiti?

In Bostromian AI Safety people often talk about human-level intelligence, defined roughly as more efficient mental performance than humans on all tasks humans care about. Has anyone ever tried to sketch out some subsets of human abilities that would still be sufficient to make a software system highly disruptive? This could develop into a stronger and more specific claim than Bostrom's. For example, perhaps a system with 'just' a superhuman ability to observe and model economics, or to find new optimization algorithms (etc) could be almost as concerning to a more vaguely defined 'human-level intelligence' AGI.

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Notes  The following text explores, in a speculative manner, the evolutionary question: Did high-intensity affective states, specifically Pain, emerge early in evolutionary history, or did they develop gradually over time? Note: We are not neuroscientists; our work draws on our evolutionary biology background and our efforts to develop welfare metrics that accurately reflect reality and effectively reduce suffering. We hope these ideas may interest researchers in neuroscience, comparative cognition, and animal welfare science. This discussion is part of a broader manuscript in progress, focusing on interspecific comparisons of affective capacities—a critical question for advancing animal welfare science and estimating the Welfare Footprint of animal-sourced products.     Key points  Ultimate question: Do primitive sentient organisms experience extreme pain intensities, or fine-grained pain intensity discrimination, or both? Scientific framing: Pain functions as a biological signalling system that guides behavior by encoding motivational importance. The evolution of Pain signalling —its intensity range and resolution (i.e., the granularity with which differences in Pain intensity can be perceived)— can be viewed as an optimization problem, where neural architectures must balance computational efficiency, survival-driven signal prioritization, and adaptive flexibility. Mathematical clarification: Resolution is a fundamental requirement for encoding and processing information. Pain varies not only in overall intensity but also in granularity—how finely intensity levels can be distinguished.  Hypothetical Evolutionary Pathways: by analysing affective intensity (low, high) and resolution (low, high) as independent dimensions, we describe four illustrative evolutionary scenarios that provide a structured framework to examine whether primitive sentient organisms can experience Pain of high intensity, nuanced affective intensities, both, or neither.     Introdu
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Article 5 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: "Obviously, no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." OK, it doesn’t actually start with "obviously," but I like to imagine the commissioners all murmuring to themselves “obviously” when this item was brought up. I’m not sure what the causal effect of Article 5 (or the 1984 UN Convention Against Torture) has been on reducing torture globally, though the physical integrity rights index (which “captures the extent to which people are free from government torture and political killings”) has increased from 0.48 in 1948 to 0.67 in 2024 (which is good). However, the index reached 0.67 already back in 2001, so at least according to this metric, we haven’t made much progress in the past 25 years. Reducing government torture and killings seems to be low in tractability. Despite many countries having a physical integrity rights index close to 1.0 (i.e., virtually no government torture or political killings), many of their citizens still experience torture-level pain on a regular basis. I’m talking about cluster headache, the “most painful condition known to mankind” according to Dr. Caroline Ran of the Centre for Cluster Headache, a newly-founded research group at the Karolinska Institutet in Sweden. Dr. Caroline Ran speaking at the 2025 Symposium on the recent advances in Cluster Headache research and medicine Yesterday I had the opportunity to join the first-ever international research symposium on cluster headache organized at the Nobel Forum of the Karolinska Institutet. It was a 1-day gathering of roughly 100 participants interested in advancing our understanding of the origins of and potential treatments for cluster headache. I'd like to share some impressions in this post. The most compelling evidence for Dr. Ran’s quote above comes from a 2020 survey of cluster headache patients by Burish et al., which asked patients to rate cluster headach
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A while back (as I've just been reminded by a discussion on another thread), David Thorstad wrote a bunch of posts critiquing the idea that small reductions in extinction risk have very high value, because the expected number of people who will exist in the future is very high: https://reflectivealtruism.com/category/my-papers/mistakes-in-moral-mathematics/. The arguments are quite complicated, but the basic points are that the expected number of people in the future is much lower than longtermists estimate because: -Longtermists tend to neglect the fact that even if your intervention blocks one extinction risk, there are others it might fail to block; surviving for billions  (or more) of years likely  requires driving extinction risk very low for a long period of time, and if we are not likely to survive that long, even conditional on longtermist interventions against one extinction risk succeeding, the value of preventing extinction (conditional on more happy people being valuable) is much lower.  -Longtermists tend to assume that in the future population will be roughly as large as the available resources can support. But ever since the industrial revolution, as countries get richer, their fertility rate falls and falls until it is below replacement. So we can't just assume future population sizes will be near the limits of what the available resources will support. Thorstad goes on to argue that this weakens the case for longtermism generally, not just the value of extinction risk reductions, since the case for longtermism is that future expected population  is many times the current population, or at least could be given plausible levels of longtermist extinction risk reduction effort. He also notes that if he can find multiple common mistakes in longtermist estimates of expected future population, we should expect that those estimates might be off in other ways. (At this point I would note that they could also be missing factors that bias their estimates of