We're excited to announce that we have updated the China x AI Reference list, which we had first published in Feb 2024. We had originally intended to produce updates every ~year, and this is the first such update. 

The full text of the updated version follows below, and can also be found in the original GoogleDoc.

Introduction

Background

• There are several China-focused AI reading lists / curricula out there (e.g.: AI governance & China: Reading list (2023), FHI Syllabus (2020), (Basic) Chinese AI Regulation Reading List (2023))
  • They are either relatively brief or somewhat outdated, so this reading list aims to provide a more comprehensive set of key resources when it comes to learning about China, AI safety and policy.
  • We incorporated readings from these reading lists where it felt relevant.
• This list is based on a community-generated set of readings that were used for a 6-week AI and China discussion group run by the China & Global Priorities Group in 2023. Last update: June 2025

Structure

• This is designed as a longlist that can act as a starting point for folks looking to dive deeper into this topic and various sub-topics — it is not a snapshot of the 3 most important readings per topic area.
• The entire reading list is broken down into key themes.
• We have added in commentary where we felt it would be useful to do so (e.g., we were made aware of potential factual inaccuracies or biased views).
• Within sections, sources are arranged roughly in order of relevance, not chronology. Sources earlier in a section are more foundational, while later ones are either primary sources that require more context to analyze or older reports/analysis. Sometimes we put related readings next to each other.

Ways to get involved

• Feel free to suggest additional readings using this form - we’re doing some amount of vetting to prevent the list from ballooning out of control.
• Join the China & Global Priorities Group if you want to be notified about further discussion groups organized.

Caveats around sources and structures

• Epistemic status:
  • This resource list was put together in a voluntary capacity by a group of non-Chinese folks with backgrounds in China Studies and professional work experience on China- and/or AI-related issues.
  • We spent several hours on resource collection and sense-checked items based on their style, content and methodology. We do not necessarily endorse all of these works as “very good,” but did exclude stuff where we could see that it is obviously low quality.
  • There are many subtopics where we struggled to find very high-quality material but we still included some publications to give interested readers a start.
• We expect that most of our audience will not be able to read Chinese easily or fluently, and as such we have provided many English sources. However, it’s important to remember that gaining a deep and concrete understanding of this space is really hard even with Chinese language skills and lived experience in China, so readers without those skills and experiences should be cautious about forming very strong views based on the select few sources that are included here.
• Machine translation is useful but imperfect in many ways.
  • Machine translation will not be able to tell you the significance of specific word choice, which potentially requires deeper knowledge of what terminology means in the broader ideological context of the party-state (this is especially true for official statements and documents).
  • Moreover, official English versions of Chinese government documents sometimes differ from the Chinese version, sometimes in meaningful ways!
  • What is Lost in Translation? Differences between Chinese Foreign Policy Statements and Their Official English Translations, Mokry, 2022
• China is not a monolith; sources you read that claim that “China does X” should be treated with caution. Different actors within China have different aims and while it’s true that the party-state has immense power, even the party-state itself is not one thing, but a collection of various entities and of people with their own specific desires and plans.
• If you are looking to do further research in this space, then treat this list as a starting point for further exploration.
• For further reading on methodological considerations of doing analysis related to China, you can start with a look at the following links:
  • We interviewed 15 China-focused researchers on how to do good research (disclaimer: two of the authors of that post also contributed to this reading list)
  • China watching in the ‘New Era’: A guide, Parton, 2022

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Oliver Guest, Jason Zhou, and Jeffrey Ding for their feedback on earlier drafts of this list. We would also like to acknowledge Aris Richardson and Zach Stein-Perlman, whose reading lists we took inspiration from.

Compiled by (in alphabetical order): Gabriel Wagner, Saad Siddiqui, Sarah Godek, and Sarah Weiler

Domestic Governance

Chinese policymaking overview

• How does the Chinese Communist Party operate?, South China Morning Post, 2021 (video)
  • This is really just a very superficial teaser on the basics of the party-state institutions. It does not explain how policy-making and enforcement works in practice. Watch if you know nothing.
• The US Congressional Research Service has several useful sources on the structure of the party-state:
  • China Primer: China’s Political System, Susan V. Lawrence, 2024 (2 pages)
  • China’s Political System in Charts: A Snapshot Before the 20th Party Congress, Susan V. Lawrence and Mari Y. Lee, 2021 (40 pages)
• Chinese Policymaking Made Easy with Trivium China, China Talk, 2019 (podcast)
• Infographic: China's New Leaders after the 20th Party Congress, Fairbank Centre for China Studies at Harvard University, James Gethyn Evans and Yuanzhuo Wang, 2022 (7 pages)
  • Gives an overview of the top leaders that were appointed to the Politburo, China’s top decision-making body. The infographic assumes familiarity with key terms and the names of significant political organs of the party-state.
• How China Works: An Introduction to China’s State-led Economic Development, Lan Xiaohuan, 2024 (350 pages)
  • English translation of a Chinese bestseller on the Chinese political economy.
• China's Political System, Sebastian Heilmann, 2016 (book)
  (Comprehensive notes from an anonymous AI governance researcher)
  • Very systematic overview of China’s political system. Probably not recommended reading from start to finish. The book is quite well organized with a good table of contents and index, making it easy to find relevant parts.
  • Perhaps especially valuable are Chapter 2.1 “Socialist organizational and ideological features” and Chapter 6 “Policy-Making: Processes and Outcomes.”

Science and technology policy

• Re-engineering China’s innovation machine: A series by MERICS and the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 2024
  • Comprehensive, high-level overview of recent reforms in China’s science and industrial policy.
  • For a less abstract analysis see Controlling the innovation chain - China’s strategy to become a science & technology superpower, MERICS, Jeroen Groenewegen-Lau and Michael Laha, 2023 (18 pages).
  • None of these address in detail the challenges the government faces in actually advancing these reforms.
  • If you want more detailed and quantitative/data-driven analysis on key PRC tech policy tools, CSET has good analysis, for instance:
    • Understanding Chinese Government Guidance Funds, CSET, Ngor Luong, Zachary Arnold, and Ben Murphy, 2021 (89 pages)
    • China’s State Key Laboratory System, CSET, Emily S. Weinstein, Channing Lee, Ryan Fedasiuk, and Anna Puglisi, 2022 (45 pages)
• High Wire: How China Regulates Big Tech and Governs Its Economy, Angela Huyue Zhang, 2024 (pdfs) (full book: 291 pages)
  • Chapters 1-3 develop a theoretical framework to understand regulatory dynamics in China’s technology governance, marked by hierarchy, volatility, and fragility.
  • Chapters 4-8 analyze the regulatory “tech crackdown” of 2020-2022 and chapter 11 analyzes the evolving regulations of generative AI, as case studies to apply and illustrate the framework. Scrutinizes the role and behavior of the state leadership, firms, technology users, and regulatory agencies.
  • Chapter 9 compares China to other jurisdictions, and chapter 10 provides a tentative assessment of the effects of China’s regulatory efforts to date.
• China’s Model of Science: Rationale, Players, Issues, BluePath Labs & China Aerospace Studies Institute, 2022 (89 pages)
  • Quite a long and advanced read, might be challenging to digest if you don’t have much China-related background, but is a very thoroughly researched analysis of Chinese decision-makers' thinking. Slightly out of date, written before 2023 scitech government agency restructuring.
• Reading the Tea Leaves on China’s New Central Science and Technology Commission, Jimmy Goodrich, 2024
• The Trajectory of China’s Industrial Policies, Barry Naughton, Siwen Xiao, and Yaosheng Xu, 2023 (33 pages)
  • Describes important shifts in PRC industrial policy over the past decades, most notably a shift in focus from economic growth to security and self-reliance.
  • Explains well China’s vision for a “enterprise-driven, government-steered” tech ecosystem.
  • Naughton is a very authoritative scholar for China’s economy, and mostly researched industrial policy in recent years.
• Xi Jinping speech on science and technology, Xi Jinping, Pekingnology Translation, 2021 (19 pages)
  • Probably skip this if you have no previous experience with reading original Chinese party-state documents.
  • Very comprehensive outline of Xi’s thoughts on scitech, what it means for the economy and global competition, key challenges China faces, etc.

Domestic AI policy

Broad approaches

• "Domestic AI Governance" in "State of AI Safety in China", Concordia AI, 2023 (pages 7-23)
  • For broader context: original 2023 report
  • For developments since then: 2024 spring update , AI Safety in China: 2024 in Review, and State of AI Safety in China (2025) (“Domestic Governance” p. 7-35)
• Forum: Xi's Message to the Politburo on AI, DigiChina, 2025
  • Short interpretations by multiple scholars on China’s April 2025 Politburo session on AI.
• Older resources that could still likely serve as good starting points:
  • Full Translation: China’s ‘New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan’, DigiChina, Graham Webster, Rogier Creemers, Elsa Kania, and Paul Triolo, 2017 (35 pages)
  • Deciphering China’s AI Dream, Jeffrey Ding, 2018 (44 pages)
• Chapter 2 “China’s AI Approach: A Top-Down Nationally Concerted Strategy?” in this book (based on this article), Jinghan Zeng, 2022 (book)
  • Provides key context on central-local relations in China’s AI governance, debunks the claim that China’s AI development is driven by a coherent strategy.
  • Other chapters in the book could also be useful, pick at your own discretion.
• China’s Approach to Promoting Artificial Intelligence as a General Purpose Technology, Jeffrey Ding, 2022 (22 pages)
• What We Get Wrong About AI & China, interview with Jeffrey Ding, 2023 (10 pages)
• Alibaba and CAICT researchers analyze domestic & int'l approaches to AI governance, translation by ChinAI, Jeffrey Ding, 2023 (2 pages, full translation 10 pages)
• Assessing Beijing Municipality’s push for General AI, Oliver Guest, 2025.

Regulations

• Tracing the Roots of China’s AI Regulations, Matt Sheehan, 2024 (25 pages)
  • Goes into detail about the societal circumstances and policymaking process behind 2 of China’s 3 AI laws - regulation on (a) recommendations algorithm and (b) deepfakes.
• China’s AI Regulations and How They Get Made, Matt Sheehan, 2023 (14 pages) (ChinaTalk podcast with the author)
  • Overview of existing binding regulations for AI, and a discussion on the process of how they are made.
  • Highlights how different stakeholders can influence AI policy in the PRC.
  • Probably worth checking out some of the author's other writing.
• Key Changes to Generative AI Measures, Jeremy Daum, 2023 (5 pages)
  • Overview of key differences between draft and final version of PRC’s generative AI regulations.
• SB 1047 with Socialist Characteristics: China’s Algorithm Registry in the LLM Era, ChinaTalk, 2024
  • Actual implementation mechanisms in the PRC’s generative AI regulations.
• A key, unresolved debate is whether existing AI regulations slow down Chinese AI developers:
  • Arguments that the regulations are restrictive:
    • AI in Chains, Ciel Qi, 2023 (7 pages)
    • How Tight AI Regs Hurt Chinese Firms, anonymous, 2023 (9 pages)
  • Arguments that the regulations in fact support Chinese companies:
    • The Promise and Perils of China's Regulation of Artificial Intelligence Chinese Regulators Give AI Firms a Helping Hand, Angela Huyue Zhang, 2023 (53 pages)
      • Author explains similar arguments in this paywalled shorter oped (2 pages) and this presentation (video, 1 hour 28 minutes)
    • This site of the debate stresses that the broader regulatory environment matters just as much as regulation explicitly targeting AI, for instance highlighting pro-business copyright rulings in the PRC.
• On proposals for a comprehensive AI Law:
  • There are currently two groups of domestic scholars who have drafted proposals for a comprehensive AI Law. In contrast to the departmental  regulations discussed above, such a law would have a higher legislative level and be more horizontally comprehensive. Note that both of these are unofficial expert proposals, not official government drafts. The most recent legislative plan of China’s legislature has not listed an intention to draft an AI Law in 2025.
    • (1) Artificial Intelligence Law, Model Law (Expert Suggestion Draft), Zhou Hui et al.
      • Version 1.0 (2023),  Version 2.0 (2024), Version 3.0 (English) (2025)
      • Analysis of Version 1.0 Forum: Analyzing an Expert Proposal for China’s Artificial Intelligence Law, DigiChina, Graham Webster, Jason Zhou, Mingli Shi, Hunter Dorwart, Johanna Costigan, and Qiheng Chen, 2023(8 pages)
      • Analysis of changes version 1.0-2.0: ChinAI #262: Expert Draft AI Law Changelog, Saad Siddiqui, 2024
      • Analysis of changes version 2.0-3.0: AI Safety in China #20, Concordia AI, 2025
    • (2)  AI Law (Scholar Suggestion Draft), Zhang Linghan et al., 2024
    • Comparison of the two proposals: State of AI Safety in China Spring 2024 Update (page 57-58), Concordia AI, 2024
  • For recent (as of June 2025) analysis of the prospects for such proposals to become adopted:
    • Legislative plans do not prioritize an AI Law—but it remains on the agenda, Concordia AI, May 2025.
    • China’s AI Law: Recent Developments and Legislative Signals, Geopolitechs, June 2025.  
• Blue Paper Report on Large Model Governance (2023): From Rules to Practice, CAICT (China Academy of Information and Communications Technology, 中国信通院), 2023 (11 pages)
  • Probably start from Concordia’s coverage, and only read the whole thing if you feel it is specifically valuable. Partial translation by Jeff Ding here.
• In March 2025, China released regulations for labelling AI-generated content:
  • New AI Content Labelling Rules in China What are they and how do they compare to the EU AI Act, Toby Bond, Bird&Bird, 2025.  
  • Professor Zhang Linghan: China's AI-generated content labeling leads international practices, Geopolitechs, 2025.

Standards

• "Voluntary Standards" in "State of AI Safety in China", Concordia AI (page 13)
  • 2023 report (page 13)
  • 2024 report update (page 65-67)
  • 2025 report update (page 14-21)
• China’s approach to AI standardisation: State-guided but enterprise-led, Finnish Institute for International Affairs, 2024
• Basic security requirements for generative artificial intelligence service (in Chinese), Standardization Administration of China, May 2025.
  • This is China’s most comprehensive standard on AI safety/security. For a brief analysis, see AI Safety in China Newsletter #21, Concordia AI.
  • For more detailed analyses based on draft versions of this standard, see:
    • China’s GenAI Content Security Standard: An Explainer, ChinaTalk, 2024
    • ChinAI #271: Key Chinese GenAI Security Standard Changelog, Saad Siddiqui and Shao Heng, 2024
    • What's in China's new national standard on GAI service safety?, Geopolitechs, 2024.  
  • CSET has published an English translation of an early draft, note that this differs from the final official standard.
• AI Safety Governance Framework (English, Chinese), National Technical Committee 260 on Cybersecurity of the Standards Administration of China, 2024 (29 pages)
  • TC260 is a technical committee responsible for drafting AI safety/security standards in China.
  • For a basic analysis, see AI Safety in China #17 , Concordia AI, 2024; and China Unveils AI Safety Governance Framework to Lead Global Standards, Geopolitechs, 2024.
• The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) has established a new AI standards committee with an AI safety working group in December 2024.
  • For basic info see Concordia AI Newsletter and ChinaTalk Newsletter.
  • For their plans on AI safety standards over the next three years, see this official document (in Chinese).

Model evaluations / benchmarks

• China's AI Safety Evaluations Ecosystem, Concordia AI, 2024
• There are several types of safety evaluations that Chinese labs and researchers have conducted. These include SafetyBench (part of a broader SuperBench evaluation), Super-CLUE-safety, CVALUES. More details can be found in the Concordia AI report above.
• 人工智能关键技术和应用评测工业和信息化部重点实验室大模型工作纵览-, 语音之家, 2023 (4 pages) (failed to archive)
  • This is commentary around the CAICT model evaluations approach, tracing its development from a model engineering focus in 2020 to a Model-as-a-Service focus in 2024.
  • CAICT (a think tank under the MIIT) has been doing AI trustworthiness evaluations since ~2019/2020, and has started doing LLM evaluations in 2023 (archived link).
• ChinAI #315: Abandoned? Checking in on Three Key AI Safety Benchmarks, ChinAI, Jeffrey Ding, 2025.

AI ethics

• "S&T Ethics System" in "State of AI Safety in China", Concordia AI, 2023 (page 15)
• AI Ethics: Overview (China), China Law Vision, Samuel Yang, Chris Fung & Bill Zhou, 2025.
• China’s Approach to AI Ethics - Mapping AI ethics discussions in China, Danit Gal, 2020 (3 pages)
  • Very basic overview on China’s AI ethics documents.
• Primary sources / translations:
  • AI Expert Yi Zeng: Value Alignment with Humanity is AI’s Biggest Challenge, translation by Helen Toner, ChinAI, Jeffrey Ding, 2019 (2 pages, full translation 5 pages)
    • Interview with one of the leading Chinese AI ethicists about the Beijing Artificial Intelligence Principles (which are distinct from the “Governance Principles” below), CAIEG, (4 pages) (archived link)
  • Governance Principles for a New Generation of Artificial Intelligence: Develop Responsible Artificial Intelligence, The National New Generation Artificial Intelligence Governance Specialist Committee, blog post by New America, translation by Lorand Laskai and Graham Webster, 2019 (5 pages)
  • Ethical Norms for New Generation Artificial Intelligence, The National New Generation Artificial Intelligence Governance Specialist Committee, CSET translation, 2021 (6 pages)

AI safety funding

We do not know of any systematic analysis of AI safety funding in the PRC. Below are a few government-funded projects we happen to be aware of. They can, at best, serve illustrative purposes.

• National Natural Science Foundation of China releases application guide, encouraging AI safety research, Concordia, 2023 (section on funding 1 page)
  • “..proposes funding six projects at 500,000 RMB ($70,000) per project, in any of six research directions. Two of those directions are directly relevant to AI safety: “research on value and safety alignment strategy for large models” and “research on automated evaluation methods for generative models.”
  • Note: this is a very small funding stream and it is unclear how important this is overall; we suspect that labs are spending more on AI safety but, given the lack of sources, we remain uncertain.
• Notice on the Release of the “Guide to the 2023 Annual Projects for the Major Research Program on Explainable and Generalizable Next-Generation Artificial Intelligence Methods”, CSET, Translation by Kevin Wei, 2023 (14 pages)
  • Lays out 2023 funding priorities in ‘explainable’, ‘generalizable’ AI by NSFC (National Natural Science Foundation of China), one of the PRC’s main government bodies for basic research funding.
  • Some directions are related to AI safety (interpretability research), but others are focused on capabilities in specific domains like biotechnology or medicine.
  • No funding amount disclosed.
• 会议回顾｜国家科技创新2030——“新一代人工智能”重大项目“可信人工智能立法制度建设研究”启动暨实施方案论证会召开, Renmin Law and Technology Institute, 2023 (3 pages) (archived link)
  • The PRC is currently running 16 “Technological Innovation 2030 – Mega-Projects”  (2017–2030). One of them is focused on “next generation AI” (科技创新2030—“新一代人工智能”重大项目).
  • Funding for each mega-project is estimated to be around 50 billion RMB. But the mega projects are relatively opaque, and no official statistics on funding size are published.
  • Institutional set-up and supervision varies significantly from one project to the other (see Barry Naughton 2022, pp. 52–59).
    • China’s domestic Comac C919 aircraft, one of the 2006–2020 mega projects, was set up as a state-owned joint stock corporation.
    • Other “mega projects” are a loose collection of many smaller sub-projects executed by unis, research institutes and companies, supervised by a specific Ministry.
  • We are not aware of any systematic analysis of the AI-focused mega project. But it appears to be supervised by MoST, with new calls (archived link) for sub-project applications published every one or two years.
  • The article describes a kick-off meeting for one of these sub-projects titled “Research on Establishing a Trustworthy AI Legislative System”. It focuses on legal systems for aggregated data governance, algorithm governance, AI safety risk assessment, and more. The project is led by Renmin University and brings together 7 institutions including the China Electronic Technology Standardization Research Institute.
  • The article has detailed information about attendees.

International Governance

Overview

• “International Governance” in “State of AI Safety in China (2025)” (pp. 22-35) and "State of AI Safety in China Spring 2024 Update" (pp. 37–51) , Concordia AI
  • This resource provides a general overview of China’s approach to international AI governance, offering many concrete examples of initiatives and features of the country’s approach. It is an update of the original 2023 report.
• Beijing's Vision of Global AI Governance, Sihao Huang, 2023, (5 pages)
  • This resource provides an overview of China’s engagement with international governance of AI, including China’s Initiative for Global AI Governance.
• In Pursuit of (Soft) Power: Chinese Artificial Intelligence Governance in an Age of Great Power Competition, K Blomquist, 2022 (88 pages)
  • The article makes an interesting argument about the implementation of domestic policy as a means to influence foreign policy through demonstration of success.

Sino-western AI competition

Race dynamics

• The Most Dangerous Fiction: The Rhetoric and Reality of the AI Race,  Seán S ÓhÉigeartaigh, 2025.
  • Traces the emergence of the narrative that the US and China are in an AI race, offering recommendations for safeguarding stability and retaining prospects for international cooperation in a governance environment increasingly shaped by the impact of this narrative and rising geopolitical tension.
• Is China Racing to AGI?, ChinaTalk, 2025 (7 pages)
  • A debate between a "Believer" and "Skeptic" about whether China is racing to develop AGI arguing that while China is heavily investing in AI applications and DeepSeek has sparked renewed interest in AGI, there's little evidence of a coordinated government push toward AGI with the urgency and resource centralization seen in the US.
• Deepseek Unmasked: Exposing the CCP's Latest Tool for Spying, Stealing and Subverting U.S. Export Control Restrictions, House Select Committee on the CCP, 2025 (16 pages)
• There can be no winners in a US-China AI arms race, MIT Technology Review, Alvin Wang Graylin and Paul Triolo, 2025 (3 pages)
• US government commission pushes Manhattan Project-style AI initiative. Reuters, Anna Tong and Michael Martina, 2024 (1 page)
• An AI Race for Strategic Advantage: Rhetoric and Risks, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, Stephen Cave and Seán S ÓhÉigeartaigh, 2018 (4 pages)
• China Hawks are Manufacturing an AI Arms Race, Garrison Lovely, 2024 (4 pages)
• Tracking the US and China AI Arms Race, AI Now Institute, 2023 (23 pages)
• Taking the AI Arms Race as a Premise

Several influential pieces take the AI arms race as a premise and further perpetuate the narrative. These pieces are not about the ‘race’ itself, but have shaped discussions.

• AI 2027, Kokataljo et al., 2025 (71 pages)
  • A forecast of AI development and geopolitics – suggests that the current moment (mid-2025) is not necessarily an AGI race between the US and China but that China may soon ‘wake up’ to AGI.
  • Superintelligence Strategy, Hendrycks et al., 2025 (41 pages)
    • Argues against a Manhattan Project to build superintelligence, instead advocating deterrence as a strategy that both the US and China can use to prevent either side from building superintelligence.
  • Situational Awareness, Aschenbrenner, 2024 (165 pages)
    • Argues for a Manhattan Project for AGI in order to compete effectively with China
• The Illusion of China’s AI Prowess, Helen Toner, Jenny Xiao, and Jeffrey Ding, 2023, (7 pages)
  • Makes the case that there is a bigger gap between Chinese and Western models than observers in the West may expect.
• In U.S.-China AI contest, the race is on to deploy killer robots, Reuters, David Lague, 2023, (14 pages) (archived link)
  • Sensational title but actually gets into some of the first military tests utilizing AI and some of the race dynamics in that domain.
• See resources on the 2022/2023 US export controls on China below (an example of how US-China competition is playing out)

‘Gap’ between Chinese and Western AI models

• DeepSeek. Temu. TikTok. China Tech Is Starting to Pull Ahead, The New York Times, Eric Schmidt and Selina Xu, 2025
  • Former Google CEO argues that China’s AI industry is beginning to pull ahead from the US AI industry.
  • See further resources on DeepSeek, and what it might imply about the limits of U.S. export controls, in the Appendix
• Chinese AI Will Match America's, ChinaTalk, Lennart Heim, 2025
  • Compute governance expert Lennart Heim argues that China will match US AI capabilities in 2025, but US advantage remains its significantly larger total compute capacity.
• AI Index 2025, Stanford HAI, 2025, pp. 96–97
  • Compares US and Chinese models based on standardized benchmarks (MMLU, MMMU, MATH, Human Eval), generally showing a closing gap between US and Chinese models over time.
• LmSys Chatbot Arena
  • There are many different benchmarks and leaderboards but many AI experts refer to LmSys as one key source to gauge the performance of different AI models. As of June 2025, Chinese companies (DeepSeek and Alibaba) had models in the top 10 ranking, although the top 5 were American. On certain dimensions like CoPilot (i.e. coding assistants), DeepSeek’s R1 model ranked 1st.
  • Other benchmarks include: Scale AI’s SEAL Leaderboard, Artificial Analysis, and OpenCompass.

Sino-western AI cooperation

Cooperation can take many forms - including a range of different diplomatic dialogues (official, semi-official etc) to investment and scientific collaboration. It is worth noting that commercial and research collaboration has continued in many forms, but that both forms of exchange and collaboration are coming under increasing scrutiny from different parts of the American government.

Diplomacy / Dialogue

• China’s AI Safety Institute Equivalent – the China AI Safety and Development Association (CnAISDA)
  • How Some of China’s Top AI Thinkers Built Their Own AI Safety Institute, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Singer et al., 2025
    • A report that outlines how China’s AISI equivalent was set up by a group of leading domestic safety experts and advocates
  • Reactions to the CnAISDA
    • Notes from the Paris AI Action Summit, Geopolitechs, 2025
    • Paris AI Action Summit readout: China establishes AI Safety Institute, setting stage for greater global collaboration, Paul Triolo, 2025
• Challenges and Opportunities for US-China Collaboration on Artificial Intelligence Governance, Camp et al., Sandia National Laboratories, 2025 (24 pages)
  • A report by Sandia National Laboratories, a national lab managed by Honeywell for the US Department of Energy, outlining options for US-China dialogue and cooperation on AI governance.
• Promising Topics for US–China Dialogues on AI Safety and Governance, Oxford Martin AI Governance Initiative, Siddiqui et al., 2025 (69 pages)
  • This report looks at potential ‘low-hanging fruit’ in international AI diplomacy by examining which AI risks and governance approaches the US and China have similar understandings of.
• How Might the United States Engage with China on AI Security Without Diffusing Technology?, RAND, Karson Elmgren, 2025
• The State of China-Western Track 1.5 and 2 Dialogues on AI, Concordia AI, 2024 (7 pages)
• Back on Track?, The Wire China, Bob Davis, 2024, (25 mins)
  • Outlines the return of US-China Track 2 dialogues (unofficial exchanges between non-governmental figures) after the pandemic; including 3–4 (out of at least a total of 40) on AI.
• A roadmap for a US-China AI dialogue, Brookings, Graham Webster and Ryan Hass, 2024 (5 pages)
  • Gives a concrete roadmap with specific areas of focus for US-China AI dialogue going forward.
  • See also Laying the groundwork for US-China AI dialogue (Brookings, 2024) for some reflections on what can be learned from previous track-2 dialogues between the US and China, as well as an outlook on the ongoing Brookings-Tsinghua CISS Track-II dialogue on AI.
• Freezing China Out of Setting the Rules for AI, The Wire China, Eliot Chen, 2025
  • This article covers the listing of the Beijing Academy of AI on the US Commerce Department’s entity list, arguing that this has made it harder for countries to work together to combat AI risks.
• What Topics Can Be Discussed in the China-U.S. Artificial Intelligence Dialogue, CSIS Interpret: China, (original title《中美人工智能对话可以谈些什么》), Wang Yifan and Zhu Rongsheng, 2024, (4 pages)
  • Tsinghua University Researchers outline potential topics for the new U.S.-China Intergovernmental Dialogue on AI.
• Principled AI, Practical Challenges: The U.S.-China Endeavor in Ethical Tech Governance, China-US Focus, Peter Bittner, 2023 (4 pages)
  • Discusses differences in approach to global governance and potentials for cooperation.
• The AI Power Paradox, Foreign Affairs, Ian Bremmer and Mustafa Suleyman, 2023 (18 pages)
  • Details challenges to the United States and China working together on AI governance and possible fixes.
• The Path to AI Arms Control, Foreign Affairs, Henry Kissinger and Graham Allison, 2023 (11 pages)
  • Outlines reasons for cooperation on AI and gives suggestions as to how the United States and China might cooperate.

Business / commercial

• US Moves To Narrowly Limit Investment in China, Skadden, Brian J. Egan, Eytan J. Fisch, Michael E. Leiter, Brooks E. Allen, Jordan Cannon, and Katie Clarke, 2023 (6 pages)
  • Coverage of a late 2023 executive order from the Biden administration that instructs the Committee on Foreign Investment in the US (CFIUS) under the Department of Treasury to create an outbound investment control regime, to look at American investments going into China in sensitive sectors (e..g, semiconductors).
  • This complements existing authority that CFIUS has to look at investments of foreign capital in the US.
• U.S. Outbound Investment into Chinese AI, CSET, Emily S. Weinstein and Ngor Luong, 2023 (68 pages)
  • CSET report that points out that significant American investment into Chinese AI development has taken place.

Scientific  collaboration

• In Which Areas of Technical AI Safety Could Geopolitical Rivals Cooperate?, Ben Bucknall et al., 2025
  • This paper outlines areas of AI safety research that geopolitical rivals could potentially cooperate on, through an analysis of the relative risks that different topics of cooperation could pose. It also includes a case study of US-China collaboration on AI.
• Can democracies cooperate with China on AI research?, Brookings, Cameron F. Kerry, Joshua P. Meltzer, and Matt Sheehan, 2023 (4 pages)
  • Outlines recent trends in US-China AI research cooperation, and discusses challenges and concerns vis-a-vis such cooperation (from a US perspective).
  • Recommends a “risk-based” approach to handling research cooperation with China.
• Examples of scientific collaboration
  • The Singapore Consensus on Global AI Safety Research Priorities, 2025 (40 pages)
    • The Singapore Consensus on Global AI Safety Research Priorities, builds on the International AI Safety Report-A, outlining related AI safety research domains into three types. It was developed through a conference hosted by the Singaporean government with participants from the West, China and other parts of Asia.
  • The International Scientific Report on the Safety of Advanced AI, Bengio et al., 2025 (298 pages)
    • This report is an example of scientific collaboration but does not talk about collaboration itself. Commissioned by the UK, with experts from over 20 countries along with the UN, EU, and OECD, the report was published in January 2025 and presented at the AI Action Summit in Paris in February. It includes writers and expert advisors from both the West and China.
  • Managing AI Risks in an Era of Rapid Progress, Bengio et. al, 2023 (4 pages)
    • A short consensus paper on the risks from advanced AI systems, ranging from large-scale social harms to malicious uses. This was written by a very broad range of Chinese and Western scholars, including, Yoshua Bengio, Geoffrey Hinton, Andrew Yao and Stuart Russell. Several influential Chinese academics are also on this paper (including Xue Lan, the chairperson of the Ministry of Science and Technology’s AI ethics committee).

Chinese engagement at multilateral fora

• UN adopts Chinese resolution with US support on closing the gap in access to artificial intelligence, AP News, Edith M. Lederer, 2024
  • China has followed up on this resolution with further announcements and action plans for AI capacity-building, see Concordia’s AI Safety in China #17 report (section International Governance), as well as some of the primary resources below.
• U.S., China, other nations urge 'responsible' use of military AI, Reuters, Toby Sterling, 2023 (about 2 pages) (archived link)
  • Text of declaration (From USG source; archived link) (Chinese name for the declaration is 《关于负责任地军事使用人工智能和自主技术的政治宣言》)
  • Details the Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy, which China and other countries signed.
• Primary sources
  • China calls for AI safety cooperation at [Global AI Safety Summit] (English), State Council Information Office, 2023 (3 pages) (archived link): Outlines China’s perspective on the summit.
  • Developing AI for Good and for All to Answer the Call of the Times for Shared Prosperity, 2025: Speech by Deputy Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu where he lays out steps taken by China to further advance capacity-building, including hosting workshops and seminars as well as setting up a Group of Friends with Zambia.
  • AI Capacity-Building Action Plan for Good and for All, 2024: An official announcement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China for AI-related capacity building initiatives.

China’s own international AI governance initiatives

• UNESCO Contributes to 2025 China–SCO AI Forum, UNESCO, 2025 (1 page).
  • Describes how China’s National Development and Reform Commission and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation convened ministers and experts to launch a proposed China–SCO AI Application Cooperation Center.
• Full text: Shanghai Declaration on Global AI Governance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2024 (3 pages).
• Global AI Governance Initiative, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2023 (2 pages) (archived link)
  • China’s primary vision for AI governance at the global level.
  • For additional context, see Sihao Huang’s piece at the top of this document.
• Position Paper of the People's Republic of China on Strengthening Ethical Governance of Artificial Intelligence (AI), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2022 (2 pages) (archived link)
  • Precursor to the Global AI Governance Initiative.
• China ready to jointly regulate military use of AI with different parties: Defense Spokesperson, Ministry of Defense of the People’s Republic of China, 2023 (<1 page) (archived link)
• Jointly Implementing the Global Security Initiative For Lasting Peace and Security of the World——Keynote Speech by H.E. Nong Rong Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs At the 10th Beijing Xiangshan Forum, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2023 (3 pages but can just read sections with information relevant to AI) (archived link)
  • Demonstrates the nesting of China’s Global AI Governance Initiative under the broader structure of the Global Security Initiative. While AI also comes under consideration in the Global Development Initiative, it is most heavily considered under the umbrella of the Global Security Initiative. The Global Security Initiative is one of the major three pillars of China’s overarching foreign policy messaging in the current era.
• Full text: Global AI Governance Action Plan, July 2025.
  • For a basic overview and interpretation, see AI Safety in China Newsletter, Special Edition: World AI Conference Recap, Concordia AI.

Key Actors and Their Views on AI Risks

Caveat: Besides the scan that Concordia and CSET have done, there are not yet many comprehensive overviews of key actors. Moreover, the CSET report has some errors that we flag below, which leads us to be less confident in the report’s overall accuracy. Where we are aware of other potentially relevant individuals, we have also included their names, even if we have no clear resources to link to.

Overview

• Inside China's AI Ecosystem: A View From Beijing (Podcast), The Cognitive Revolution
  • Interview with anonymous Chinese tech worker ‘L-squared’ that gives a good introductory overview of some of the key actors, key companies, public opinion on AI, and high-level consideration of thinking on AI safety in China.

Knowledge of and support for AGI

• "Introduction" in "State of AI Safety in China", pp. 1–3, Concordia, 2023 (3 pages)
• Beijing Policy Interest in General Artificial Intelligence is Growing, Heide, 2023 (5 pages)
  • Argues that Chinese policymakers’ focus shifted from narrow to general AI in early 2023.
  • Just as for the English 'artificial general intelligence’, there are multiple interpretations of the Chinese term 通用人工智能. So there is still plenty of ambiguity on what the Politburo meant with the term, which is only partly acknowledged in this piece.
  • This is an opinion piece that gestures towards a potential trend, based on high-level reasoning, rather than rigorous evaluation.
• Assessing Beijing Municipality’s push for General AI, Human General Intelligence, Oliver Guest, 2025 (16 pages)
  • Discusses the modest results of Beijing’s push to promote the development of general AI following the above-mentioned trends.
• Wuhan’s AI Development: China’s Alternative Springboard to Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), CSET, William Hannas, Huey-Meei Chang, and Daniel Chou, 2025 (21 pages without notes)
  • Discusses the ecosystem of AI development in Wuhan including key figures and institutions, industrial chain, and initiatives.
• China's Advanced AI Research, CSET, William Hannas, Huey-Meei Chang, Daniel Chou, Brian Fleegeras, 2022 (78 pages)
  • This is a fairly comprehensive report but there are several factual and framing issues that have been identified since its release that are relevant for any reader to consider.
  • The report implies that China is looking to develop AGI to achieve a decisive advantage over its rivals due to the self-improving nature of AGI; a closer reading of the quoted policies suggests a more commercial implication that this is linked more closely to ensuring Chinese firms have larger market share in new technological industries.
  • This report (and a wide range of other materials) imply that there is unified Chinese action on AI/AGI. However, there are a range of relevant government and non-government actors involved, and arguing that ‘China wants X’ with any strong degree of confidence is quite fraught.
  • The report also inaccurately characterizes the types of research being pursued at particular large AI labs in China.
• China’s Views on AI Safety Are Changing—Quickly, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Matt Sheehan, 2024 (11 pages)
  • Demonstration of how Chinese views on AI safety are changing including concern for AGI and consideration of frontier development risks.
• Is China Racing to AGI?, ChinaTalk, 2025 (16 pages)
  • While more of a poppy analysis, this piece contains many useful sources on each side of the debate of whether China is racing to AGI and key actors in those considerations.
• Chinese Critiques of Large Language Models: Finding the Path to General Artificial Intelligence, CSET, William Hannas, Huey-Meei Chang, Maximilian Riesenhuber, and Daniel Chou, 2025 (29 pages total)
  • Useful reference on the debates between key scientists over whether LLMs can meaningfully lead to the development of AGI.

AI scientists / key academics

• Chinese Perspectives on AI Safety, Concordia AI (interactive webpage)
  • Database of translations of key Chinese AI safety scientists’ views on AI risk and safety  (currently about ~1 article for each of the 10 authors on their website).
• "Expert Views" in "State of AI Safety in China (2023)” (pp. 43-60), spring 2024 update,  “State of AI Safety in China (2025)” (pp. 44-52), Concordia AI
• How Some of China’s Top AI Thinkers Built Their Own AI Safety Institute, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Scott Singer, Karson Elmgren, and Oliver Guest, 2025 (~41 pages without notes)
  • Details the development of the China AI Safety and Development Association (CnAISDA), including discussion of the key players who helped drive the creation of the institute and participating institutions.
• Who’s Who: China’s AI Industry, The Wire China (interactive webpage)
  • Details 52 people who are shaping China’s AI industry and highlights whether or not they are party-affiliated.
• Zhang Hongjiang, founder of BAAI: ‘AI systems should never be able to deceive humans,’ FT, Ryan McMorrow and Nian Liu, 2024 (12 pages)
  • An interview with a key figure and founder of the Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence on a range of topics including AI safety.
• "Technical Safety Developments" in "State of AI Safety in China", pp. 34–42, Concordia AI, 2023 (18 pages)
• AI Alignment: A Comprehensive Survey, Jiaming Ji et. al, 2023 (98 pages total)
  • A wide-ranging bilingual survey of many directions written by a broad range of Chinese authors, focused on AI alignment research (not specifically within China).
  • Further resources linked to the paper available here.
• Can U.S. and China Rebuild Trust on AI? China-US Focus, Xiao Qian, 2025 (5 pages)
  • Commentary by a key academic in China on race dynamics between the United States and China on AI and possibilities for rebuilding trust.
• How Experts in China and the United Kingdom View AI Risks and Collaboration, Center for Data Innovation, Yanzi Xu and Daniel Castro, 2024 (10 pages)
• 安远AI受邀参与“人工智能立法之开源发展与法律规制”会议, Concordia AI, 2024 (9 pages) (archived link)
  • Contains a summary of a roundtable meeting between various academics on the topic of open source models and the draft AI law.
  • This conference was organized by Tsinghua University’s School of Public Policy and Management and was attended by academics from various universities and disciplines, a representative from Concordia, compliance officers and lawyers, as well as a member of an ISO standard setting technical committee.
  • Participants had a wide range of views on how much AI regulation was required and whether and in what way open source models are risky. Several attendees drew attention to the security risks posed by open source models.

Industry

• China’s Generative AI Ecosystem in 2024: Rising Investment and Expectations, NBR, Paul Triolo and Kendra Schaefer, 2024 (17 pages)
  • Background on the current state of China’s AI industry including major players and up-and-comers and discussion of benchmarking and evaluation.
• Recent Trends in China's LLM Landscape, Centre for the Governance of AI, Jenny Xiao and Jeffrey Ding, 2023 (14 pages)
  • Points to trends in Chinese LLM model landscape, including some commentary about industry perception of different factors of AI development.
• DeepSeek and Other Chinese Firms Converge with Western Companies on AI Promises, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Scott Singer, 2025 (10 pages)
  • Details the current state of how AI companies in China are approaching AI safety commitments.
• "Lab Self-Governance" in "State of AI Safety in China", pp. 61–73 Concordia AI, 2023 (13 pages)
• Tencent Research Institute releases Large Model Security & Ethics Report, ChinAI, Jeffrey Ding, 2024 (3 pages, full translation 23 pages)
  • Tencent report on large model security and ethics, covering 1) LLM development trends, 2) opportunities and challenges in LLM security, 3) LLM security frameworks, 4) best practices for large model security, and 5) large model value alignment progress and trends.
  • The report gives insight into the types of assessments Chinese AI labs are implementing to comply with generative AI regulations.
• AI Safety in China #10, Concordia AI, 2024 (10 pages)
  • This issue covers meetings held by China’s AI industry association, which include working groups on value alignment, policy and law, and security and governance. The policy and law working group meeting covered here focused on AGI risks.
• Primary Sources:
  • Original text of the AI Safety Commitments launched by a Chinese Industry Association (in English and Chinese)
  • Chapter six of the report published by Alibaba’s AI Governance Center’s Large Language Model Technology Development and Governance Practice Report covers safety/security and governance. This was covered briefly by Concordia AI, and will likely eventually be published in English (currently only through chapter 3 has been published in English).

Military

• Exploring the Implications of Generative AI for Chinese Military Cyber-Enabled Influence Operations, RAND, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, 2024 (23 pages)
  • Testimony presented before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.
• ‘Overtaking on the Curve’? Defense AI in China, John Lee, in Heiko Borchert, Torben Schütz, and Joseph Verbovszky, The Very Long Game: 20 Studies on the Global State of Defense AI, 2024 (22 pages)
  • Goes into detail on the current state of defense AI in China including PLA structure managing it.
• U.S.-China Competition and Military AI, CNAS, Jacob Stokes, Alexander Sullivan and Noah Greene, 2023 (32 pages total)
  • Explores how use of AI in the military poses risks in the context of US-China competition. P.2-5 lays out the way Chinese government sources have talked about the use of AI in military applications. P.6-10 talk about the ways in which this use of AI can cause particular types of risks.
  • Testimony by Jacob Stokes from early 2024 can serve as a good supplement to this resource.
• Is the PLA Overestimating the Potential of Artificial Intelligence? (PDF), National Defense University, Joint Force Quarterly 116 (1st Quarter 2025), Koichiro Takagi, (8 pages)
  • Gives an overview of the focus on AI in PLA Daily articles to analyze the discussions around military use of AI in China.
• China’s Military AI Roadblocks, CSET, Sam Bresnick, 2024 (51 pages total)
  • Notes where Chinese perspectives see limitations with AI in military contexts, drawing from 59 Chinese-language articles published in various critical actors in the defense or AI industries.
  • A paywalled Foreign Policy summarizing some key findings can be found here.
• Debunking the SCMP report that shaved 36 bln HKD off Baidu, Pekingology, Zichen Wang and Jia Yuxuan, 2023 (25 pages) (archived link)
  • A response to a South China Morning Post (SCMP) article that covered a Chinese academic paper. The SCMP article claimed that Chinese researchers had connected civilian AI systems (Baidu and iFlytek LLMs) to military applications, and led to a significant dip in Baidu’s stock value.
  • This response argues that this characterization by the SCMP article is false and that a closer reading of the paper reveals no such activity took place.
  • It’s worth noting that this source has close ties to the party-state and therefore has a vested interest in mounting this defense. However, it seems like the response has some merit too.
  • It seems like the Chinese researchers were interested in trying to develop militarily useful agents and did try to do so by prompting LLMs. However, rather than integration of AI into military systems to fire weapons etc, the use case here seems more akin to using LLMs as advisers on military situations.
  • This is notable because it's kind of crux-y to understand whether and in what ways leading AI civilian companies like Baidu are also being used in military applications.
• The PLA’s Strategic Support Force and AI Innovation, Brookings, Amy J. Nelson and Gerald L. Epstein, 2022 (6 pages)
  • Dives into the setting up of the Chinese military’s AI support force that aims to modernize China’s military, including through the use of AI.
• Harnessed Lightning, CSET, Ryan Fedasiuk, Jennifer Melot, and Ben Murphy, 2021 (84 pages total)
  • Looks at Chinese AI procurement contracts in 2020 to build a picture of the types of AI technology the military is adopting.
• Draft Code of Conduct for the Use of AI in Military Applications, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2021 (10 pages)
  • A draft developed during a US-China Track 2 dialogue organized by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and Tsinghua University’s Centre for International Security and Strategy.
• Chinese Debates on the Military Utility of Artificial Intelligence, War on the Rocks, Michael Dahm, 2020 (11 pages) (archived link)
• Chinese thinking on AI integration and interaction with nuclear command and control, force structure, and decision-making, European Leadership Network, Fei Su and Dr. Jingdong Yuan, November 2023 (44 pages)
  • Broadly covers Chinese thinking on AI military integration and major power dynamics surrounding specific topics related to strategic stability.
• Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission Chinese Military Innovation in AI, Elsa B. Kania, 2019 (56 pages total) (archived link)
  • A bit dated but seems quite comprehensive.
• China’s Military Employment of Artificial Intelligence and Its Security Implications, The International Affairs Review, Jiayu Zhang, n.d. (15 pages)
  • Likely a bit dated by now and from a graduate school journal but highlights a good swath of examples of China’s use of AI in the military domain.
• Short media articles on various applications:
  • Chinese team taps DeepSeek AI for military battle simulation, SCMP, Meredith Chen, 2025
  • Exclusive: Chinese researchers develop AI model for military use on back of Meta's Llama, Reuters, James Pomfret and Jessie Pang, 2024
  • New products show China’s quest to automate battle, Defense One, Tye Graham and Peter W. Singer, 2025
  • China’s Military Reportedly Deploys DeepSeek AI for Non-Combat Duties, FDD, Jack Burnham, 2025
    • This is a bit click-baity but highlights a broader consideration of the potential for AI use in military contexts and how some U.S. think tanks are thinking about “civil-military fusion” from a very broad perspective.
• Primary sources
  • At the 20th Collective Study Session of the CCP Central Committee Politburo, Xi Jinping Stresses: Persist in Being Self-Reliant, Be Strongly Oriented Toward Applications, and Push the Orderly Development of Artificial Intelligence (习近平在中共中央政治局第二十次集体学习时强调 坚持自立自强 突出应用导向 推动人工智能健康有序发展) (Chinese text archived  link), Xinhua, translated by CSET, 2025
    • Translation of a report on a Politburo study session on AI in which Xi made recommendations.
  • 中国关于规范人工智能军事应用的立场文件, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023 (2 pages) (archived link)
    • China’s Official Position Paper on regulating the use of AI in Military, official English translation available at the link.
  • Opportunities and Challenges Posed to International Peace and Security by the Application of AI in the Military Domain--Document submitted by China in accordance with General Assembly resolution 79/239 (2024), Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2025 (archived link)
    • Chinese suggestions on AI in the military domain submitted in accordance with UNGA resolution 79/239.
  • China Keyhole
    • It is unclear who the researchers behind this initiative are but they have a few pieces that provide significant detail about different dimensions of China’s military AI effort, up to 2020.
    • For example, there is slightly outdated information about the People’s Liberation Army’s AI Research Centre and doctoral research in military AI (document 18 pages total).
  • The Chinese Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) has a subsidiary committee that focuses on AI.
    • There is no clear website to refer to, however, you can refer to Chapter 9, Section 6 of the AMS’s 2020 publication on the Science of Military Strategy (page 170 of the PDF translation linked, pdf page 183) (archived link).

Public opinion

• "Public Opinion" in "State of AI Safety in China", pp. 68–73, Concordia AI, 2023 (6 pages)
  • This section of Concordia’s report takes a look at several opinion polls, notably two by the Centre for Long-term AI, led by Zeng Yi, listed as one of Time’s 100 notable AI figures in 2023. These include a poll on whether we can and should develop strong AI, and one on Chinese perspectives on pausing AI development.
• Survey: How Do Elite Chinese Students Feel About the Risks of AI?, China Brief, Nick Corvino and Boshen LiCorvino and Li, 2024 (11 pages)
  • Shares results from surveys of over 1,000 students at Tsinghua and Peking Universities conducted in April 2024.
• Chapter 8: Public Opinion, Emily Capstick, in Stanford HAI, Artificial Intelligence Index Report, 2025 (21 pages total)
• The Ipsos AI Monitor 2024, Ipsos, 2024 (43 pages total, but results on China sprinkled throughout)
  • Shares results of surveys with China in comparison to other countries.

AI Inputs

Here we try to provide more varied sources linked to the different inputs of AI models. Some sources will be repeated. For three of the sections (Algorithms, Capital and Talent), we only did a cursory survey of the literature; the pieces in these sections are thus just a snapshot and it is quite likely that relevant publications have been overlooked.

Overview: China’s AI ecosystem

• Chasing Artificial General Intelligence: China Between Breakthroughs and Bottlenecks, Mengying Tao, Sinolytics, 2024 (23 pages)
  • Gives an overview of “China’s AGI strategy”, examining both government and company publications and statements. Has content on Chips, Computing, Data, Models, and Applications, and analyzes China’s strengths, weaknesses, and strategic priorities for each.
• China's Evolving Industrial Policy for AI, Kyle Chan et al., RAND, 2025
  • Gives an overview of policies/initiatives to promote and assist AI development from across China’s governance levels (national & local) and across input sectors.
  • Includes rough comparisons to public and private investment in the U.S., and hypothesizes over the likely success of China’s industrial policy in pushing for AI leadership.
• Seeking the next DeepSeek: What China’s generative AI registration data can tell us about China’s AI competitiveness, Kendra Schaefer, trivium china, 2025 (16 pages)
  • Uses an extensive dataset produced by the Chinese state to analyze the generative AI ecosystem in the country (ignores other AI products).
  • Questions addressed:
    • How many generative AI tools are operating in China?
    • How fast is China’s generative AI ecosystem growing?
    • Where are generative AI tools being built?
    • Which companies are doing the most generative AI development?
    • Which sectors are seeing the most generative AI innovation?
    • What’s the role of the state in China’s generative AI ecosystem?
    • What types of generative AI projects are foreign companies undertaking in China?

Algorithms

For lack of time, we only did a cursory survey of the literature. The pieces in the section are thus just a snapshot and it is quite likely that relevant publications have been overlooked.

• 互联网信息服务算法备案系统, CAC (interactive government portal)
  • The portal where the Chinese government releases all officially registered“algorithms”, including recommendation algorithms, “deep synthesis” algorithms, content filtering algorithms, and more. Filings contain basic detail, such as the algorithm name, filing company, and a basic description of its training method and function.
  • Generative AI models that have passed regularly review are published separately on the CAC website: 国家互联网信息办公室关于发布生成式人工智能服务已备案信息的公告.
  • You can find a compiled list of application results for post-2023 ‘deep synthesis’ algorithms here.
  • For some analysis of this algorithm registration data see: Seeking the next DeepSeek: What China’s generative AI registration data can tell us about China’s AI competitiveness, Kendra Schaefer, Trivium China, 2025.
• Relevant domestic regulations:
  • What China’s Algorithm Registry Reveals about AI Governance, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Matt Sheehan and Sharon Du, 2022 (4 pages)
  • Tracing the Roots of China’s AI Regulations, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Matt Sheehan, 2024 (48 pages total)
  • Opening the ‘black box’ of algorithms: regulation of algorithms in China. Communication Research and Practice, Jian Xu (academic journal article), 2024 (8 pages)

Compute

Semiconductors

Overview

• China’s Quest for Semiconductor Self-Sufficiency, Alan Turing Institute (Centre for Emerging Technology and Security), Ardi Janjeva, Seoin Baek, and Andy Sellars, 2024 (40 pages total, pp. 9–25 for the overview of semiconductor developments in China)
  • The first section gives a good overview of China’s semiconductor landscape, including a description of major initiatives for self-reliance and an analysis of their success. (The second and third sections focus on implications for the UK and for South Korea.)
• Introduction to AI chip making in China, Institute for AI Policy and Strategy, Erich Grunewald and Christopher Phenicie, 2023 (41 pages total)
  • A basic overview of the importance of semiconductors to AI with some details about China’s role.
  • The majority of the report sets global context for specific parts of the semiconductor supply chain, with Chinese gaps vis-a-vis the West highlighted for each part of the supply chain.
  • Key gaps specified pp.15–22; details about export controls covered pp.23–24; forecasting questions about Chinese chip-making linked in pp.26–27.
  • More detailed than the Alan Turing report, but less up-to-date.
• 半导体产业政策梳理与分析：集成电路政策力度有望加大, CITIC Securities, 2023 (19 pages) (archived link)
  • A detailed overview of the history of semiconductor policy in China, including a breakdown of gaps by specific parts of the supply chain and key priorities for key local governments.
• Measuring China’s Technological Self-Reliance Drive, China Leadership Monitor, Jeffrey Ding, 2023 (10 pages)
  • Chinese policy-making is driven by metrics, including quantitative targets for domestic substitution in semiconductors. The article problematizes/disentangles what these metrics mean.

Chinese semiconductor policy

Note that the overviews listed above also contain some commentary on Chinese policies.

• Chip Subsidy Flows – Comparing China and the U.S., Arrian Ebrahimi and Jiong Feng, 2023 (9 pages)
  • Lays out Chinese semiconductor subsidies from local and central government, and contrasts them to the US CHIPS Act.
  • Does not discuss the role of Chinese SOEs, which form a significant part of the Chinese semiconductor industry.
  • Has a section on China’s ‘Big Fund’, but fails to mention its major corruption scandal.
• Chinese Semiconductor Industrial Policy: Past and Present, United States International Trade Commission Journal of International Commerce and Economics, John VerWey, 2019 (29 pages)
  • Comprehensive background to understand the PRC’s semiconductor industrial policy (going back to 1950, focusing on more recent years).
  • Not an up-to-date picture of current semiconductor policy, but useful as a complement (and an informative backdrop) to more recent commentary.
• A New Era for the Chinese Semiconductor Industry: Beijing Responds to Export Controls, American Affairs Journal, Paul Triolo, 2024 (28 pages)
  • Detailed account of the impact of and response to export controls by key actors in the Chinese semiconductor industry.
  • See more details on the US export controls, their impacts, and China’s responses in the Appendix: US Export controls of 2022 and 2023.

International dynamics (esp. US-China relations)

• The Global Might of the Tiny Chip, New York Times, Virginia Heffernan, 2022
  • Book review of Chris Miller’s Chip War.
  • The book and book review present insights into global semiconductor supply chains, and discuss what this implies for international affairs.
• Nvidia’s China Business is Important to US Geopolitical Positioning, Interconnected, Kevin Xu, 2023 (7 pages)
  • Argues that Nvidia retaining some business in China is important for the US. Also mentions Nvidia’s new chips (in development) (archived link), that are compliant with the updated controls and to be launched in Q2 2024.
• Not Trading With the Enemy: The Case of Computer Chips, Journal of World Trade, Olga Hrynkiv and Saskia Lavrijssen, 2024 (pdf) (26 pages)
  • Provides a legal analysis of the compatibility of export controls with the international trade law framework.
  • Also analyzes possible effects of governments’ ‘decoupling’ strategies toward China on shaping international trade law.
• Chapter 3 - U.S.-China Competition in Emerging Technologies, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2024 Annual Report to Congress, 2024 (pdf) (102 pages)
  • pp. 181-187 analyzes China’s efforts to develop its domestic semiconductor industry, especially in the context of U.S. policies to hamper such efforts.
  • The rest of the report looks at U.S.-China competition in advanced technologies more broadly.
  • Note that this report was written by a U.S. congressional commission and makes some strong assumptions about the motivations driving Chinese policymakers as well as normative assumptions about the U.S.’s national interest.
• See also resources listed under: Race dynamics
• See also Appendix: US Export controls of 2022 and 2023

Data centers

• 中国算力发展指数白皮书, CAICT, 2023 (63 pages) (failed to archive)
  • A white paper by a think tank under the Ministry of Industry and Information which looks into the development of China’s data center industry and includes suggestions for what China can do to further develop this industry.
  • Relatedly, CAICT also released another paper (archived link) that goes further into the details behind the construction of the index used in the whitepaper to evaluate the state of China’s computing industry.
• China's Data Center Sector: Industry and Regulatory Insights, China Briefing from Dezan Shira and Associates, Giulia Interesse, 2023 (12 pages)
  • Overview of key regulations, regulators and recent developments in China’s data center sector.
• “Eastern Data, Western Computing” – China’s Big Plan to Boost Data Center Computing Power Across Regions, China Briefing from Dezan Shira and Associates, Arendse Huld, 2022 (12 pages)
  • Describes China’s state-driven infrastructure project that is supposed to lead to more efficient allocation of computing resources.
• China’s AI Infrastructure Surge: How PRC Data Centers and PRC AI Models Bridge Military Ambitions and Global Connections, Strider and the Special Competitive Studies Project (SCSP), 2025 (31 pages)
  • Open-source investigation to map data centers across the PRC, covering data centers that are already operational as well as those which are in construction or have only been announced so far.
  • Charts the growth of data centers over the past few years; estimates computing power capabilities; and analyzes relevant stakeholders (including military actors) involved in the construction and use of data centers.
• ChinAI #249: China's idle AI computing centers, ChinAI, Jeffrey Ding, 2024 (3 pages, translation 9 pages)
  • Paradox of simultaneous over- and under-supply of compute in China.
  • See also China built hundreds of AI data centers to catch the AI boom. Now many stand unused. (Caiwei Chenarchive page, MIT Technology Review, 2025)

Data

• General overview
  • Note: there are not many good general overviews of data as an input in China’s approach to AI, but you can get a sense of how it is being treated through reading some of the regulations and sources related to considerations of data ownership, sharing and trading, storage, and cross-border flows.
  • Much Ado About Data: How America and China Stack Up, MacroPolo: Matt Sheehan, 2019
    • Analyzes dimensions of the landscape of data as an input in China.
    • Debunks the meme of “China has an advantage in AI because of all the data.”
• Training data
  • 大模型高质量语料缘何短缺?, China Science and Technology Network, 2024 (archived link)
    • Coverage about factors potentially limiting the availability of high-quality corpora for LLM training.
  • WuDaoCorpora: A super large-scale Chinese corpora for pre-training language models, AI Open, Sha Yuan, Hanyu Zhao, Zhengxiao Du, Ming Ding, Xiao Liu, Yukuo Cen, Xu Zou, Zhilin Yang, and Jie Tang, 2021 (4 pages)
• Relevant domestic regulations that are data-focused
  • China proposes blacklist of training data for generative AI models, Reuters, Eduardo Baptista, Jane Merriman, and Jan Harvey, 2023 (about 2 pages) (archived link)
    • This is not a regulation, but highlights limitations on the data that is able to be utilized in the training of AI models that China’s National Information Security Standardization Committee has published.
  • Data protection laws in China, DLA Piper, 2025 (27 pages)
    • Gives an overview of data protection laws in China, written with a corporate audience in mind and without any specific AI focus.
  • Data Security Law of the People’s Republic of China, enacted by the 13th National People’s Congress, Translated by DigiChina with significant reference to China Law Translate, 2021 (12 pages, 21 pages including Chinese text)
    • Most significant piece of legislation recently addressing data, should be well understood as following AI regulations that consider the use of data have been and will be built on the foundation of this law in concert with other relevant foundational laws such as one on cybersecurity and one on personal information.
• Broader regulations that touch on data
  • Artificial Intelligence Law, Model Law v. 1.0 (Expert Suggestion Draft), Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Major National Condition Research Project, Translated by Concordia AI, Kwan Yee Ng, Jason Zhou, Ben Murphy, Rogier Creemers, and Hunter Dorwart, 2023 (23 pages, 39 including Chinese text)
    • This is not a regulation, but expert proposals such as these could influence the direction of a draft AI law that is reportedly in the works in 2024; suggested regulations related to data are sprinkled throughout the draft and include measures related to data sharing, specialized databases, data security, discrimination, risk management, etc.
  • Interim Measures for the Management of Generative Artificial Intelligence Services, especially Chapter II, Cyberspace Administration of China, translation by China Law Translate, 2023 (about 8 pages)
    • Gives stipulations related to data and discrimination, the requirements for data sources, appropriate uses of data, and content tagging.
  • Provisions on the Administration of Deep Synthesis Internet Information Services, Cyberspace Administration of China, translation by China Law Translate, 2022 (about 8 pages)
    • Established on the basis of the Cybersecurity Law, Data Security Law (below) and Personal Information Protection Law (archived link) of the People's Republic of China, etc.; with respect to data, the provisions mainly list stipulations to ensure security of data including protection of personal information.
  • Ethical Norms for New Generation Artificial Intelligence, National New Generation Artificial Intelligence Governance Expert Committee, translation by CSET (see also the translation by Yi Zeng at International Research Center for AI Ethics and Governance), 2021, Section 1 Article 3, Section 3, and Section 4 Article 14 (6 pages)
    • Gives stipulations including on ensuring data integrity, timeliness, consistency, normative compliance, and accuracy as well as preventing discrimination and ensuring the security of data.
• Data ownership, data sharing/trading, storage
  • Unpacking data: China’s ‘bundle of rights’ approach to the commercialization of data, Bingwan Xiong, Jiangqiu Ge, and Li Chen, 2023 (14 pages)
    • A comprehensive look at China’s legal treatment of data and the properties that this implies.
  • People's Daily unit issues first ‘data certificates’ in China to prove data ownership and rights, South China Morning Post, Ben Jiang, 2023 (3 pages) (archived link)
    • Gives an interesting example of a data ownership and trading platform.
  • China Wants to Put Data to Work as an Economic Resource—But How? DigiChina, Qiheng Chen, 2022 (5 pages)
    • Discusses China’s approach to data as a factor of production and potential uncertainties surrounding ownership and data sharing.
  • China just set up a new bureau to mine data for economic growth, MIT Technology Review, Zeyi Yang, 2023 (5 pages)
    • Very basic overview of China’s National Data Administration, a new government body set up in 2023.

Capital

For lack of time, we only did a cursory survey of the literature on the capital resources that go into AI developments in China. The pieces in the section are thus just a snapshot and it is quite likely that relevant publications have been overlooked.

• CHINA'S AI ECOSYSTEM, Andres C. Johansson (Stockholm School of Economics), 2022 (68 pages)
  • Has several sections related to capital and funding, see esp. pp. 26-29
• ChinAI #191: AI Venture Capital Trends Report, ChinAI, Jeffrey Ding, 2022 (5 pages, translation 10 pages)
• ChinAI #274: After raising 3 billion, who else can large model startups get money from?, ChinAI, Jeffrey Ding, 2024 (X pages, translation X pages)
• Understanding Chinese Government Guidance Funds, CSET, Ngor Luong, Zachary Arnold, and Ben Murphy, 2021 (89 pages)
  • Not AI-focused, but provides general context on tech financing in the PRC.
• U.S. Outbound Investment into Chinese AI, CSET, Emily S. Weinstein Ngor Luong, 2023 (68 pages)
  • CSET report that points out that significant American investment into Chinese AI development has taken place.
• Biden Takes Measured Approach on China Investment Controls, Foreign Policy, Kevin Klyman, 2023 (about 10 pages)
  • About the US outbound investment control for three technology sectors in China: semiconductors, quantum information technologies, and AI.

Talent

For lack of time, we only did a cursory survey of the literature on AI talent in China. The pieces in the section are thus just a snapshot and it is quite likely that relevant publications have been overlooked.

• The Global AI Talent Tracker 2.0, MacroPolo, 2024 (8 pages) (archived link)
  • Uses data from the Neural Information Processing Systems conference (NeurIPS) to estimate top-tier AI talent flows between China, US, Europe, etc.
  • See also the response and additional data provided in: Tracking Global AI Talent Flow (Kevin Xu, Interconnected, 2024, access only for paid subscribers)
• China Artificial Intelligence Talent Training Report, Zhejiang University and Baidu, translation by CSET, 2022 (79 pages)
  • White paper that examines shortcomings in China’s AI talent training. Urges closer university-enterprise cooperation.
• China’s AI Workforce, CSET: Gelhaus et al, 2022 (60 pages)
  • Assesses China's AI workforce demands through a dataset of ~7M job postings.
• China's quest for AI talent in Chinese Power and Artificial Intelligence, Emily Weinstein and Jeffrey Stoff, edited by William C. Hannas and Huey-Meei Chang, 2022 (book chapter, 16 pages)
• CHINA'S AI ECOSYSTEM: Talent and Education (pp. 46-47), Andres C. Johansson (Stockholm School of Economics), 2022 (2 pages)

Key resources

• Concordia’s AI Safety in China newsletter
  • The AI Safety in China newsletter provides regular news and research updates on Technical safety and alignment research in China; China’s governance and policy efforts to reduce AI risk; and China’s positions on international AI governance.
• 中国计算机学会通讯
  • The journal of the China Computer Federation, a leading academic publication for computer scientists. Important to gain a sense of leading intellectual thinking across various issues, e.g., 2nd issue of 2024 on compute.
• Defense AI and Arms Control Network, Centre for Long-term AI
  • This is a database of AI and military related material (policies, commentary, white papers) maintained by a leading think-tank within the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Center for Long-term AI is led by Yi Zeng, one of Time’s 100 AI leaders in 2023 and a signatory of both FLI and CAIS open letters.
• MERICS
  • MERICS is a German-based think tank focused exclusively on China-related issues, analyzing and commenting on these with an eye to implications for Europe and Germany. Most relevant analyses on China x AI can be found in their Industrial Policy and Technology and Digital China topic pages.
• Chinatalk — newsletter and podcast run by Jordan Schneider, a fellow at the Center for New American Security; features commentary by Jordan as well as by guest writers and speakers.
• Recode China AI — run by a Communications Manager at Baidu in the US.
• Chip Capitols Newsletter — written by Arrian Ebrahimi, a Yenching Scholar with experience in the semiconductor industry.
• BluePath Labs — for defense technology related analysis.
• Geotechnopolitics — Patrick Zhang, ex Chinese Foreign Ministry, writes about geopolitics and tech.
• Sinocism - Bill Bishop’s newsletter (4x weeks) with analysis, commentary and curated links on general China-related news of the day (English and Chinese-language sources); not specifically AI- or tech-focused, but has content on these issues if they make it into news headlines.
• Chinese tech news websites
  • Leiphone
  • 36Kr
• Wechat Accounts (Note: it is not possible to “link” to Wechat accounts, but you can find them by simply searching for the names in Wechat. Some of these accounts may also have websites and you can find those on Google/Baidu)
  • General
    • AI 科技评论
      • Posts about AI research and the implementation of AI projects.
    • 数据观
      • Posts content and industry information  related to big data, blockchain, AI.
    • 安远 AI  
      • Concordia’s Chinese-language channel.
  • Think-tanks
    • 清华大学人工智能国际治理研究院
      • Has a weekly newsletter on AI governance (AI治理周报) with several sections on government policy, enterprise news, international AI governance, etc.
    • 中国信通院 CAICT
      • A research institution under the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, regularly publishes white papers related to AI and other technologies.
    • 可信 AI 评测
      • A WeChat account run by the CAICT, dedicated to evaluations of AI. They have been running model evaluations around trustworthiness for the past few years, and have also done model evaluations recently. These evaluations are done by a ‘national key laboratory’ under the MIIT, set up in 2017.
  • AI lab accounts
    • 智谱AI
      • A leading AI startup that collaborates with Tsinghua University to produce ChatGLM.
    • Moonshot AI
      • The startup behind KimiChat, one of the best performing Chinese LLMs.
    • 瑞莱智慧RealAI
      • Another leading AI startup, with significant focus on AI security.
    • 诺亚方舟实验室
      • Huawei’s Noah Ark Lab focused on AI research and development.
    • 上海人工智能实验室
      • Shanghai AI Laboratory, an AI lab that publishes research on theories, technology, and ethics. Works with Sensetime on their InternLM model.
    • 阿里巴巴人工智能治理研究中心
      • Alibaba Artificial Intelligence Governance Laboratory, which focuses on over 200 AI applications in and outside of the Alibaba ecosystem.
    • 腾讯研究院
      • Tencent’s research institute, which puts out content about AI safety, including a series on AI alignment.
    • 腾讯安全应急响应中心
      • Tencent Security Response Center, online platform for cooperation between Tencent security team and international researchers; WeChat account publishes reports on security, LLM capabilities, and security risks to LLMs.
  • Semiconductor-focused
    • 半导体观察 (Semiconductor observatory)
      • More domestic-focused look at semiconductors.
    • 全球半导体观察 (world semicon observatory)
      • Chinese perspectives on global semiconductors.
    • 半导体材料行业分会（Semicon materials association)
      • Posts updates from forums and investment / project update announcements.
• Translation resources
  • Jeff Ding’s ChinAI newsletter and searchable archive
    • Translates AI- and China-related articles and documents from government departments, think tanks, traditional media, and newer forms of “self-media,” etc., aiming to disseminate a diverse discourse from the Chinese-language world to an English audience.
  • The Center for Strategic Translation
    • Translates material “of strategic and historical value” and annotates them to contextualize the relevance of specific phrases, words and ideas.
  • Interpret: China (CSIS)
    • Translates selected documents, and adds interpretation and contextualisation.
    • Material covered: speeches, newspaper and academic articles, government and policy documents, and other primary source materials; selected “for relevance” by their analysts.
  • China Law Translate
    • Translates key regulations.
  • ETO Scout
    • Collects Chinese-language news and commentary on technology issues, lists them in a search-able database, provides short English summary and link to the original for each item, and offers to send customized updates on new releases via email.
  • CSET Translations
    • Selects and translates documents (mostly Chinese state and Communist party sources, or sources from institutions with links to the Chinese state or Communist party).

Appendix: US Export controls of 2022 and 2023: policy measures, effects, and China’s response

The articles linked here track the changing views on how well export controls have been able to actually impact Chinese chipmaking capacity. It is important to note that experts seem to disagree about how much of a lag one should expect to see between the introduction of these export controls and their actual impact on Chinese chipmaking, given that Chinese companies have some reserves of now-restricted chips, amongst other reasons.

Policy overview

• Public Information On Export Controls Imposed On Advanced Computing And Semiconductor Manufacturing Items To The People’s Republic Of China (PRC) In 2022 And 2023, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, 2023 (with an update from May 2024) (1 page)
• A Bigger Yard, A Higher Fence CSET, Hanna Dohmen Jacob Feldgoise, 2023 (16 pages)  
  • Discusses the most recent version of the export controls.
• 2023 Export Control Update, ChinaTalk, Diego, 2023 (13 pages)
  • Podcast discussion focused on the new updates to the export controls. The discussants argue that the controls seem to close up loopholes (visualized here) that had been left open under the previous export controls.
• Choking off China's Access to the Future of AI, CSIS, Gregory C. Allen, 2022 (10 pages)
  • Discusses the first major round of US-led export controls on semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment.

Impact and China’s efforts to deal with the export controls

• Overview
  • A New Era for the Chinese Semiconductor Industry: Beijing Responds to Export Controls, American Affairs Journal, Paul Triolo, 2024 (28 pages)
    • Detailed account of the impact of and response to export controls by key actors in the Chinese semiconductor industry.
  • The US expands restrictions on AI exports to China. What are the x-risk effects?, Stephen Clare, 2022 (2.5 pages, 7 pages with comments)
    • Relatively short blog post that lays out important questions and considerations around the effects and reasonableness of the US’s export controls; does not provide a deep analysis of the causes or consequences and does not pretend to provide solid answers to the questions posed.
    • Focused only on the first round of export controls, no update since.
  • How US Export Controls Have (and Haven't) Curbed Chinese AI, Chris Miller, 2025 (11 pages)
  • Weathering the Storm: Chinese Chipmakers Respond to U.S. Export Controls, Justin Feng, April 2023 (4 pages)
    • Brief blog post describing the export control measures, their observed effects on Chinese chipmakers in the short term, China’s possible policy responses, and the likely medium- to longer-term consequences for China’s chip industry.
  • China Boosts Semiconductor Subsidies as US Tightens Restrictions, Arrian Ebrahimi, 2023 (2 pages)
    • R&D subsidies form part of the Chinese govt response to tightened export control.
  • The “Chokepoint” Fallacy of Tech Export Controls, Stimson Center, Ansgar Baums, 2024
    • Briefly recaps the first and second round of export controls, and cites some data on their effects
    • Challenges the idea that there are singular chokepoints in tech value chains that could be leveraged effectively for foreign policy goals.
    • Argues that the main effect of US technology export controls may be to incentivize faster industrial innovation in China.
  • Internet giants, it’s hard to buy A100s even if you have money, translation by Jeffrey Ding, Chinese original by Xu Qing (archived link), February 2024 (original 14 pages, translation 12 pages)
    • On-the-ground reporting on how Chinese tech companies have been responding to (expected) chip shortages. No causal or explanatory analysis, but gives some insights into the practical consequences that can result from a policy like the US export controls.
• Retaliation by the PRC
  • The New Arms Race: Sanctions, Export Control Policy, and China, CSIS, Jeannette Chu, 2022 (6 pages)
    • Describes Chinese policies to combat foreign governments’ measures to restrict economic flows to and from the PRC: China’s Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law, Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extra-territorial Application of Foreign Legislation and Other Measures, the Export Control Law, and Unreliable Entities List.
    • Explains that these policies have not been strictly enforced in response to the recent U.S. export controls, but argues that they may foreshadow a tit-for-tat dynamic between China and the U.S.
  • China just fought back in the semiconductor exports war. Here’s what you need to know, MIT Technology Review, Zeyi Yang, 2023 (5 pages) (archived link)
    • Describes China’s export restrictions on gallium and germanium (July 2023), two materials used in computer chips and other products.
    • Analyzes the immediate and expected longer-term impact of the restrictions, and discusses the likelihood of further retaliatory measures from the Chinese side.
  • China’s New Graphite Restrictions, CSIS, Emily Benson and Thibault Denamiel, 2023 (4 pages)
    • Describes China’s restrictions on certain graphite products (October 2023) in retaliation against the second round of U.S. semiconductor export controls.
• Export control evasions
  • Huawei is quietly dominating China’s semiconductor supply chain, Antonia Hmaidi (MERICS and IGCC), 2024 (13 pages)
    • Analyzes China's efforts to achieve technological self-sufficiency using Huawei's role in semi-conductor supply chains as a case study.
    • Explicitly takes a "western" perspective, investigating how Huawei's activities (and their "clandestine" nature) might impact European and American abilities to "de-risk" their trade relations with China.
  • Countering AI Chip Smuggling Has Become a National Security Priority: An Updated Playbook for Preventing AI Chip Smuggling to the PRC [pdf], Tim Fist and Erich Grunewald, 2025 (38 pages)
  • Accessing Controlled AI Chips via Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS): Implications for Export Controls, Centre for the Governance of AI, Lennart Heim and Janice Egan, 2023 (20 pages)
  • Chinese AI groups use cloud services to evade US chip export controls, Financial Times, Eleanor Olcott, Qianer Liu, and Demetri Sevastopulo, 2023 (2 pages)
• Discussions around DeepSeek’s release of the AI model R1 in January 2025
  • DeepSeek, Huawei, Export Controls, and the Future of the U.S.-China AI Race, Gregory C. Allen, CSIS, 2025 (28 pages)
  • DeepSeek's Lesson: America Needs Smarter Export Controls, Ashley Lin and Lennart Heim, RAND, 2025 (7 pages)
  • DeepSeek shows the limits of US export controls on AI chips, John Villasenor, Brookings, 2025 (6 pages)
  • DeepSeek and the Strategic Limits of U.S. Sanctions, Lizzi C. Lee, The Wire China, 2025
  • On DeepSeek and Export Controls, Dario Amodei, Anthropic, 2025 (6 pages)
• Discussions around Huawei’s release of Mate 60 Pro in August 2023, a phone that is reported to contain a domestically produced 7nm semiconductor chip
  • Huawei’s 5G chip breakthrough needs a reality check, MIT Technology Review, Zeyi Yang, 2023, (6 pages)
    • Explains the relevance of Huawei’s release of the Mate 60 Pro smartphone in spite of the export controls: Argues that it shows unexpected advances in domestic chip design and manufacturing capabilities, but that export controls are still hampering Chinese companies and that China’s capabilities to mass-produce advanced chips domestically remain an open question.
  • China AI & Semiconductors Rise: US Sanctions Have Failed, Semianalysis, Dylan Patel, Afzal Ahmad, and Myron Xie, 2023 (14 pages)
    • In light of SMIC’s production of a 7nm chip for Huawei smartphones (August 2023), the authors argue that the first round of US export controls failed to achieve their intended goals.
  • Size isn’t everything: China’s new chip is less earthshaking than you may have heard, DefenseOne: Matt Brazil and Peter W. Singer, 2023 (2 pages)
    • Contrasting perspective on how much of a breakthrough the SMIC chip used in Huawei’s Mate 60 Pro phone represents.