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by Sarah Weiler, Gabriel Wagner, Saad Siddiqui, Sarah Godek
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AI safetyPolicyAI governanceAI safety resources and materialsChinaInternational relationsResearch
Frontpage
China x AI Reference List: August 2025 Update
Introduction
Background
Structure
Ways to get involved
Caveats around sources and structures
Acknowledgments
Domestic Governance
Chinese policymaking overview
Science and technology policy
Domestic AI policy
Broad approaches
Regulations
Standards
Model evaluations / benchmarks
AI ethics
AI safety funding
International Governance
Overview
Sino-western AI competition
Race dynamics
‘Gap’ between Chinese and Western AI models
Sino-western AI cooperation
Diplomacy / Dialogue
Business / commercial
Scientific  collaboration
Chinese engagement at multilateral fora
China’s own international AI governance initiatives
Key Actors and Their Views on AI Risks
Knowledge of and support for AGI
AI scientists / key academics
Industry
Military
Public opinion
AI Inputs
Overview: China’s AI ecosystem
Algorithms
Compute
Semiconductors
Data centers
Data
Capital
Talent
Key resources
Appendix: US Export controls of 2022 and 2023: policy measures, effects, and China’s response
Policy overview
Impact and China’s efforts to deal with the export controls
1 comment
This is a linkpost for https://docs.google.com/document/d/1OJcHhhBfNwEbeUaT-d4RIq58I1oJ3XGxu2yCzsnieuo/edit?usp=sharing

We're excited to announce that we have updated the China x AI Reference list, which we had first published in Feb 2024. We had originally intended to produce updates every ~year, and this is the first such update. 

The full text of the updated version follows below, and can also be found in the original GoogleDoc.

Introduction

Background

  • There are several China-focused AI reading lists / curricula out there (e.g.: AI governance & China: Reading list (2023), FHI Syllabus (2020), (Basic) Chinese AI Regulation Reading List (2023))
    • They are either relatively brief or somewhat outdated, so this reading list aims to provide a more comprehensive set of key resources when it comes to learning about China, AI safety and policy.
    • We incorporated readings from these reading lists where it felt relevant.
  • This list is based on a community-generated set of readings that were used for a 6-week AI and China discussion group run by the China & Global Priorities Group in 2023. Last update: June 2025

Structure

  • This is designed as a longlist that can act as a starting point for folks looking to dive deeper into this topic and various sub-topics — it is not a snapshot of the 3 most important readings per topic area.
  • The entire reading list is broken down into key themes.
  • We have added in commentary where we felt it would be useful to do so (e.g., we were made aware of potential factual inaccuracies or biased views).
  • Within sections, sources are arranged roughly in order of relevance, not chronology. Sources earlier in a section are more foundational, while later ones are either primary sources that require more context to analyze or older reports/analysis. Sometimes we put related readings next to each other.

Ways to get involved

  • Feel free to suggest additional readings using this form - we’re doing some amount of vetting to prevent the list from ballooning out of control.
  • Join the China & Global Priorities Group if you want to be notified about further discussion groups organized.

Caveats around sources and structures

  • Epistemic status:
    • This resource list was put together in a voluntary capacity by a group of non-Chinese folks with backgrounds in China Studies and professional work experience on China- and/or AI-related issues.
    • We spent several hours on resource collection and sense-checked items based on their style, content and methodology. We do not necessarily endorse all of these works as “very good,” but did exclude stuff where we could see that it is obviously low quality.
    • There are many subtopics where we struggled to find very high-quality material but we still included some publications to give interested readers a start.
  • We expect that most of our audience will not be able to read Chinese easily or fluently, and as such we have provided many English sources. However, it’s important to remember that gaining a deep and concrete understanding of this space is really hard even with Chinese language skills and lived experience in China, so readers without those skills and experiences should be cautious about forming very strong views based on the select few sources that are included here.
  • Machine translation is useful but imperfect in many ways.
  • China is not a monolith; sources you read that claim that “China does X” should be treated with caution. Different actors within China have different aims and while it’s true that the party-state has immense power, even the party-state itself is not one thing, but a collection of various entities and of people with their own specific desires and plans.
  • If you are looking to do further research in this space, then treat this list as a starting point for further exploration.
  • For further reading on methodological considerations of doing analysis related to China, you can start with a look at the following links:

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Oliver Guest, Jason Zhou, and Jeffrey Ding for their feedback on earlier drafts of this list. We would also like to acknowledge Aris Richardson and Zach Stein-Perlman, whose reading lists we took inspiration from.

Compiled by (in alphabetical order): Gabriel Wagner, Saad Siddiqui, Sarah Godek, and Sarah Weiler

Domestic Governance

Chinese policymaking overview

Science and technology policy

  • Re-engineering China’s innovation machine: A series by MERICS and the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 2024
  • High Wire: How China Regulates Big Tech and Governs Its Economy, Angela Huyue Zhang, 2024 (pdfs) (full book: 291 pages)
    • Chapters 1-3 develop a theoretical framework to understand regulatory dynamics in China’s technology governance, marked by hierarchy, volatility, and fragility.
    • Chapters 4-8 analyze the regulatory “tech crackdown” of 2020-2022 and chapter 11 analyzes the evolving regulations of generative AI, as case studies to apply and illustrate the framework. Scrutinizes the role and behavior of the state leadership, firms, technology users, and regulatory agencies.
    • Chapter 9 compares China to other jurisdictions, and chapter 10 provides a tentative assessment of the effects of China’s regulatory efforts to date.
  • China’s Model of Science: Rationale, Players, Issues, BluePath Labs & China Aerospace Studies Institute, 2022 (89 pages)
    • Quite a long and advanced read, might be challenging to digest if you don’t have much China-related background, but is a very thoroughly researched analysis of Chinese decision-makers' thinking. Slightly out of date, written before 2023 scitech government agency restructuring.
  • Reading the Tea Leaves on China’s New Central Science and Technology Commission, Jimmy Goodrich, 2024
  • The Trajectory of China’s Industrial Policies, Barry Naughton, Siwen Xiao, and Yaosheng Xu, 2023 (33 pages)
    • Describes important shifts in PRC industrial policy over the past decades, most notably a shift in focus from economic growth to security and self-reliance.
    • Explains well China’s vision for a “enterprise-driven, government-steered” tech ecosystem.
    • Naughton is a very authoritative scholar for China’s economy, and mostly researched industrial policy in recent years.
  • Xi Jinping speech on science and technology, Xi Jinping, Pekingnology Translation, 2021 (19 pages)
    • Probably skip this if you have no previous experience with reading original Chinese party-state documents.
    • Very comprehensive outline of Xi’s thoughts on scitech, what it means for the economy and global competition, key challenges China faces, etc.

Domestic AI policy

Broad approaches

Regulations

Standards

Model evaluations / benchmarks

AI ethics

AI safety funding

We do not know of any systematic analysis of AI safety funding in the PRC. Below are a few government-funded projects we happen to be aware of. They can, at best, serve illustrative purposes.

  • National Natural Science Foundation of China releases application guide, encouraging AI safety research, Concordia, 2023 (section on funding 1 page)
    • “..proposes funding six projects at 500,000 RMB ($70,000) per project, in any of six research directions. Two of those directions are directly relevant to AI safety: “research on value and safety alignment strategy for large models” and “research on automated evaluation methods for generative models.”
    • Note: this is a very small funding stream and it is unclear how important this is overall; we suspect that labs are spending more on AI safety but, given the lack of sources, we remain uncertain.
  • Notice on the Release of the “Guide to the 2023 Annual Projects for the Major Research Program on Explainable and Generalizable Next-Generation Artificial Intelligence Methods”, CSET, Translation by Kevin Wei, 2023 (14 pages)
    • Lays out 2023 funding priorities in ‘explainable’, ‘generalizable’ AI by NSFC (National Natural Science Foundation of China), one of the PRC’s main government bodies for basic research funding.
    • Some directions are related to AI safety (interpretability research), but others are focused on capabilities in specific domains like biotechnology or medicine.
    • No funding amount disclosed.
  • 会议回顾｜国家科技创新2030——“新一代人工智能”重大项目“可信人工智能立法制度建设研究”启动暨实施方案论证会召开, Renmin Law and Technology Institute, 2023 (3 pages) (archived link)
    • The PRC is currently running 16 “Technological Innovation 2030 – Mega-Projects”  (2017–2030). One of them is focused on “next generation AI” (科技创新2030—“新一代人工智能”重大项目).
    • Funding for each mega-project is estimated to be around 50 billion RMB. But the mega projects are relatively opaque, and no official statistics on funding size are published.
    • Institutional set-up and supervision varies significantly from one project to the other (see Barry Naughton 2022, pp. 52–59).
      • China’s domestic Comac C919 aircraft, one of the 2006–2020 mega projects, was set up as a state-owned joint stock corporation.
      • Other “mega projects” are a loose collection of many smaller sub-projects executed by unis, research institutes and companies, supervised by a specific Ministry.
    • We are not aware of any systematic analysis of the AI-focused mega project. But it appears to be supervised by MoST, with new calls (archived link) for sub-project applications published every one or two years.
    • The article describes a kick-off meeting for one of these sub-projects titled “Research on Establishing a Trustworthy AI Legislative System”. It focuses on legal systems for aggregated data governance, algorithm governance, AI safety risk assessment, and more. The project is led by Renmin University and brings together 7 institutions including the China Electronic Technology Standardization Research Institute.
    • The article has detailed information about attendees.

International Governance

Overview

Sino-western AI competition

Race dynamics

Several influential pieces take the AI arms race as a premise and further perpetuate the narrative. These pieces are not about the ‘race’ itself, but have shaped discussions.

  • AI 2027, Kokataljo et al., 2025 (71 pages)
    • A forecast of AI development and geopolitics – suggests that the current moment (mid-2025) is not necessarily an AGI race between the US and China but that China may soon ‘wake up’ to AGI.
    • Superintelligence Strategy, Hendrycks et al., 2025 (41 pages)
      • Argues against a Manhattan Project to build superintelligence, instead advocating deterrence as a strategy that both the US and China can use to prevent either side from building superintelligence.
    • Situational Awareness, Aschenbrenner, 2024 (165 pages)
      • Argues for a Manhattan Project for AGI in order to compete effectively with China
  • The Illusion of China’s AI Prowess, Helen Toner, Jenny Xiao, and Jeffrey Ding, 2023, (7 pages)
    • Makes the case that there is a bigger gap between Chinese and Western models than observers in the West may expect.
  • In U.S.-China AI contest, the race is on to deploy killer robots, Reuters, David Lague, 2023, (14 pages) (archived link)
    • Sensational title but actually gets into some of the first military tests utilizing AI and some of the race dynamics in that domain.
  • See resources on the 2022/2023 US export controls on China below (an example of how US-China competition is playing out)

‘Gap’ between Chinese and Western AI models

  • DeepSeek. Temu. TikTok. China Tech Is Starting to Pull Ahead, The New York Times, Eric Schmidt and Selina Xu, 2025
    • Former Google CEO argues that China’s AI industry is beginning to pull ahead from the US AI industry.
    • See further resources on DeepSeek, and what it might imply about the limits of U.S. export controls, in the Appendix
  • Chinese AI Will Match America's, ChinaTalk, Lennart Heim, 2025
    • Compute governance expert Lennart Heim argues that China will match US AI capabilities in 2025, but US advantage remains its significantly larger total compute capacity.
  • AI Index 2025, Stanford HAI, 2025, pp. 96–97
    • Compares US and Chinese models based on standardized benchmarks (MMLU, MMMU, MATH, Human Eval), generally showing a closing gap between US and Chinese models over time.
  • LmSys Chatbot Arena
    • There are many different benchmarks and leaderboards but many AI experts refer to LmSys as one key source to gauge the performance of different AI models. As of June 2025, Chinese companies (DeepSeek and Alibaba) had models in the top 10 ranking, although the top 5 were American. On certain dimensions like CoPilot (i.e. coding assistants), DeepSeek’s R1 model ranked 1st.
    • Other benchmarks include: Scale AI’s SEAL Leaderboard, Artificial Analysis, and OpenCompass.

Sino-western AI cooperation

Cooperation can take many forms - including a range of different diplomatic dialogues (official, semi-official etc) to investment and scientific collaboration. It is worth noting that commercial and research collaboration has continued in many forms, but that both forms of exchange and collaboration are coming under increasing scrutiny from different parts of the American government.

Diplomacy / Dialogue

Business / commercial

  • US Moves To Narrowly Limit Investment in China, Skadden, Brian J. Egan, Eytan J. Fisch, Michael E. Leiter, Brooks E. Allen, Jordan Cannon, and Katie Clarke, 2023 (6 pages)
    • Coverage of a late 2023 executive order from the Biden administration that instructs the Committee on Foreign Investment in the US (CFIUS) under the Department of Treasury to create an outbound investment control regime, to look at American investments going into China in sensitive sectors (e..g, semiconductors).
    • This complements existing authority that CFIUS has to look at investments of foreign capital in the US.
  • U.S. Outbound Investment into Chinese AI, CSET, Emily S. Weinstein and Ngor Luong, 2023 (68 pages)
    • CSET report that points out that significant American investment into Chinese AI development has taken place.

Scientific  collaboration

  • In Which Areas of Technical AI Safety Could Geopolitical Rivals Cooperate?, Ben Bucknall et al., 2025
    • This paper outlines areas of AI safety research that geopolitical rivals could potentially cooperate on, through an analysis of the relative risks that different topics of cooperation could pose. It also includes a case study of US-China collaboration on AI.
  • Can democracies cooperate with China on AI research?, Brookings, Cameron F. Kerry, Joshua P. Meltzer, and Matt Sheehan, 2023 (4 pages)
    • Outlines recent trends in US-China AI research cooperation, and discusses challenges and concerns vis-a-vis such cooperation (from a US perspective).
    • Recommends a “risk-based” approach to handling research cooperation with China.
  • Examples of scientific collaboration
    • The Singapore Consensus on Global AI Safety Research Priorities, 2025 (40 pages)
      • The Singapore Consensus on Global AI Safety Research Priorities, builds on the International AI Safety Report-A, outlining related AI safety research domains into three types. It was developed through a conference hosted by the Singaporean government with participants from the West, China and other parts of Asia.
    • The International Scientific Report on the Safety of Advanced AI, Bengio et al., 2025 (298 pages)
      • This report is an example of scientific collaboration but does not talk about collaboration itself. Commissioned by the UK, with experts from over 20 countries along with the UN, EU, and OECD, the report was published in January 2025 and presented at the AI Action Summit in Paris in February. It includes writers and expert advisors from both the West and China.
    • Managing AI Risks in an Era of Rapid Progress, Bengio et. al, 2023 (4 pages)
      • A short consensus paper on the risks from advanced AI systems, ranging from large-scale social harms to malicious uses. This was written by a very broad range of Chinese and Western scholars, including, Yoshua Bengio, Geoffrey Hinton, Andrew Yao and Stuart Russell. Several influential Chinese academics are also on this paper (including Xue Lan, the chairperson of the Ministry of Science and Technology’s AI ethics committee).

Chinese engagement at multilateral fora

China’s own international AI governance initiatives

Key Actors and Their Views on AI Risks

Caveat: Besides the scan that Concordia and CSET have done, there are not yet many comprehensive overviews of key actors. Moreover, the CSET report has some errors that we flag below, which leads us to be less confident in the report’s overall accuracy. Where we are aware of other potentially relevant individuals, we have also included their names, even if we have no clear resources to link to.

Overview

  • Inside China's AI Ecosystem: A View From Beijing (Podcast), The Cognitive Revolution
    • Interview with anonymous Chinese tech worker ‘L-squared’ that gives a good introductory overview of some of the key actors, key companies, public opinion on AI, and high-level consideration of thinking on AI safety in China.

Knowledge of and support for AGI

  • "Introduction" in "State of AI Safety in China", pp. 1–3, Concordia, 2023 (3 pages)
  • Beijing Policy Interest in General Artificial Intelligence is Growing, Heide, 2023 (5 pages)
    • Argues that Chinese policymakers’ focus shifted from narrow to general AI in early 2023.
    • Just as for the English 'artificial general intelligence’, there are multiple interpretations of the Chinese term 通用人工智能. So there is still plenty of ambiguity on what the Politburo meant with the term, which is only partly acknowledged in this piece.
    • This is an opinion piece that gestures towards a potential trend, based on high-level reasoning, rather than rigorous evaluation.
  • Assessing Beijing Municipality’s push for General AI, Human General Intelligence, Oliver Guest, 2025 (16 pages)
    • Discusses the modest results of Beijing’s push to promote the development of general AI following the above-mentioned trends.
  • Wuhan’s AI Development: China’s Alternative Springboard to Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), CSET, William Hannas, Huey-Meei Chang, and Daniel Chou, 2025 (21 pages without notes)
    • Discusses the ecosystem of AI development in Wuhan including key figures and institutions, industrial chain, and initiatives.
  • China's Advanced AI Research, CSET, William Hannas, Huey-Meei Chang, Daniel Chou, Brian Fleegeras, 2022 (78 pages)
    • This is a fairly comprehensive report but there are several factual and framing issues that have been identified since its release that are relevant for any reader to consider.
    • The report implies that China is looking to develop AGI to achieve a decisive advantage over its rivals due to the self-improving nature of AGI; a closer reading of the quoted policies suggests a more commercial implication that this is linked more closely to ensuring Chinese firms have larger market share in new technological industries.
    • This report (and a wide range of other materials) imply that there is unified Chinese action on AI/AGI. However, there are a range of relevant government and non-government actors involved, and arguing that ‘China wants X’ with any strong degree of confidence is quite fraught.
    • The report also inaccurately characterizes the types of research being pursued at particular large AI labs in China.
  • China’s Views on AI Safety Are Changing—Quickly, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Matt Sheehan, 2024 (11 pages)
    • Demonstration of how Chinese views on AI safety are changing including concern for AGI and consideration of frontier development risks.
  • Is China Racing to AGI?, ChinaTalk, 2025 (16 pages)
    • While more of a poppy analysis, this piece contains many useful sources on each side of the debate of whether China is racing to AGI and key actors in those considerations.
  • Chinese Critiques of Large Language Models: Finding the Path to General Artificial Intelligence, CSET, William Hannas, Huey-Meei Chang, Maximilian Riesenhuber, and Daniel Chou, 2025 (29 pages total)
    • Useful reference on the debates between key scientists over whether LLMs can meaningfully lead to the development of AGI.

AI scientists / key academics

Industry

  • China’s Generative AI Ecosystem in 2024: Rising Investment and Expectations, NBR, Paul Triolo and Kendra Schaefer, 2024 (17 pages)
    • Background on the current state of China’s AI industry including major players and up-and-comers and discussion of benchmarking and evaluation.
  • Recent Trends in China's LLM Landscape, Centre for the Governance of AI, Jenny Xiao and Jeffrey Ding, 2023 (14 pages)
    • Points to trends in Chinese LLM model landscape, including some commentary about industry perception of different factors of AI development.
  • DeepSeek and Other Chinese Firms Converge with Western Companies on AI Promises, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Scott Singer, 2025 (10 pages)
    • Details the current state of how AI companies in China are approaching AI safety commitments.
  • "Lab Self-Governance" in "State of AI Safety in China", pp. 61–73 Concordia AI, 2023 (13 pages)
  • Tencent Research Institute releases Large Model Security & Ethics Report, ChinAI, Jeffrey Ding, 2024 (3 pages, full translation 23 pages)
    • Tencent report on large model security and ethics, covering 1) LLM development trends, 2) opportunities and challenges in LLM security, 3) LLM security frameworks, 4) best practices for large model security, and 5) large model value alignment progress and trends.
    • The report gives insight into the types of assessments Chinese AI labs are implementing to comply with generative AI regulations.
  • AI Safety in China #10, Concordia AI, 2024 (10 pages)
    • This issue covers meetings held by China’s AI industry association, which include working groups on value alignment, policy and law, and security and governance. The policy and law working group meeting covered here focused on AGI risks.
  • Primary Sources:
    • Original text of the AI Safety Commitments launched by a Chinese Industry Association (in English and Chinese)
    • Chapter six of the report published by Alibaba’s AI Governance Center’s Large Language Model Technology Development and Governance Practice Report covers safety/security and governance. This was covered briefly by Concordia AI, and will likely eventually be published in English (currently only through chapter 3 has been published in English).

Military

Public opinion

AI Inputs

Here we try to provide more varied sources linked to the different inputs of AI models. Some sources will be repeated. For three of the sections (Algorithms, Capital and Talent), we only did a cursory survey of the literature; the pieces in these sections are thus just a snapshot and it is quite likely that relevant publications have been overlooked.

Overview: China’s AI ecosystem

  • Chasing Artificial General Intelligence: China Between Breakthroughs and Bottlenecks, Mengying Tao, Sinolytics, 2024 (23 pages)
    • Gives an overview of “China’s AGI strategy”, examining both government and company publications and statements. Has content on Chips, Computing, Data, Models, and Applications, and analyzes China’s strengths, weaknesses, and strategic priorities for each.
  • China's Evolving Industrial Policy for AI, Kyle Chan et al., RAND, 2025
    • Gives an overview of policies/initiatives to promote and assist AI development from across China’s governance levels (national & local) and across input sectors.
    • Includes rough comparisons to public and private investment in the U.S., and hypothesizes over the likely success of China’s industrial policy in pushing for AI leadership.
  • Seeking the next DeepSeek: What China’s generative AI registration data can tell us about China’s AI competitiveness, Kendra Schaefer, trivium china, 2025 (16 pages)
    • Uses an extensive dataset produced by the Chinese state to analyze the generative AI ecosystem in the country (ignores other AI products).
    • Questions addressed:
      • How many generative AI tools are operating in China?
      • How fast is China’s generative AI ecosystem growing?
      • Where are generative AI tools being built?
      • Which companies are doing the most generative AI development?
      • Which sectors are seeing the most generative AI innovation?
      • What’s the role of the state in China’s generative AI ecosystem?
      • What types of generative AI projects are foreign companies undertaking in China?

Algorithms

For lack of time, we only did a cursory survey of the literature. The pieces in the section are thus just a snapshot and it is quite likely that relevant publications have been overlooked.

Compute

Semiconductors

Overview

  • China’s Quest for Semiconductor Self-Sufficiency, Alan Turing Institute (Centre for Emerging Technology and Security), Ardi Janjeva, Seoin Baek, and Andy Sellars, 2024 (40 pages total, pp. 9–25 for the overview of semiconductor developments in China)
    • The first section gives a good overview of China’s semiconductor landscape, including a description of major initiatives for self-reliance and an analysis of their success. (The second and third sections focus on implications for the UK and for South Korea.)
  • Introduction to AI chip making in China, Institute for AI Policy and Strategy, Erich Grunewald and Christopher Phenicie, 2023 (41 pages total)
    • A basic overview of the importance of semiconductors to AI with some details about China’s role.
    • The majority of the report sets global context for specific parts of the semiconductor supply chain, with Chinese gaps vis-a-vis the West highlighted for each part of the supply chain.
    • Key gaps specified pp.15–22; details about export controls covered pp.23–24; forecasting questions about Chinese chip-making linked in pp.26–27.
    • More detailed than the Alan Turing report, but less up-to-date.
  • 半导体产业政策梳理与分析：集成电路政策力度有望加大, CITIC Securities, 2023 (19 pages) (archived link)
    • A detailed overview of the history of semiconductor policy in China, including a breakdown of gaps by specific parts of the supply chain and key priorities for key local governments.
  • Measuring China’s Technological Self-Reliance Drive, China Leadership Monitor, Jeffrey Ding, 2023 (10 pages)
    • Chinese policy-making is driven by metrics, including quantitative targets for domestic substitution in semiconductors. The article problematizes/disentangles what these metrics mean.

Chinese semiconductor policy

Note that the overviews listed above also contain some commentary on Chinese policies.

International dynamics (esp. US-China relations)

  • The Global Might of the Tiny Chip, New York Times, Virginia Heffernan, 2022
    • Book review of Chris Miller’s Chip War.
    • The book and book review present insights into global semiconductor supply chains, and discuss what this implies for international affairs.
  • Nvidia’s China Business is Important to US Geopolitical Positioning, Interconnected, Kevin Xu, 2023 (7 pages)
  • Not Trading With the Enemy: The Case of Computer Chips, Journal of World Trade, Olga Hrynkiv and Saskia Lavrijssen, 2024 (pdf) (26 pages)
    • Provides a legal analysis of the compatibility of export controls with the international trade law framework.
    • Also analyzes possible effects of governments’ ‘decoupling’ strategies toward China on shaping international trade law.
  • Chapter 3 - U.S.-China Competition in Emerging Technologies, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2024 Annual Report to Congress, 2024 (pdf) (102 pages)
    • pp. 181-187 analyzes China’s efforts to develop its domestic semiconductor industry, especially in the context of U.S. policies to hamper such efforts.
    • The rest of the report looks at U.S.-China competition in advanced technologies more broadly.
    • Note that this report was written by a U.S. congressional commission and makes some strong assumptions about the motivations driving Chinese policymakers as well as normative assumptions about the U.S.’s national interest.
  • See also resources listed under: Race dynamics
  • See also Appendix: US Export controls of 2022 and 2023

Data centers

Data

Capital

For lack of time, we only did a cursory survey of the literature on the capital resources that go into AI developments in China. The pieces in the section are thus just a snapshot and it is quite likely that relevant publications have been overlooked.

Talent

For lack of time, we only did a cursory survey of the literature on AI talent in China. The pieces in the section are thus just a snapshot and it is quite likely that relevant publications have been overlooked.

  • The Global AI Talent Tracker 2.0, MacroPolo, 2024 (8 pages) (archived link)
    • Uses data from the Neural Information Processing Systems conference (NeurIPS) to estimate top-tier AI talent flows between China, US, Europe, etc.
    • See also the response and additional data provided in: Tracking Global AI Talent Flow (Kevin Xu, Interconnected, 2024, access only for paid subscribers)
  • China Artificial Intelligence Talent Training Report, Zhejiang University and Baidu, translation by CSET, 2022 (79 pages)
    • White paper that examines shortcomings in China’s AI talent training. Urges closer university-enterprise cooperation.
  • China’s AI Workforce, CSET: Gelhaus et al, 2022 (60 pages)
    • Assesses China's AI workforce demands through a dataset of ~7M job postings.
  • China's quest for AI talent in Chinese Power and Artificial Intelligence, Emily Weinstein and Jeffrey Stoff, edited by William C. Hannas and Huey-Meei Chang, 2022 (book chapter, 16 pages)
  • CHINA'S AI ECOSYSTEM: Talent and Education (pp. 46-47), Andres C. Johansson (Stockholm School of Economics), 2022 (2 pages)

Key resources

  • Concordia’s AI Safety in China newsletter
    • The AI Safety in China newsletter provides regular news and research updates on Technical safety and alignment research in China; China’s governance and policy efforts to reduce AI risk; and China’s positions on international AI governance.
  • 中国计算机学会通讯
    • The journal of the China Computer Federation, a leading academic publication for computer scientists. Important to gain a sense of leading intellectual thinking across various issues, e.g., 2nd issue of 2024 on compute.
  • Defense AI and Arms Control Network, Centre for Long-term AI
    • This is a database of AI and military related material (policies, commentary, white papers) maintained by a leading think-tank within the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Center for Long-term AI is led by Yi Zeng, one of Time’s 100 AI leaders in 2023 and a signatory of both FLI and CAIS open letters.
  • MERICS
    • MERICS is a German-based think tank focused exclusively on China-related issues, analyzing and commenting on these with an eye to implications for Europe and Germany. Most relevant analyses on China x AI can be found in their Industrial Policy and Technology and Digital China topic pages.
  • Chinatalk — newsletter and podcast run by Jordan Schneider, a fellow at the Center for New American Security; features commentary by Jordan as well as by guest writers and speakers.
  • Recode China AI — run by a Communications Manager at Baidu in the US.
  • Chip Capitols Newsletter — written by Arrian Ebrahimi, a Yenching Scholar with experience in the semiconductor industry.
  • BluePath Labs — for defense technology related analysis.
  • Geotechnopolitics — Patrick Zhang, ex Chinese Foreign Ministry, writes about geopolitics and tech.
  • Sinocism - Bill Bishop’s newsletter (4x weeks) with analysis, commentary and curated links on general China-related news of the day (English and Chinese-language sources); not specifically AI- or tech-focused, but has content on these issues if they make it into news headlines.
  • Chinese tech news websites
    • Leiphone
    • 36Kr
  • Wechat Accounts (Note: it is not possible to “link” to Wechat accounts, but you can find them by simply searching for the names in Wechat. Some of these accounts may also have websites and you can find those on Google/Baidu)
    • General
      • AI 科技评论
        • Posts about AI research and the implementation of AI projects.
      • 数据观
        • Posts content and industry information  related to big data, blockchain, AI.
      • 安远 AI  
        • Concordia’s Chinese-language channel.
    • Think-tanks
      • 清华大学人工智能国际治理研究院
        • Has a weekly newsletter on AI governance (AI治理周报) with several sections on government policy, enterprise news, international AI governance, etc.
      • 中国信通院 CAICT
        • A research institution under the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, regularly publishes white papers related to AI and other technologies.
      • 可信 AI 评测
        • A WeChat account run by the CAICT, dedicated to evaluations of AI. They have been running model evaluations around trustworthiness for the past few years, and have also done model evaluations recently. These evaluations are done by a ‘national key laboratory’ under the MIIT, set up in 2017.
    • AI lab accounts
      • 智谱AI
        • A leading AI startup that collaborates with Tsinghua University to produce ChatGLM.
      • Moonshot AI
        • The startup behind KimiChat, one of the best performing Chinese LLMs.
      • 瑞莱智慧RealAI
        • Another leading AI startup, with significant focus on AI security.
      • 诺亚方舟实验室
        • Huawei’s Noah Ark Lab focused on AI research and development.
      • 上海人工智能实验室
        • Shanghai AI Laboratory, an AI lab that publishes research on theories, technology, and ethics. Works with Sensetime on their InternLM model.
      • 阿里巴巴人工智能治理研究中心
        • Alibaba Artificial Intelligence Governance Laboratory, which focuses on over 200 AI applications in and outside of the Alibaba ecosystem.
      • 腾讯研究院
      • 腾讯安全应急响应中心
        • Tencent Security Response Center, online platform for cooperation between Tencent security team and international researchers; WeChat account publishes reports on security, LLM capabilities, and security risks to LLMs.
    • Semiconductor-focused
      • 半导体观察 (Semiconductor observatory)
        • More domestic-focused look at semiconductors.
      • 全球半导体观察 (world semicon observatory)
        • Chinese perspectives on global semiconductors.
      • 半导体材料行业分会（Semicon materials association)
        • Posts updates from forums and investment / project update announcements.
  • Translation resources
    • Jeff Ding’s ChinAI newsletter and searchable archive
      • Translates AI- and China-related articles and documents from government departments, think tanks, traditional media, and newer forms of “self-media,” etc., aiming to disseminate a diverse discourse from the Chinese-language world to an English audience.
    • The Center for Strategic Translation
      • Translates material “of strategic and historical value” and annotates them to contextualize the relevance of specific phrases, words and ideas.
    • Interpret: China (CSIS)
      • Translates selected documents, and adds interpretation and contextualisation.
      • Material covered: speeches, newspaper and academic articles, government and policy documents, and other primary source materials; selected “for relevance” by their analysts.
    • China Law Translate
      • Translates key regulations.
    • ETO Scout
      • Collects Chinese-language news and commentary on technology issues, lists them in a search-able database, provides short English summary and link to the original for each item, and offers to send customized updates on new releases via email.
    • CSET Translations
      • Selects and translates documents (mostly Chinese state and Communist party sources, or sources from institutions with links to the Chinese state or Communist party).

Appendix: US Export controls of 2022 and 2023: policy measures, effects, and China’s response

The articles linked here track the changing views on how well export controls have been able to actually impact Chinese chipmaking capacity. It is important to note that experts seem to disagree about how much of a lag one should expect to see between the introduction of these export controls and their actual impact on Chinese chipmaking, given that Chinese companies have some reserves of now-restricted chips, amongst other reasons.

Policy overview

Impact and China’s efforts to deal with the export controls

 

 

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Erich_Grunewald 🔸5
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Nice work!

On AI chip smuggling, rather than the report you listed, which is rather outdated now, I recommend reading Countering AI Chip Smuggling Has Become a National Security Priority, which is essentially a Pareto improvement over the older one.

I also think Chris Miller's How US Export Controls Have (and Haven't) Curbed Chinese AI provides a good overview of the AI chip export controls, and it is still quite up-to-date.

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