Looking to advance businesses with charities in the vast majority shareholder position. Check out my TEDx talk for why I believe Profit for Good businesses could be a profound force for good in the world.
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Thanks for the thoughtful reply — and yes, I do think this is a pretty serious concern for trust and scale.
The core issue, as I see it, is that for the “we’re neutralizing opposing political donations” story to really hold, donors should be doing something like:
“This is money I was otherwise going to use to support the specific zero-sum political cause indicated (or a very close substitute), and I’m now redirecting it instead.”
One concrete way to reinforce that would be a short pledge at checkout, e.g.:
“I understand that DuelGood only works if donors genuinely redirect money they would otherwise have used to support the indicated political cause (or a very similar one). I pledge that this donation meets that description.”
You could then reserve the strongest “duel/neutralization” framing and stats for donors who sign that pledge, and be transparent about that in the FAQ.
I’d really love to see DuelGood work — turning political deadlock into bednets is a very compelling vision.
One concern I have is how this might be pretty gameable to not reflect someone's counterfactual donation decisions.
For instance, say that I am going to donate anyway to GiveWell's Top Charities Fund, but I also have other political preferences (say promoting second amendment rights in the United States). Now, instead of just donating directly to GiveWell's Top Charities Fund, I can use DuelGood to donate to GiveWell, while neutralizing the donations to a gun safety organization.Â
This possibility, that your DuelGood contribution may not actually be neutralizing spending by the opposing cause, seems like it could prompt some serious concern (even if, in fact, people were being honest and using it for counterfactual donations).
EDIT: This sort of setup where two people agree not to fund causes where they oppose each other seems like it would work very well if the two people trust each other. How can DuelGood create this degree of trust in a scalable way between strangers?
EDIT2: second amendment is the right to bear arms, not first!
I definitely agree that looking for tweaks that could save money without reducing luxury or convenience is a great idea and think that resources to help EAs make such decisions quickly and easily would be great. I don't think it is all that people mean typically when they think about living frugally, so maybe a different framing would make sense.
Thanks, Jason — this is exactly the kind of scrutiny I think the idea needs.
On your core point: I basically agree with your descriptive read. Looking at Thankyou’s ~4–5% donate-able margin or Newman’s ~5% donations on ~5% net margins does not scream “these businesses are crushing the for-profit competition.” When I talk about large profit uplifts, I’m not claiming we already see that in their published numbers; I’m saying the mechanism (thin margins + modest stakeholder advantages) could plausibly generate big differences if we ever set this up deliberately and at scale. What we actually have today are a handful of pioneers operating under lousy conditions: low category awareness, no shared certification, and a chronic capital misfit (too “weird” for normal investors, too “businessy” for most philanthropy). In that world, you’d expect “survive and sometimes do well,” not “obvious margin dominance.”
I also think you’re right to flag survivorship and the Paul Newman effect. Newman’s Own probably got a brand tailwind few founders can replicate, and we don’t have good public data on the PFG attempts that fizzled. That’s partly why the article opens by saying “the basic math is compelling, what we lack is rigorous measurement.” I’m using Thankyou/Newman’s as existence proofs (“this can work at all”), not as clean evidence that the multiplier is already realized in the wild.
On the Kraft question and capital: I don’t think the story has to be “small PFG beats the global leader on day one.” The more realistic path I have in mind is stepwise:
So I’m not claiming “PFG firms are already out-earning Kraft” or that we have tidy margin graphs to prove a large edge. I’m claiming: (a) we have decent evidence that stakeholder preferences exist at parity and can matter; (b) the margin arithmetic makes it at least plausible that, in the right contexts, this could translate into big differences in distributable profits; and (c) given that, it’s rational for philanthropists to run some careful, sector-specific experiments rather than either assuming PFG can’t compete or assuming it already does. If those trials show no advantage once you control for capital and sector, I’ll happily update. Right now, the main thing I’m arguing against is staying forever in exactly the “anecdata vs intuition” uncertainty you’re highlighting.