Could you provide some examples of people who have said that this is hypocritical? I’ve never seen anyone in the EA community say this, and if they did, they’d be wrong. There are plenty of non-vegan EAs who donate to animal welfare.
Thanks for posting and for being open to outside perspectives!
The most obvious thing to ask is whether you've engaged with the previous literature on the cost-effectiveness of animal charities. For example, in October 2023, Rethink Priorities estimated that 1,132 DALYs are averted per $1,000 donated to corporate cage-free campaigns using their moral weights, and that 73 DALYs are averted per $1,000 if you assume low moral weights for chickens. They also found that shrimp stunning interventions may avert 38 DALYs per $1,000 donated to them, using their own moral weights. This compared with 19.1 DALYs averted per $1,000 donated to the Against Malaria Foundation. You can also check out their cross-cause cost-effectiveness model and play around with it.
The other question is what you mean when you say "my moral weights clearly go towards the humans here". Does this mean that you're solely incorporating the probability of sentience and the intensity of pleasure and suffering that each species experiences, or are you smuggling in speciesist discounts to your moral weights? Also, what would be your bar for preferring to donate to an animal charity? That should probably be worked out beforehand, otherwise the goalposts could shift.
Finally, I think each charity should be evaluated on its own merits. I don't think The Humane League and Shrimp Welfare Project can be grouped together in the you've done, for instance. They do quite different things!
As I commented there: I don't think this is the kind of "ends justify the means" reasoning that MacAskill is objecting to. Vasco isn’t arguing that we should break the law. He’s just doing a fairly standard EA cause prioritization analysis. Arguing that people should not donate to global health doesn't even contradict common-sense morality because as we see from the world around us, common-sense morality holds that it's perfectly permissible to let hundreds or thousands of children die of preventable diseases. Utilitarians and other consequentialists are the ones who hold "weird" views here, because we reject the act/omission distinction in the first place.
(For my part, I try to donate in such a way that I'm net-positive from the perspective of someone like Vasco as well as global health advocates.)
It is admirable that you acknowledge that you are not using “reason and evidence to do the most good” and that you presumably accept that you have no leg to stand on when trying to persuade nativists who assign zero weight to people who live in other countries to give more to those who live abroad.
Common-sense morality has nothing to say about cause prioritisation in the first place, so it rejects the problem only in the sense that it doesn’t subscribe to standard EA cause-neutrality and prioritisation frameworks. Global health EAs also violate common-sense morality when they argue that charity doesn’t begin at home (as in, within one’s own country). This is to be expected: EAs are committed to impartiality and welfarism, and the vast majority of humans are not.
Thank you for writing this, it was an interesting read.
Common sense morality is great. As Sidgwick argued, it's actually a good approximation of utilitarianism: a utilitarian does want a world in which people do not steal or kill, and in which humans (being humans) look after their family and friends.
However, common sense morality is also a bit incoherent and contradictory, and (as you demonstrate) it has very little to say about how to prioritize when it comes to our positive duties toward other sentient beings. In my view (and in Sidgwick's), utilitarianism best resolves these contradictions and guides us when it comes to prioritization.
I don't think common sense morality has much to say about prioritization, because it barely asks us to do anything for others in the first place. It is, after all, relatively comfortable with thousands of children dying of preventable diseases each day, and with the suffering of billions of factory farmed animals each year. If you think these things require urgent action, all it has to say is "that's fine, you do you".
So I don't think the common sense moralist can, on the one hand, say that we aren't obligated to help other sentient beings, and then presume to tell those of us who do believe we are obligated to help other sentient beings how we should go about this. In other words, I don't think that utilitarian conclusions about prioritization do go against common sense morality, because common sense morality has little to say about prioritization.
I'm not saying anything novel here. Indeed, you acknowledge this point when you say: "it is true that incommensurability of values does not provide immediate tools to weigh in different values. For example, how should we prioritize funding or reform efforts between health, education or housing?"
I don't think the problem that common sense morality has with prioritization can be "explained away", despite your attempt to do so. Ethics is about asking how we ought to live, and if an ethical theory cannot provide answers to this question, it should be discarded. And I disagree that utilitarians are ourselves guilty of "explaining away" when we "moderate" our conclusions. In fact, utilitarians are obligated to take human nature (including our own) into account, so considerations about burnout and human emotion when it comes to donations and careers aren't merely "secondary considerations" but an integral part of applying utilitarianism in a sophisticated way.
Given that EAs are tentatively committed to impartiality and welfarism, I don't think the beliefs are particularly unconventional on this Forum.
It is also highly controversial to state that charity doesn't begin at home (as in, within one's country) and that we should instead equally consider the welfare of people no matter where they live. But it shouldn't be controversial on this Forum.
Sophisticated (as opposed to naive) utilitarians shouldn't break the law or violate commonly accepted negative duties. But they can say that one should donate to Cause X instead of Cause Y (and common-sense morality says it's fine to donate to neither!) So I disagree that the same logic could be used to justify breaking the law.
I don't think this is an example of "naive utilitarianism". It's a fairly standard EA cause prioritization analysis. Vasco is not arguing that we ought to break the law, or even that we should go against common-sense morality.
Indeed, common-sense morality finds itself in a bit of a pickle on this question: it cannot object to someone arguing that we ought not to donate to global health charities, because (as we see from the world around us) it deems it permissible to let thousands of children die every day of preventable disease. EAs (particularly the more utilitarian/consequentialist ones) are the weird ones because we reject the act/omission distinction.
(For my part, I try to donate in such a way that I'm net-positive from the perspective of both anti-speciesist animal welfare and global health advocates.)
I don't think this is the kind of "ends justify the means" reasoning that MacAskill is objecting to. @Vasco Grilo🔸is not arguing that we should break the law. He is just doing a fairly standard EA cause prioritization analysis. Arguing that people should not donate to global health doesn't even contradict common-sense morality because as we see from the world around us, common-sense morality holds that it's perfectly permissible to let hundreds or thousands of children die of preventable diseases. Utilitarians and other consequentialists are the ones who hold "weird" views here, because we reject the act/omission distinction in the first place.
(For my part, I try to donate in such a way that I'm net-positive from the perspective of someone like Vasco as well as global health advocates.)
This question was asked in last year's AMA with THL UK. It was also addressed in THL UK's marginal funding post this year. In summary:
THL UK receives an annual grant from THL, but they are trying to reduce their dependence on them. In addition, because of US lobbying laws, THL's grant to them can't be used for legislative work (for instance, the recent Frankenchickens case) or lobbying work (for example, lobbying for fish welfare in the UK Parliament), and one might believe that such work has a greater chance of succeeding in the UK than the US.
THL UK likely focuses more on fish welfare than THL as a whole.
THL UK also engages in activities in other parts of Europe, not just the UK.
UK donors may be more likely to donate to THL UK as they may be able to claim Gift Aid, although they could donate to THL via EA Funds and might be able to claim Gift Aid there.
Could you provide some examples of people who have said that this is hypocritical? I’ve never seen anyone in the EA community say this, and if they did, they’d be wrong. There are plenty of non-vegan EAs who donate to animal welfare.
Thanks for posting and for being open to outside perspectives!
The most obvious thing to ask is whether you've engaged with the previous literature on the cost-effectiveness of animal charities. For example, in October 2023, Rethink Priorities estimated that 1,132 DALYs are averted per $1,000 donated to corporate cage-free campaigns using their moral weights, and that 73 DALYs are averted per $1,000 if you assume low moral weights for chickens. They also found that shrimp stunning interventions may avert 38 DALYs per $1,000 donated to them, using their own moral weights. This compared with 19.1 DALYs averted per $1,000 donated to the Against Malaria Foundation. You can also check out their cross-cause cost-effectiveness model and play around with it.
The other question is what you mean when you say "my moral weights clearly go towards the humans here". Does this mean that you're solely incorporating the probability of sentience and the intensity of pleasure and suffering that each species experiences, or are you smuggling in speciesist discounts to your moral weights? Also, what would be your bar for preferring to donate to an animal charity? That should probably be worked out beforehand, otherwise the goalposts could shift.
Finally, I think each charity should be evaluated on its own merits. I don't think The Humane League and Shrimp Welfare Project can be grouped together in the you've done, for instance. They do quite different things!
As I commented there: I don't think this is the kind of "ends justify the means" reasoning that MacAskill is objecting to. Vasco isn’t arguing that we should break the law. He’s just doing a fairly standard EA cause prioritization analysis. Arguing that people should not donate to global health doesn't even contradict common-sense morality because as we see from the world around us, common-sense morality holds that it's perfectly permissible to let hundreds or thousands of children die of preventable diseases. Utilitarians and other consequentialists are the ones who hold "weird" views here, because we reject the act/omission distinction in the first place.
(For my part, I try to donate in such a way that I'm net-positive from the perspective of someone like Vasco as well as global health advocates.)
It is admirable that you acknowledge that you are not using “reason and evidence to do the most good” and that you presumably accept that you have no leg to stand on when trying to persuade nativists who assign zero weight to people who live in other countries to give more to those who live abroad.
Common-sense morality has nothing to say about cause prioritisation in the first place, so it rejects the problem only in the sense that it doesn’t subscribe to standard EA cause-neutrality and prioritisation frameworks. Global health EAs also violate common-sense morality when they argue that charity doesn’t begin at home (as in, within one’s own country). This is to be expected: EAs are committed to impartiality and welfarism, and the vast majority of humans are not.
Thank you for writing this, it was an interesting read.
Common sense morality is great. As Sidgwick argued, it's actually a good approximation of utilitarianism: a utilitarian does want a world in which people do not steal or kill, and in which humans (being humans) look after their family and friends.
However, common sense morality is also a bit incoherent and contradictory, and (as you demonstrate) it has very little to say about how to prioritize when it comes to our positive duties toward other sentient beings. In my view (and in Sidgwick's), utilitarianism best resolves these contradictions and guides us when it comes to prioritization.
I don't think common sense morality has much to say about prioritization, because it barely asks us to do anything for others in the first place. It is, after all, relatively comfortable with thousands of children dying of preventable diseases each day, and with the suffering of billions of factory farmed animals each year. If you think these things require urgent action, all it has to say is "that's fine, you do you".
So I don't think the common sense moralist can, on the one hand, say that we aren't obligated to help other sentient beings, and then presume to tell those of us who do believe we are obligated to help other sentient beings how we should go about this. In other words, I don't think that utilitarian conclusions about prioritization do go against common sense morality, because common sense morality has little to say about prioritization.
I'm not saying anything novel here. Indeed, you acknowledge this point when you say: "it is true that incommensurability of values does not provide immediate tools to weigh in different values. For example, how should we prioritize funding or reform efforts between health, education or housing?"
I don't think the problem that common sense morality has with prioritization can be "explained away", despite your attempt to do so. Ethics is about asking how we ought to live, and if an ethical theory cannot provide answers to this question, it should be discarded. And I disagree that utilitarians are ourselves guilty of "explaining away" when we "moderate" our conclusions. In fact, utilitarians are obligated to take human nature (including our own) into account, so considerations about burnout and human emotion when it comes to donations and careers aren't merely "secondary considerations" but an integral part of applying utilitarianism in a sophisticated way.
Given that EAs are tentatively committed to impartiality and welfarism, I don't think the beliefs are particularly unconventional on this Forum.
It is also highly controversial to state that charity doesn't begin at home (as in, within one's country) and that we should instead equally consider the welfare of people no matter where they live. But it shouldn't be controversial on this Forum.
Sophisticated (as opposed to naive) utilitarians shouldn't break the law or violate commonly accepted negative duties. But they can say that one should donate to Cause X instead of Cause Y (and common-sense morality says it's fine to donate to neither!) So I disagree that the same logic could be used to justify breaking the law.
I don't think this is an example of "naive utilitarianism". It's a fairly standard EA cause prioritization analysis. Vasco is not arguing that we ought to break the law, or even that we should go against common-sense morality.
Indeed, common-sense morality finds itself in a bit of a pickle on this question: it cannot object to someone arguing that we ought not to donate to global health charities, because (as we see from the world around us) it deems it permissible to let thousands of children die every day of preventable disease. EAs (particularly the more utilitarian/consequentialist ones) are the weird ones because we reject the act/omission distinction.
(For my part, I try to donate in such a way that I'm net-positive from the perspective of both anti-speciesist animal welfare and global health advocates.)
I don't think this is the kind of "ends justify the means" reasoning that MacAskill is objecting to. @Vasco Grilo🔸is not arguing that we should break the law. He is just doing a fairly standard EA cause prioritization analysis. Arguing that people should not donate to global health doesn't even contradict common-sense morality because as we see from the world around us, common-sense morality holds that it's perfectly permissible to let hundreds or thousands of children die of preventable diseases. Utilitarians and other consequentialists are the ones who hold "weird" views here, because we reject the act/omission distinction in the first place.
(For my part, I try to donate in such a way that I'm net-positive from the perspective of someone like Vasco as well as global health advocates.)
This question was asked in last year's AMA with THL UK. It was also addressed in THL UK's marginal funding post this year. In summary: