The last ten years have witnessed rapid advances in the science of animal cognition and behavior. Striking results have hinted at surprisingly rich inner lives in a wide range of animals, driving renewed debate about animal consciousness.
To highlight these advances, the NYU Mind, Ethics and Policy Program and NYU Wild Animal Welfare Program co-hosted a conference on the emerging science of animal consciousness on Friday April 19 at New York University. This conference also served as the launch event for The New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness.
This short statement, signed by leading scientists who research a wide range of taxa, holds that all vertebrates (including reptiles, amphibians, and fishes) and many invertebrates (including cephalopod mollusks, decapod crustaceans, and insects) have a realistic chance of being conscious, and that their welfare merits consideration.
We now welcome signatures from others as well. If you have relevant expertise (for example, a graduate education or the equivalent in science, philosophy, or policy), you can send an email to nydeclaration@gmail.com from your institutional email address, say that you wish to sign, and list your title and institution as they should appear.
Day-one media coverage of the conference and declaration included articles at Nature, NBC, Quanta, The Hill, and The Times. We also recorded the event, and our team will post videos on the declaration website in the near future.
If you have questions or comments, feel free to send an email to nydeclaration@gmail.com or sofia.fogel@nyu.edu.
Thank you to NYU Animal Studies, the NYU Center for Bioethics, and the NYU Center for Mind, Brain, and Consciousness for supporting this event.
I'm interested in the scientific arguments because, as far as I know, we don't have a good model of consciousness, and many models involve higher-level structures that we don't see in animals with very small brains. I know that some models of consciousness seem to imply that many small animals (or even LLMs!) with "integrated information" are conscious, but it's unclear enough not to pretend that there's a consensus on whether a hummingbird with 100 million neurons is able to instantiate subjective experience! I agree that when in doubt we must take steps to minimise any risk of causing suffering, but this should not lead us to assume an epistemologically questionable perspective. So maybe I'm wrong, and since I'm not a specialist in consciousness, I'm interested in why experts endorse such a statement.