The institute is called Käte Hamburger Centre for Apocalyptic and Post-Apocalyptic Studies and is based in Heidelberg, Germany. They started in 2021 and initially received 9 million € of funding from the German government for the first four years.
AFAICT, they study sociological aspects of narratives of apocalypses, existential risks, and the end of the world.
They have engaged with EA thinking, and I assume they will have an interesting outside perspective of some prevalent worldviews in EA. For example, here is a recorded talk about longtermism (I have only skipped through it so far), which mentions MIRI, FHI, and What We Owe The Future.
I stumbled upon this today and thought it could interest some people here. Generally, I am very curious to learn more about alternative worldviews to EA that also engage with existential risk in epistemically sound ways. One criticism of EA that became more popular over the last months is that EA organizations engage too little with other disciplines and institutions with relevant expertise. Therefore, I suggest checking out the work of this Centre.
Please comment if you have engaged with them before and know more than I do.
Threatmodel homogeneity is a major ecosystem risk in alignment in particular. There's this broad sense of "eliezer and holden are interested in extinction-level events" leading to "it's not cool to be interested in subextinction level events" that leads some people to unclear reasoning, which at worst becomes "guess the password to secure the funding". The whole "if eliezer is right the stakes are so high but I have nagging questions or can't wrap my head around exactly what's going on with the forecasts" thing leads to 1. an impossible to be happy with prioritization/tradeoff problem between dumping time into hard math/cs and dumping time into forecasting and theories of change (which would be a challenge for alignment researchers regardless), 2. an attack surface with a lot of opening to vultures or password guessers (many of whom aren't really distinguishable from people earnestly doing their best, so I may regret framing them as "attackers") , but most of all 3. people getting nowhere with research goals ostensibly directed at extinction-level threatmodels because they don't deep down in their heart of hearts understand those threatmodels when they could instead be making actual progress on other threatmodels that they do understand.