Qualia Research Institute, plus some pro bono time for a project at the intersection of law and AI.

I get what you mean! Here are a few very quick thoughts—hope they make sense!

• Maybe one challenge around introspecting on binding is that one typically has to be in altered or ill states of consciousness to experience what it's like for binding to break down. For instance, under some psychedelics, the color of an object can "bleed out" of its boundaries.
• In normal waking consciousness, we just take binding for granted. We have no problem recognizing that the eyes, nose, mouth, etc. of the person in front of us are "glued" together into a unified gestalt that we can make sense of (and e.g. recognize as our friend). Some people with integrative agnosia can't do that.
• As David Pearce says, no binding = no mind. Without binding, there would only be "qualia dust" floating around. It makes sense that evolution would recruit bound experiences to make sense of the external world. Ethically, we should care about bound experiences.
• Binding is also the reason why you can't do your taxes on a high dose of LSD (though maybe altered states of consciousness can be used for other types of computation).

Happy to chat about this more in person one of these days! I just moved to London and plan to visit Oxford every now and then. ☺️

Thanks for sharing your thoughts!

I’m unsure whether we can in principle ascertain whether a digital mind is conscious. 

I used to believe this too, but I've actually become quite optimistic that this is a tractable question. If, as David Pearce argues, the laws of physics don't break down inside the brain, and we define the constraints that a satisfactory theory of consciousness should fulfill, then I believe we can make very good progress. For instance, one such constraint is that the theory should solve the binding problem (see also here). So if we cannot observe a binding mechanism in digital computers, or explain how digital computers could in principle give rise to binding (as I and other at QRI argue), then that should be very strong evidence against digital computers being conscious. More in: Digital Sentience: Can Digital Computers Ever "Wake Up"?

(Note that this doesn't rule out other forms of artificial, non-digital consciousness!)

Thanks for sharing this! You might be interested in this: Consciousness Isn't Substrate-Neutral: From Dancing Qualia & Epiphenomena to Topology & Accelerators

Leaving this here: "Testimonial of a chronic cluster headache patient after using DMT to abort attacks". @jonleighton of the Organisation for the Prevention of Intense Suffering interviews John Fletcher, chronic cluster headache patient.

JF: I'm 65 years old now and they [cluster headaches] started for me in late September 1973, so about 51 years I've had cluster headaches. […] I came out of a seven-year remission and as soon as I did, I haven't had a break since, and that was 6 months ago. I've been getting at least 10 attacks a day, every day.

JL: Can you tell us a little bit more about the other medical conditions that you're suffering from at the moment, just to give a bit of context?

JF: Besides stage five COPD [chronic obstructive pulmonary disease], I have adenocarcinoma lung cancer. I have achalasia disease, which my esophagus swells up and ultimately causes me to aspirate food and causes bacteria pneumonia. And I've got multiple abdominal hernias from surgery I had 20 major surgeries. I broke my back at the beginning of the year that was caused by severe osteoporosis from steroids, from my COPD. And I've broken my ribs 30 or 40 times in the last couple of years from severe osteoporosis.

JL: How would you compare the suffering due to cluster headaches compared to everything else that you're experiencing?

JF: I wouldn't trade anything for cluster headaches. None of it. Cluster headaches is the worst pain I've ever had in my life. I've never felt anything worse. And, I mean, including being terminally ill and breaking and just so many other really severe painful conditions, but cluster headaches is in a in a category by itself. I've never felt anything like it. It's such severe pain, it's literally violent screaming pain and, to put it bluntly, it feels like you're being murdered. It's unbelievable pain. And you expect to see blood. Telling people about my first attack, I thought I was shot in the head. I thought somebody shot me and I was dying. Every attack pretty much feels like you're dying. It's just horrible, horrible thing. So no, I wouldn't trade any of it for cluster headaches.

JL: And what medications have you tried? And have any of them worked for you over the years?

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Thanks for sharing, Deborah! I'll add these resources to my list of interventions. :)

I'm very interested in what you find out! It'd be great to compare the results of the survey with the predictions of the heavy-tailed valence hypothesis (see here or here).

Thanks so much for your comment!

Actually, someone else brought up this point separately, so I agree there's more to say here. I'd love to dig deeper into this question and possibly write a paper on the topic (e.g. for this collection). If you have literature to recommend (either by you or otherwise), please send it my way. And also let me know if you'd like to get involved in such a project. :)

Gee, not sure what happened there—thanks for pointing that out! I've edited the footnote.

Thank you for your comment, Tim!

Indeed, the choice of e is arbitrary and used for illustration purposes. And the base 6 is simply the choice for which the total burden of CH is larger than that of migraines, so it's also not derived from first principles. This footnote is relevant:

The resulting scaling as $6^x$ would mean that the 0–10 scale would have to span 4 orders of magnitude. While Gómez-Emilsson & Percy (2023) suggest the scale spans “at least two orders of magnitude”, private communication with the authors indicates their central estimates might be closer to 4 orders of magnitude, with uncertainty ranging from 2 to 8 OOMs.

The paper cited also mentions the possibility of a linear relationship for lower pain intensities and an exponential relationship at higher intensities (a "kinked" distribution), highlighting the fact that there are more possibilities beyond a uniform exponential increase. 

I personally don't have a good intuition for what the base should be but might do more work on this specific question.

I'm also not sure what the optimal mapping of intensities for the Russell vs Torelli & Manzoni scales is, also considering the fact that the two studies had different methodologies. I think there's no correct answer, so that was my best guess (though I could also imagine "Very slight" being more intense than a 1.5). Do let me know if you have other suggestions! (Or feel free to fork the code and play around with the parameters. :) )