I appreciate that you took the time to respond to your article.
I definitely agree in terms of your recommendation to incentivize careful analysis of unintended consequences and update accordingly, but I'm not sure I fully agree with your thoughts on rigorous theory of change. There should definitely be principles that you stand behind, and yes, de-risk as much as you knowingly can, but a level of flexibility needs to be built in so that the model can evolve as thinking evolves. Perhaps groups impacted by a decision have a different perspective of the outcomes of the work (if they weren't initially consulted from the offset, which is a whole other set of problems).
Your article also made me think of a conversation we were having as cohort for the EA In-Depth program about who is making decisions about what's important and where larger organizations put funding.
"This tendency to focus disproportionately on what is known, or readily verifiable, can hence systematically skew priorities and lead to certain forms of bias and error."
Some of my discussions with others new to the EA space has been centered around finding ways to have an impact when their potential problem space falls outside of what is defined as a pressing problem and whether there is space for them in EA beyond AI safety, organizational decision-making, Great Power conflict, biosecurity, etc.
I'm lucky that the work that I want to do falls within what's captured in EA, but as a community, are we thinking about others that are crowded out unintentionally if their own interests fall outside of known priorities? And if so, where do they go and what place do they have in EA? Meanwhile those that are starting up/scaling up organizations that are working on key priorities, who and how are their impacts being measured, and how do we sustain their momentum?
I know that this became a meta-perspective on EA but the article was timely to discussions I've been having. Thanks for sharing!
I appreciate that you took the time to respond to your article.
I definitely agree in terms of your recommendation to incentivize careful analysis of unintended consequences and update accordingly, but I'm not sure I fully agree with your thoughts on rigorous theory of change. There should definitely be principles that you stand behind, and yes, de-risk as much as you knowingly can, but a level of flexibility needs to be built in so that the model can evolve as thinking evolves. Perhaps groups impacted by a decision have a different perspective of the outcomes of the work (if they weren't initially consulted from the offset, which is a whole other set of problems).
Your article also made me think of a conversation we were having as cohort for the EA In-Depth program about who is making decisions about what's important and where larger organizations put funding.
Some of my discussions with others new to the EA space has been centered around finding ways to have an impact when their potential problem space falls outside of what is defined as a pressing problem and whether there is space for them in EA beyond AI safety, organizational decision-making, Great Power conflict, biosecurity, etc.
I'm lucky that the work that I want to do falls within what's captured in EA, but as a community, are we thinking about others that are crowded out unintentionally if their own interests fall outside of known priorities? And if so, where do they go and what place do they have in EA? Meanwhile those that are starting up/scaling up organizations that are working on key priorities, who and how are their impacts being measured, and how do we sustain their momentum?
I know that this became a meta-perspective on EA but the article was timely to discussions I've been having. Thanks for sharing!