I don't know what point you're trying to make, because your response was rambling, poorly formatted and incoherent.
Are you just agreeing with me that the 'paradox' is solved and also nitpicking by claiming that it's possible that humans don't make decisions at all? If not, then I think you're very confused.
Basically, if your final decision was knowable to the predictor before he made his prediction, then it doesn't make sense, after his prediction is locked in, to say, "The predictor has already made his prediction, so the decision I make now can't affect his prediction." The predictor knew what your final decision was going to be.
I'm not making any bold claims about free will; I'm just pointing out that the 'causal' arguments for taking both boxes are contradicting the setup of the question.
You haven't understood. Your analogy fails because your friend isn't incentivised to select against you and try to make you guess incorrectly.
Obviously, from the predictor's perspective, there can be some explicable variance and some inexplicable variance, and it's plausible to claim that some of the inexplicable variance comes from decisions that have not yet been made. But the question states that the predictor has an exceedingly good track record, so the vast, vast majority of the variance can be explained.
You can claim that the predictor thinks you're 99.98% to take both boxes, but you know that you're actually only 99.96% to take both boxes. But that doesn't help you make nonnegligible money in the game, and you're just missing the point of the 'paradox'.
What I said was correct. It holds up in the stochastic case where the predictor is nearly certain of your decision, though it's simpler to think about the deterministic case where the predictor is certain.
I'm disappointed by 'Effective' 'Altruists' circle jerking around yet another wrong answer. :')
I think this 'paradox' is chronically misunderstood. Many people claim that the player can choose whether or not to take the transparent box after the predictor makes his prediction, but this is not how humans actually seem to make decisions and it directly contradicts the setup of the question - so I claim that your 'causal' solution is just wrong.
In order for the predictor to be able to make accurate predictions, players' decisions must be deducible at the time the prediction is made. Depending on your mental model of free will (or the lack thereof), this might seem completely plausible or utterly absurd. But for the paradox's setup to make sense, the player must have, in some sense, made his decision before the prediction is made: he is either someone who is going to take both boxes or someone who is just going to take the opaque box.
Simply put, if you're going to reason about this using causality, then you have to explain the causality of the predictor's predictions. And once you explain this, it becomes clear that the causal approach agrees with the evidential approach: you should take only the opaque box. It will feel like you're making the decision while looking at the boxes, but you actually made the decision long before (if at all).
lol! I haven't said anything inappropriate or incorrect.
You seem to value arrogant people's fragile egos over correct solutions to problems, which is obviously a terrible idea.
So you can't read or type properly; I recommend avoiding online forums.
I don't know what point you're trying to make, because your response was rambling, poorly formatted and incoherent.
Are you just agreeing with me that the 'paradox' is solved and also nitpicking by claiming that it's possible that humans don't make decisions at all? If not, then I think you're very confused.
Basically, if your final decision was knowable to the predictor before he made his prediction, then it doesn't make sense, after his prediction is locked in, to say, "The predictor has already made his prediction, so the decision I make now can't affect his prediction." The predictor knew what your final decision was going to be.
I'm not making any bold claims about free will; I'm just pointing out that the 'causal' arguments for taking both boxes are contradicting the setup of the question.
You haven't understood. Your analogy fails because your friend isn't incentivised to select against you and try to make you guess incorrectly.
Obviously, from the predictor's perspective, there can be some explicable variance and some inexplicable variance, and it's plausible to claim that some of the inexplicable variance comes from decisions that have not yet been made. But the question states that the predictor has an exceedingly good track record, so the vast, vast majority of the variance can be explained.
You can claim that the predictor thinks you're 99.98% to take both boxes, but you know that you're actually only 99.96% to take both boxes. But that doesn't help you make nonnegligible money in the game, and you're just missing the point of the 'paradox'.
What I said was correct. It holds up in the stochastic case where the predictor is nearly certain of your decision, though it's simpler to think about the deterministic case where the predictor is certain.
I'm disappointed by 'Effective' 'Altruists' circle jerking around yet another wrong answer. :')
I think this 'paradox' is chronically misunderstood. Many people claim that the player can choose whether or not to take the transparent box after the predictor makes his prediction, but this is not how humans actually seem to make decisions and it directly contradicts the setup of the question - so I claim that your 'causal' solution is just wrong.
In order for the predictor to be able to make accurate predictions, players' decisions must be deducible at the time the prediction is made. Depending on your mental model of free will (or the lack thereof), this might seem completely plausible or utterly absurd. But for the paradox's setup to make sense, the player must have, in some sense, made his decision before the prediction is made: he is either someone who is going to take both boxes or someone who is just going to take the opaque box.
Simply put, if you're going to reason about this using causality, then you have to explain the causality of the predictor's predictions. And once you explain this, it becomes clear that the causal approach agrees with the evidential approach: you should take only the opaque box. It will feel like you're making the decision while looking at the boxes, but you actually made the decision long before (if at all).