RE your first comment, there are two points. Suppose, first, that VPAs merely transmit value forward without being sensitive to its valence (good or bad). This is the worst-case scenario for my proposal. My thought was two part: (i) even in the worst-case scenario, the downstream consequences aren't merely causal but are filtered through human agency; (2) human agency even for non-altruists has an inherent bias against eventuating the absolutely worst consequences of our actions even if we just look narrowly at things like self-interest, nepotism, and the like. So, by and large, if EV(A) > EV(B) near term, value-persistence + bias provides some defeasible reason for thinking EV(A) > EV(B) long term. The magnitude of that effect will be susceptible to the cases. But this is why I suggested that there is a research program here: What can we do as actors to maximize these features so the bias is strongest?
But (second point) let me also note something that didn't come out in the paper. Consider the education case: If one thinks of education in a coarse-grained way (e.g., merely imparting information to people), then the consequences you mention are live alternatives. But if one thinks in a fine-grained manner about the nature of the education, then we have reason to think its value tends to be positive and that this positive value persists. In other words, education isn't simply value neutral. For example, explicitly educating about things like intellectual virtues (epistemic humility, non-dogmatism, etc) and rational biases (confirmation bias, recency effects, etc.) might themselves help ensure positive downstream value. How that plays out in other cases, isn't something I have thought through. But, again, that was why I suggested a research program here, using education as illustrative.
The second argument is aimed at how one articulates the rationality of belief-dependent action, which is what DiGiovanni's normative premise turns on. As stated, this is a really strong premise, implausibly strong (I think) if one were just articulating a principle of rational action per se (not altruistic rational action). So, the goal was, first, to try to charitably explain why the strong principle might be reasonable when restricting to "impartial, altruistic" action. The argument was then designed to show that neither the "impartial" or "altruistic" side of that restriction warrants the strong, normative principle. One can act as an impartial altruist in spite of cluelessness (i.e., without justifiably believing that "if we were idealized agents who could aggregate all of A’s and B’s possible consequences into literal EVs, then we’d say A has higher EV"). I don't think that argument presupposes that P2a is false (Against precise EVs: We shouldn’t represent actions’ degrees of c-preferability with literal precise expected values). But it can be construed as an argument that impartial altruism doesn't require precise long-term EVs, even if (we can grant) it requires precise short term (reachable) EVs.
Hey Jim, Thanks for the comment.
RE your first comment, there are two points. Suppose, first, that VPAs merely transmit value forward without being sensitive to its valence (good or bad). This is the worst-case scenario for my proposal. My thought was two part: (i) even in the worst-case scenario, the downstream consequences aren't merely causal but are filtered through human agency; (2) human agency even for non-altruists has an inherent bias against eventuating the absolutely worst consequences of our actions even if we just look narrowly at things like self-interest, nepotism, and the like. So, by and large, if EV(A) > EV(B) near term, value-persistence + bias provides some defeasible reason for thinking EV(A) > EV(B) long term. The magnitude of that effect will be susceptible to the cases. But this is why I suggested that there is a research program here: What can we do as actors to maximize these features so the bias is strongest?
But (second point) let me also note something that didn't come out in the paper. Consider the education case: If one thinks of education in a coarse-grained way (e.g., merely imparting information to people), then the consequences you mention are live alternatives. But if one thinks in a fine-grained manner about the nature of the education, then we have reason to think its value tends to be positive and that this positive value persists. In other words, education isn't simply value neutral. For example, explicitly educating about things like intellectual virtues (epistemic humility, non-dogmatism, etc) and rational biases (confirmation bias, recency effects, etc.) might themselves help ensure positive downstream value. How that plays out in other cases, isn't something I have thought through. But, again, that was why I suggested a research program here, using education as illustrative.
The second argument is aimed at how one articulates the rationality of belief-dependent action, which is what DiGiovanni's normative premise turns on. As stated, this is a really strong premise, implausibly strong (I think) if one were just articulating a principle of rational action per se (not altruistic rational action). So, the goal was, first, to try to charitably explain why the strong principle might be reasonable when restricting to "impartial, altruistic" action. The argument was then designed to show that neither the "impartial" or "altruistic" side of that restriction warrants the strong, normative principle. One can act as an impartial altruist in spite of cluelessness (i.e., without justifiably believing that "if we were idealized agents who could aggregate all of A’s and B’s possible consequences into literal EVs, then we’d say A has higher EV"). I don't think that argument presupposes that P2a is false (Against precise EVs: We shouldn’t represent actions’ degrees of c-preferability with literal precise expected values). But it can be construed as an argument that impartial altruism doesn't require precise long-term EVs, even if (we can grant) it requires precise short term (reachable) EVs.
Hope that helps clarify!