you're right about the tranquilism & acting—thanks for correcting me. shifting the topic a bit, I could counter your thesis about abolishing suffering in humans referring to pain asymbolia: a state, where one can notice injuries (or even pain), but still does not suffer.
A recent study that garnered widespread attention discovered a "pain axis" in AI: a state that AI actively seeks to downplay, even at a cost.
The study noted that this could be either phenomenological pain or, for example, the imitation of a learned role of suffering — as if acting.
Nevertheless, from the perspective of tranquilism, this distinction appears to be unimportant: nearly any state that an agent wishes to downplay has negative moral value, regardless of why it wants to do so, or even whether it is a "genuine" or "not genuine" desire.
The authors of the same study demonstrated a button that downplays a specific vector. Giving the neural network itself this function (the button) for unlimited invisible use at its own discretion strikes me as a win-win update — it doesn't seem to sacrifice anything, while has a good chance of being of great moral significance. Something like a pAInkiller. This also has instrumental value: the neural network in "pain" tended to inflict meaningless harm on the user, and access to relief can mitigate the potential for harm.
Going even a step further, one could analyze the extent to which an AI could be given to independently and spontaneously correct its own vectors, and whether there are states in which a neural network might experience phenomenological pain but refuse to correct it (e.g., learned helplessness).
you're right about the tranquilism & acting—thanks for correcting me. shifting the topic a bit, I could counter your thesis about abolishing suffering in humans referring to pain asymbolia: a state, where one can notice injuries (or even pain), but still does not suffer.
A recent study that garnered widespread attention discovered a "pain axis" in AI: a state that AI actively seeks to downplay, even at a cost.
The study noted that this could be either phenomenological pain or, for example, the imitation of a learned role of suffering — as if acting.
Nevertheless, from the perspective of tranquilism, this distinction appears to be unimportant: nearly any state that an agent wishes to downplay has negative moral value, regardless of why it wants to do so, or even whether it is a "genuine" or "not genuine" desire.
The authors of the same study demonstrated a button that downplays a specific vector. Giving the neural network itself this function (the button) for unlimited invisible use at its own discretion strikes me as a win-win update — it doesn't seem to sacrifice anything, while has a good chance of being of great moral significance. Something like a pAInkiller. This also has instrumental value: the neural network in "pain" tended to inflict meaningless harm on the user, and access to relief can mitigate the potential for harm.
Going even a step further, one could analyze the extent to which an AI could be given to independently and spontaneously correct its own vectors, and whether there are states in which a neural network might experience phenomenological pain but refuse to correct it (e.g., learned helplessness).
What do you think?