I am a generalist quantitative researcher. I am open to volunteering and paid work. I welcome suggestions for posts. You can give me feedback here (anonymously or not).
Hi Rocky and Tom. Great post. I share your concerns.
Our worry is not that welfare tech is a bad idea (some of it is likely excellent). Rather, the worry is that it has several traits that make it vulnerable to becoming a bubble. It has a clean theory of change, no obvious need for mass public persuasion, compatibility with short AI timelines, appeal to tech-oriented funders and builders, and the ability to be framed as a silver bullet: build the tool, deploy the tool, reduce suffering at scale.
I estimated SWP's stunning work is 383 and 139 times as cost-effective as broiler welfare and layer cage-free corporate campaigns (neglecting effectson non-target animals). However, I think the estimate depends way more on welfare comparisons across species than the probability of it benefiting and harming shrimps.
Say the cost-effectiveness of SWP's stunning work is proportional to the difference between the probability of benefiting and harming shrimps, and that shrimps are either benefited or harmed. Suppose the probability of benefiting shrimps decreases from 75 % to 60 %, which means the probability of harming shrimps increases from 25 % to 40 %. The cost-effectiveness would become 40 % (= (0.6 - 0.4)/(0.75 - 0.25)) as large.
My estimate for the cost-effectiveness of SWP's stunning work is proportional to the value of 1 shrimp-QALY. I assumed this to be 9.34 % (= 0.031/0.332) of the value of 1 chicken-QALY. Suppose the value of 1 anima-QALY is instead proportional to the individual number of neurons, which I consider plausible. I calculate shrimps have 0.0389 % as many neurons as chickens. So the cost-effectiveness would become 0.416 % (= 3.89*10^-4/0.0934) as large.
Thanks for the clarifications. They made sense to me. At the same time, I believe the most cost-effective ways of building capacity to help any given group of animals will generally be optimised with such animals in mind.
Hi Aidan. You estimated a giving multiplier of 7 for 2025 (for 15 k$ per new 10 % Pledge), 6 for 2023-2024 (for 15 k$ per new 10 % Pledge), and 30 for 2020-2022 (for 22 k$ per new 10 % Pledge). Your estimates for the value per new 10 % Pledge are similar. So the giving multiplier has decreased overwhelmingly because the cost per new 10 % Pledge has increased?
I would think about it as I do about grains of sand. The statement "a N ft man is tall" is not logically true or false (regardless of the value of N). However, a taller man is more likely to be described as tall. It is very unlikely a man A is described as tall if they have an height of 5 ft (1.5 m). A man B who is 10^-10 ft taller will be a super tiny bit more likely to be described as tall than man A. However, in practice, one can assume A and B to be as tall. I am not seeing which decisions would be influenced by rounding a height difference of 10^-10 ft to exactly 0.
In contrast, rounding to exactly 0 a super small moral weight could have significant implications. Moral weight might be roughly proportional to the individual number of neurons (or, more plausibly, proportional to "individual number of neurons"^"exponent"), and soil invertebrates have way fewer neurons per individual than humans, but more neurons in total.
Hi @Laura Duffy . Below is a print from the doc describing the cost-effectiveness estimates.
Animal Charity Evaluators (ACE) estimated The Humane League's (THL's) cage-free work in 2025 helped 11 (2 to 44) chickens per $. How did you get the above range of 3.6 to 22?
More importantly, ACE's estimate of 11 chickens helped per $ refer to 7.65 M$ spent by THL, but what matters to you is THL's marginal cost-effectiveness? I think this is closer to the cost-effectiveness of cage-free work funded through CCF than the cost-effectiveness of all cage-free work from THL. Relatedly, I woud like ACE to calculate the marginal cost-effectiveness of THL.
Nitpick. Would it be better to let people copy text from the doc? I shared a print because I am not able to copy the text.
claims we definitely want to accept like "0 grains is not a heap" or "a non-conscious non-living, mindless object isn't a moral patient"
I think 0 grains of sand could be a heap of sand under some definitions of being a heap of sand, and I also believe non-conscious non-living mindless objects could have moral value (and therefore be moral patients) under some definitions of consciousness, life, mind, and objects. For example, I think standard laptops could reasonably be described as non-conscious non-living mindless objects, but I would not assign them a moral value of exactly 0.
The big, undetermined, crucial considerations are: as I learn more, new, previously unconsidered effects are likely to outweigh the positive impacts I was evaluating; what trade-offs to make between pain intensity and duration; and how much to weigh different animals. The first consideration, I try to “cover” by updating over time if a new effect becomes sufficiently[21] evidenced. For the other two considerations, I try to cover them with a portfolio, but when that is not possible, I consider multiple options worthwhile under my procedure and tiebreak on other factors.[22]
The 3 considerations you highlighted above are my major uncertainties too. I think they can make it very unclear whether any intervention increases or decreases welfare/suffering/happiness (even in expectation). Have you considered prioritising interventions aiming to decrease the uncertainties instead or portfolios of interventios? Under your own views, any portfolio of interventions can easily increase or decrease animal suffering?
I wonder whether you have any thoughts on how to integrate considerations related to welfare comparisons across species into WAWS. I think this is needed to assess whether effects on non-target animals can be neglected. I link some related posts in the 1st paragraph here.
I do not think a statement like "Vasco is tall" is true or false
I meant logically/mathematically true or false, which is a property of logical/mathematical statements, not sentences in natural language.
The standard way of running the sorites, with the toy example of "heap" is:
A. 1 grain of sand is not a heap of sand. B: For any number n, if n grains don't make a heap, then n+1 grains don't make a heap. Conclusion, 1 million grains of sand don't make a heap.
Here is how I would think about this. The statement "N grains of sand make up a heap of sand" is not logically true or false (regardless of the value of N). However, N grains of sand are more likely to be described by people as a heap of sand as N increases if N is positive, and not super large (for a sufficiently large N, the grains would collapse into a solid body which is not well described as a heap of sand). It is super unlikely for people to describe 1 grain of sand as one heap of sand. It is much more likely people would do so for 1 M grains of sand.
I would prefer people to investigate the falsifiable/physical properties of N grains of sand (like mass) instead of whether they are fundamentally a heap of sand or not. I think there is a fact of the matter about the former, but not the latter. Likewise, I would prefer people to investigate the falsifiable/physical properties of systems which may be relevant to assess their moral value (including all the behavioural, physiological, neural, pharmacological, cognitive, evolutionary, and ecological evidence) instead of whether they are fundamentally morally relevant or not.
Hi Rocky and Tom. Great post. I share your concerns.
I very much agree.
I estimated SWP's stunning work is 383 and 139 times as cost-effective as broiler welfare and layer cage-free corporate campaigns (neglecting effects on non-target animals). However, I think the estimate depends way more on welfare comparisons across species than the probability of it benefiting and harming shrimps.
Say the cost-effectiveness of SWP's stunning work is proportional to the difference between the probability of benefiting and harming shrimps, and that shrimps are either benefited or harmed. Suppose the probability of benefiting shrimps decreases from 75 % to 60 %, which means the probability of harming shrimps increases from 25 % to 40 %. The cost-effectiveness would become 40 % (= (0.6 - 0.4)/(0.75 - 0.25)) as large.
My estimate for the cost-effectiveness of SWP's stunning work is proportional to the value of 1 shrimp-QALY. I assumed this to be 9.34 % (= 0.031/0.332) of the value of 1 chicken-QALY. Suppose the value of 1 anima-QALY is instead proportional to the individual number of neurons, which I consider plausible. I calculate shrimps have 0.0389 % as many neurons as chickens. So the cost-effectiveness would become 0.416 % (= 3.89*10^-4/0.0934) as large.
Thanks for the clarifications. They made sense to me. At the same time, I believe the most cost-effective ways of building capacity to help any given group of animals will generally be optimised with such animals in mind.
Hi Aidan. You estimated a giving multiplier of 7 for 2025 (for 15 k$ per new 10 % Pledge), 6 for 2023-2024 (for 15 k$ per new 10 % Pledge), and 30 for 2020-2022 (for 22 k$ per new 10 % Pledge). Your estimates for the value per new 10 % Pledge are similar. So the giving multiplier has decreased overwhelmingly because the cost per new 10 % Pledge has increased?
I would think about it as I do about grains of sand. The statement "a N ft man is tall" is not logically true or false (regardless of the value of N). However, a taller man is more likely to be described as tall. It is very unlikely a man A is described as tall if they have an height of 5 ft (1.5 m). A man B who is 10^-10 ft taller will be a super tiny bit more likely to be described as tall than man A. However, in practice, one can assume A and B to be as tall. I am not seeing which decisions would be influenced by rounding a height difference of 10^-10 ft to exactly 0.
In contrast, rounding to exactly 0 a super small moral weight could have significant implications. Moral weight might be roughly proportional to the individual number of neurons (or, more plausibly, proportional to "individual number of neurons"^"exponent"), and soil invertebrates have way fewer neurons per individual than humans, but more neurons in total.
Hi @Laura Duffy . Below is a print from the doc describing the cost-effectiveness estimates.
Animal Charity Evaluators (ACE) estimated The Humane League's (THL's) cage-free work in 2025 helped 11 (2 to 44) chickens per $. How did you get the above range of 3.6 to 22?
More importantly, ACE's estimate of 11 chickens helped per $ refer to 7.65 M$ spent by THL, but what matters to you is THL's marginal cost-effectiveness? I think this is closer to the cost-effectiveness of cage-free work funded through CCF than the cost-effectiveness of all cage-free work from THL. Relatedly, I woud like ACE to calculate the marginal cost-effectiveness of THL.
Nitpick. Would it be better to let people copy text from the doc? I shared a print because I am not able to copy the text.
I think 0 grains of sand could be a heap of sand under some definitions of being a heap of sand, and I also believe non-conscious non-living mindless objects could have moral value (and therefore be moral patients) under some definitions of consciousness, life, mind, and objects. For example, I think standard laptops could reasonably be described as non-conscious non-living mindless objects, but I would not assign them a moral value of exactly 0.
Hi Jo. Great post.
The 3 considerations you highlighted above are my major uncertainties too. I think they can make it very unclear whether any intervention increases or decreases welfare/suffering/happiness (even in expectation). Have you considered prioritising interventions aiming to decrease the uncertainties instead or portfolios of interventios? Under your own views, any portfolio of interventions can easily increase or decrease animal suffering?
Hi Richard. Nice post.
Hi Luke. Thanks for the great post.
I wonder whether you have any thoughts on how to integrate considerations related to welfare comparisons across species into WAWS. I think this is needed to assess whether effects on non-target animals can be neglected. I link some related posts in the 1st paragraph here.
I meant logically/mathematically true or false, which is a property of logical/mathematical statements, not sentences in natural language.
Here is how I would think about this. The statement "N grains of sand make up a heap of sand" is not logically true or false (regardless of the value of N). However, N grains of sand are more likely to be described by people as a heap of sand as N increases if N is positive, and not super large (for a sufficiently large N, the grains would collapse into a solid body which is not well described as a heap of sand). It is super unlikely for people to describe 1 grain of sand as one heap of sand. It is much more likely people would do so for 1 M grains of sand.
I would prefer people to investigate the falsifiable/physical properties of N grains of sand (like mass) instead of whether they are fundamentally a heap of sand or not. I think there is a fact of the matter about the former, but not the latter. Likewise, I would prefer people to investigate the falsifiable/physical properties of systems which may be relevant to assess their moral value (including all the behavioural, physiological, neural, pharmacological, cognitive, evolutionary, and ecological evidence) instead of whether they are fundamentally morally relevant or not.