While I deeply value human welfare, I believe the combination of vast scale, neglectedness, and tractability makes a compelling case for prioritizing animal welfare more than we currently do — especially from an impartial, evidence-based perspective. Many on the opposing side mention that they assign more moral worth to humans than non-humans, but I don't think that view is incompatible with allocating more resources towards animal welfare.
I, too, have a strong intuitive sense that human lives are, on average, much more valuable than animal lives, yet I strongly agree with the proposition. In fact, I think most people would agree with that prior, including those who strongly agree.
Let me pose a few questions to examine this view more deeply:
Is there a specific trait or set of traits that humans possess which animals lack that grounds our belief that humans are more important? Is it intelligence, self-awareness, ability to suffer, something else? And do all humans have those traits to a greater degree than all animals?
Even if we believe each individual human life is more valuable than an individual animal life, could there be a number of animals whose collective suffering would outweigh a human's? Is there a ratio where the sheer scale of animal suffering would compel us to prioritize it? 10 animals, 100, 10,000?
If we faced a situation where we could spend $100 to give 10 people a slight positive boost to their well-being or to eliminate extreme suffering for 1,000 animals, would our prior that humans are more important still lead us to help the 10 humans over the 1,000 suffering animals?
My overall point is this: even with a strong prior that humans are more valuable, if we zoom out and look at the metrics of scale, neglectedness, and tractability, there are still compelling reasons to allocate more resources to animal welfare.
Humans are just more important. If you disagree, how many chickens would you trade your mother's life for?
This is a provocative question that cuts to the heart of the issue. Let me offer a different hypothetical to illustrate the complexity of making such moral trade-offs.
Imagine a situation where you had to choose between saving the life of a complete stranger or saving the life of your mother. I expect you would choose your mother, and I would likely do the same. The emotional bond we feel outweighs our concern for a stranger.
Now consider an advanced, benevolent alien species observing this dilemma. From their impartial perspective, your mother and the stranger deserve equal moral consideration as sentient beings capable of suffering. The aliens wouldn't prioritize one over the other based on personal attachment or individual characteristics.
Expanding this principle further: a chicken's capacity to suffer deserves moral consideration as well, even if their inner lives differ from ours. The immense scale of animal suffering in factory farms — tens of billions of sentient beings in cruel conditions — is a major ethical catastrophe from an impartial view.
I'm not saying an animal suffering is right or acceptable, but it comes second, and will always come second to me, at least while human suffering is still so so high.
I completely agree that alleviating human suffering should remain a key priority. The scope of human struggles globally is vast and demands action.
However, this isn't an either/or choice. $100 million — a tiny fraction of resources spent on human welfare — could dramatically improve conditions for billions of farm animals. There's ample room to address both human and non-human animal suffering.
Critically, expanding our moral circle to include non-human animals isn't at odds with human-focused altruism — it's a matter of extending the same principles of compassion and concern for suffering that we apply to humans. It's part of building a more ethical world for all sentient beings.
While I deeply value human welfare, I believe the combination of vast scale, neglectedness, and tractability makes a compelling case for prioritizing animal welfare more than we currently do — especially from an impartial, evidence-based perspective. Many on the opposing side mention that they assign more moral worth to humans than non-humans, but I don't think that view is incompatible with allocating more resources towards animal welfare.
I, too, have a strong intuitive sense that human lives are, on average, much more valuable than animal lives, yet I strongly agree with the proposition. In fact, I think most people would agree with that prior, including those who strongly agree.
Let me pose a few questions to examine this view more deeply:
My overall point is this: even with a strong prior that humans are more valuable, if we zoom out and look at the metrics of scale, neglectedness, and tractability, there are still compelling reasons to allocate more resources to animal welfare.
This is a provocative question that cuts to the heart of the issue. Let me offer a different hypothetical to illustrate the complexity of making such moral trade-offs.
Imagine a situation where you had to choose between saving the life of a complete stranger or saving the life of your mother. I expect you would choose your mother, and I would likely do the same. The emotional bond we feel outweighs our concern for a stranger.
Now consider an advanced, benevolent alien species observing this dilemma. From their impartial perspective, your mother and the stranger deserve equal moral consideration as sentient beings capable of suffering. The aliens wouldn't prioritize one over the other based on personal attachment or individual characteristics.
Expanding this principle further: a chicken's capacity to suffer deserves moral consideration as well, even if their inner lives differ from ours. The immense scale of animal suffering in factory farms — tens of billions of sentient beings in cruel conditions — is a major ethical catastrophe from an impartial view.
I completely agree that alleviating human suffering should remain a key priority. The scope of human struggles globally is vast and demands action.
However, this isn't an either/or choice. $100 million — a tiny fraction of resources spent on human welfare — could dramatically improve conditions for billions of farm animals. There's ample room to address both human and non-human animal suffering.
Critically, expanding our moral circle to include non-human animals isn't at odds with human-focused altruism — it's a matter of extending the same principles of compassion and concern for suffering that we apply to humans. It's part of building a more ethical world for all sentient beings.
Wrong EA forum.
Effective altruism is in no way affiliated with Electronic Arts. :)