In Liberal Radicalism: A Flexible Design For Philanthropic Matching Funds, Vitalik Buterin, Zoë Hitzig and E. Glen Weyl propose a mechanism for (near) optimal provision of public goods.
The paper is quite recent (December 2018). Considering that the EA community may be vetting-constrained, has anyone implemented or considered implementing the suggested mechanism?
MIRI took part in a Liberal Radicalism-based fundraiser at the end of 2018 (see "WeTrust Spring" in this post).
The main issue with the mechanism seems to be collusion between donors. As Aaron mentioned, MIRI took part in such a fundraiser. I claim that it was so successful for them precisely because MIRI supporters were able to coordinate well relative to the supporters of the other charities -- there were a bunch of posts about how supporting this fundraiser was effectively a 50x donation multiplier or something like that.
In my understanding, coordination/collusion can be limited by keeping donations anonymous.
It's not hard for an individual to prove that they donated by other means, e.g. screenshots and bank statements.
(See the first two paragraphs on page 16 in the paper for an example.)
Right after that, the authors say:
There is a broader point here. If perfect harmonization of interests is possible, Capitalism leads to optimal outcomes. LR is intended to overcome such lack of harmonization and falls prey to manipulation when it wrongly assumes harmonization is diffi... (read more)
I haven't heard of anyone implementing something like this. I think it's a great idea – would love to see more exploration of it!
IIRC, the mechanism has problems with collusion/dissembling. For example, one backer with $46 dollars and 4 backers with $1 each will get significantly better results by splitting their money into 5 contributions of $10 each. This seems like a problem that's actually moderately likely to arise in practice.
It's not hard for an individual to prove that they donated by other means, e.g. screenshots and bank statements.
Right after that, the authors say:
With donations it is particularly easy to harmonize interests: if I'm planning to allocate 2 votes to MIRI and you're planning to allocate 2 votes to AMF, we can instead have each of us allocate 1 vote each to MIRI and AMF and we both benefit. Yes, we have to build trust that neither of us would defect by actually putting both of our votes to our preferred charity; but this seems doable in practice: even in the hardest case of vote trading (where there are laws attempting to enforce anonymity and inability to prove your vote) there seems to have been some success.