Re: What to do with people? and After one year of applying for EA jobs: It is really, really hard to get hired by an EA organisation
Epistemic status: just my personal impression. Please prove me wrong.
So we know that:
1) In aggregate, there are billions of dollars in EA
2) There are lots of surplus talented people looking for EA work, that can't get it
and I would like to add:
3) I estimate that there are at least 10-20 budding organisations that would love to use this money to get these people to work, and scale beyond their current size, and properly tackle the problem they aim to solve. I know at least 5 founders like that personally.
So with all the ingredients in place for amazing movement growth, why isn't the magic happening?
Knowing who to delegate to
I agree with the idea that if you want to solve problems, you need to organise your system in a hierarchy, with some kind of divide-and-conquer strategy where a principal figures out the subproblems of a problem and delegates them to some agents, and recurse.
One problem here is that, even if the agent is aligned, the principal needs some way to tell that the agent is capable of carrying out a problem to a certain standard.
Different systems solve this problem in different ways. A company might have some standards for hiring and structurally review the performance of their employees. Academia relies on prestige and some metrics that are proxies of quality. The market gives the most money to those that sell the most popular products. Communities kick out members that cross boundaries, and deprive uninteresting people of attention.
EA, by which I mean the established organisations of EA, does this kind of thing in two ways: by hiring directly, and by vetting projects. For the latter there are grantmakers. As professionals that have thought a lot about what projects need to happen, they take a long hard look at an application by a startup founder, and if they expect it to work out well, they fund it. Simple enough.
The state of vetting in EA
I want to clarify that none of the following is meant to be accusatory. Grantmaking sounds like one of the hardest jobs in the world, and projects are by no means entitled to EA money just because they call themselves EA. I hope that this post keeps a spirit of high trust, which I think is very important.
So why aren't we seeing more new EA organisations getting funding? Two hypotheses come to mind:
- The “high standards” hypothesis. Grantmakers think that these new organisations just aren't up to standard, and they would therefore cause damage. Perhaps their model is that EA should retain a very high standard to make sure that the prestige of the movement stays intact. After all that's what the movement might need to influence big institutions like academia and government.
- The "vetting bottleneck" hypothesis. Grantmaking organisations are just way understaffed. It's not that they're sure that these organisations don't meet the bar, it's just that they can't verify that in time, so the safest option is to hold off on funding, or fund a more established organisation instead.
In reality, it is probably a combination of both of these. Some anecdotal evidence:
- When one startup got rejected by a grantmaking organisation, and they pressed for feedback, there were told that "We do not possess the domain expertise to evaluate scalable existential risk reduction projects in the way that [other org] would be better placed to do." And "as such, we rely more on the strength and quality of references when modeling out the potential impact of projects." This was after they were invited to the interview stage. It suggests that grantmakers fall back on prestige because they don’t always have the resources to properly evaluate ideas.
- Another startup contacted at least 4 grantmaking organisations. Three of them deferred to the fourth. This organisation would inform them of their decision in November, then postponed to December, then postponed to "after the holidays", but they haven't responded yet. They once mentioned to the startup that "we believe that we don't currently have the capacity to review your application sufficiently".
- Quote 80k: "One reason why these donors don’t give more is a lack of concrete “shovel-ready” opportunities. This is partly due to a lack of qualified leaders able to run projects in the top problem areas (especially to found non-profits working on research, policy and community building). But another reason is a lack of grantmakers able to vet these opportunities or start new projects themselves."
- If you look at where, for example, EA Funds spends their money, it seems like most of the funds are just going to safe bets that don't need much vetting.
So what does all of this suggest?
What kind of standards grantmakers should have, is up for debate. I'm personally under the impression that the stardards are too high. There are a lot of startups out there that would increase total direct value. In you believe the prestige of EA (through the average quality of its projects) is more important than its total direct value, consider that prestige is a negative-sum game. but that's just my 2 low-effort cents and it's off-topic.
Regardless of the bar that we think an EA startup should meet, I don't think the current pattern of payouts reflects the set of organisations that meet that bar. I'd be very surprised if exactly all of the established orgs are doing better work per marginal dollar than exactly all of the new ones.
This especially because established organisations are precisely the ones that aren't funding constrained. Even the rationale of the EA Funds payout mentions “a sense that their work is otherwise much less funding constrained than it used to be”. The grantmaker suggests spending the money on child care and upgrading electronics. He doesn’t seem to be aware of any good funding constrained organisations (This was in August, and it looks like they've moved to smaller projects now).
So scale up the vetting! Then fund more orgs! And all of those amazingly competent people will eventually find a job in one of them, and who knows, net utility of EA might end up orders of magnitude larger.
Again, just my impression. Please prove me wrong.
This topic seems even more relevant today compared to 2019 when I wrote it. At EAG London I saw an explosion of initiatives and there is even more money that isn't being spent. I've also seen an increase in attention that EA is giving to this problem, both from the leadership and on the forum.
Increase fidelity for better delegation
In 2021 I still like to frame this as a principal-agent problem.
First of all there's the risk of goodharting. One prominent grantmaker recounted to me that back when one prominent org was giving out grants, people would just frame what they were doing as EA, and then they would keep doing what they were doing anyway.
This is not actually an unsolved problem if you look elsewhere in the world. Just look at your average company. Surely employees like to sugarcoat their work a bit, but we don't often see a total departure from what their boss wants from them. Why not?
Well I recently applied for funding to the EA meta fund. The project was a bit wacky, so we gave it a 20% chance of being approved. The rejection e-mail contained a whopping ~0.3 bits of information: "No". It's like that popular meme where a guy asks his girlfriend what she wants to eat, makes a lot of guesses, and she just keeps saying "no" without giving him any hints.
So how are we going to find out what grantmakers want from us, if not by the official route? Perhaps this is why it seems so common for people close to the grantmaker to get funded: they do get to have high-fidelity communication.
If this reads as cynicism, I'm sorry. For all I know, they've got perfect reasons for keeping me guessing. Perhaps they want me to generate a good model by myself, as a proof of competence? There's always a high-trust interpretation and despite everything I insist on mistake theory.
The subscription model
My current boss talks to me for about an hour, about once a month. This is where I tell him how my work is going. If I'm off the rails somehow, this is where he would tell me. If my work was to become a bad investment for him, this is where he would fire me.
I had a similar experience back when I was doing RAISE. Near the end, there was one person from Berkeley who was funding us. About once a month, for about an hour, we would talk about whether it was a good idea to continue this funding. When he updated away from my project being a good investment, he discontinued it. This finally gave me the high-fidelity information I needed to decide to quit. If not for him, who knows for how much longer I would have continued.
So if I was going to attempt for a practical solution: train more grantmakers. Allow grantmakers to make exploratory grants unilaterally to speed things up. Fund applicants according to a subscription model. Be especially liberal with the first grant, but only fund them for a small period. Talk to them after every period. Discontinue funds as soon as you stop believing in their project. Give them a cooldown period between projects so they don't leech off of you.