Hide table of contents

Introduction

In this post, I present what I believe to be an important yet underexplored argument that fundamentally challenges the promise of cultivated meat. In essence, there are compelling reasons to conclude that cultivated meat will not replace conventional meat, but will instead primarily compete with other alternative proteins that offer superior environmental and ethical benefits. Moreover, research into and promotion of cultivated meat may potentially result in a net negative impact. Beyond critique, I try to offer constructive recommendations for the EA movement. While I've kept this post concise, I'm more than willing to elaborate on any specific point upon request. Finally, I contacted a few GFI team members to ensure I wasn't making any major errors in this post, and I've tried to incorporate some of their nuances in response to their feedback.

From industry to academia: my cultivated meat journey

I'm currently in my fourth year (and hopefully final one!) of my PhD. My thesis examines the environmental and economic challenges associated with alternative proteins. I have three working papers on cultivated meat at various stages of development, though none have been published yet. Prior to beginning my doctoral studies, I spent two years at Gourmey, a cultivated meat startup. I frequently appear in French media discussing cultivated meat, often "defending" it in a media environment that tends to be hostile and where misinformation is widespread. For a considerable time, I was highly optimistic about cultivated meat, which was a significant factor in my decision to pursue doctoral research on this subject. However, in the last two years, my perspective regarding cultivated meat has evolved and become considerably more ambivalent.

Motivations and epistemic status

Although the hype has somewhat subsided and organizations like Open Philanthropy have expressed skepticism about cultivated meat, many people in the movement continue to place considerable hope in it, or at minimum, maintain strong sympathy toward the concept. Yet there are numerous reasons to be skeptical, and it's worth debating whether promoting cultivated meat should remain among the priorities of EA or EA-supported organizations, and more generally to what extent the sympathy many EAs hold toward cultivated meat remains justified in 2025.

While I consider myself well-informed on cultivated meat, there are certainly more knowledgeable individuals who likely don't share my position, such as the people doing excellent work at GFI. Therefore, I don't wish to suggest that my skepticism automatically stems from superior knowledge of the subject. Moreover, many aspects remain uncertain, and we should place only limited confidence in many current studies.

Important limitations of this post include:

  • The difficulty in predicting consumers' actual attitudes toward cultivated meat. Even the most rigorously conducted studies provide only limited insight, given today's general lack of familiarity with cultivated meat and uncertainty about how it will eventually be marketed. Similarly, studies on environmental impact or production costs remain speculative without data from large-scale production facilities.
  • This critique relies on hypotheses that don't all have strong empirical foundations, though they appear reasonable enough to warrant consideration.
  • My main argument seems relatively simple and straightforward, and I'm surprised it isn't discussed more frequently. I may have overlooked something significant.

Baseline assumptions for this discussion

Cultivated meat is likely environmentally better than conventional meat, but probably not as good as plant-based meat

I don't contest that cultivated meat would likely be better for the environment than the average piece of conventional meat, particularly beef. Cultivated meat shows promising environmental advantages compared to conventional meat, particularly regarding land use. According to Sinke et al. (2023), cultivated meat would require 64% less land than chicken and up to 90% less than beef. Note however that other studies nuance the idea that cultivated meat would require much less land.

Comparison of the results of selected life cycle analyses about cultivated meat published in peer-reviewed journals.

Regarding greenhouse gas emissions, the results vary dramatically by energy source, cultivated meat produced with renewable energy demonstrates substantially lower emissions than beef, while with conventional energy sources, it actually performs worse than chicken, emitting more greenhouse gases. This stems from the fact that the production process remains extremely energy-intensive, approximately 5.5 times more than conventional meat.

Plant-based meat demonstrably remains more promising from an environmental perspective. Below is a synthesis of the LCAs I've found regarding greenhouse gas emissions from different plant-based meats, noting that this is quite a broad category with, for example, processing methods that can vary considerably, which influences the final result.

Summary of GHG emissions from a selection of LCAs of plant-based meat substitutes

a) Values reported for PBMs in (Fresán 2019b; Mejia et al. 2019; Dettling et al. 2016) are means.

Cultivated meat will remain quite expensive for several years, and hybrid plant-cell products will likely appear on the market first

While cultivated meat made its market debut in December 2020, only four companies (excepting pet food) have obtained market authorization so far, and their products remain available in extremely limited quantities. To date, six publicly available TEAs (Techno-Economic Analyses) have scrutinized the production process of cultivated meat (I've chosen to ignore one concerning insect cells), with cost estimates and technical assumptions regarding bioreactor designs, media formulations, cell characteristics, aseptic requirements,cetc. varying dramatically, making direct comparisons challenging. You can look at this paper for a detailed comparison and summary of the different TEAs. Nevertheless, here are the estimates obtained by these TEAs:

Estimated costs for the production of 1kg of cultivated meat (wet matter)

Study1kg production cost estimation
Risner et al. 2020$2 - $437 000
Vergeer et al. 2021$6.43 (optimistic future scenario) - $22 421 (current cost for pessimistic scenario)
Humbird 2021$22 (fed-batch + amino acids obtained from hydrolysates) - $51$ (perfusion)
Garrison et al. 2022$63 (lowest)
Negulescu et al. 2022$17 (262,000 L airlift bioreactor) - $35 (stirred tank bioreactor)
Pasitka et al. 2024$23.26 - $26.44

Even with optimistic assumptions, it appears difficult to go below $20 at the moment and for the years to come. Note that I've also received information supporting these figures and order of magnitude from industry insiders. And these are just production costs, which don't include, for example, distribution and margins for various intermediaries.

As a result, a growing number of industry players are now adopting a different approach: hybrid products where cultivated cells represent just one ingredient among others, with the raw material being primarily plant-based. A typical example is adding animal fat cells, which are reputed to be very flavorful and difficult to imitate with plant-based alternatives. To my knowledge, there are no recommendations or standards regarding the desirable proportion of cells. Some companies claim to be aiming for 50/50. At the other extreme, recently the company Good Meat launched a product in Singapore containing only 3% cultivated cells.

While I believe that cost remains a crucial crux in the discussion and a legitimate concern regarding cultivated meat's potential, I choose not to delve deeper into this topic in this post, as it is already well-known to most people interested in the subject.

Cultivated meat is ethically better than conventional meat

The suffering inflicted by factory farming is immense, and reducing our reliance on systems that cause such harm is morally urgent. Cultivated meat would dramatically reduce the number of animals used in meat production, with donor animals potentially serving as what Van Dooren and others have called "sacrificial surrogates"—beings whose lives are subordinated to benefit others. Of course, just as some people decide to walk away from Omelas, I understand that some people reject this idea, particularly those with non-utilitarian moral frameworks. On the contrary, adherents to utilitarian frameworks might argue that farmed animals used for cultivated meat could have net-positive lives worth living, especially since there would be far fewer economic constraints on their welfare compared to conventional farming, and providing these animals with high living standards could even serve as positive PR for cultivated meat companies.

Additionally, I think that concerns about fetal bovine serum that often arise are not a genuine problem, given that eliminating it will be necessary to achieve economic viability and large-scale production. Several studies suggest this is possible, and of the few products that have obtained marketing authorization in recent years, some were not produced using media containing fetal bovine serum. The same applies to scaffolds and microcarriers, for which edible, non-animal alternatives are being developed and appear promising.

The main argument: cannibalization rather than conversion

A common misconception pervades discussions of cultivated meat (and other alternative proteins): the assumption that any product environmentally and ethically superior to conventional meat must necessarily yield net positive outcomes. This reasoning fundamentally misframes the issue. The critical question is not whether cultivated meat improves upon conventional meat, but rather whether it improves upon the specific alternatives it will actually displace in the marketplace.

The theoretical foundation supporting cultivated meat rests on its potential to deliver products with sensory characteristics remarkably similar to conventional meat, while dramatically reducing animal suffering and environmental degradation. The implicit promise is that such products would directly substitute for conventional meat consumption. However, this theory contains a crucial, often understated assumption: that cultivated meat would appeal to consumer segments distinct from those already receptive to other meat alternatives, thereby expanding the total market share diverted from conventional meat. Proponents envision capturing meat enthusiasts who remain deeply attached to meat's material qualities and sensory experience, consumers who have historically rejected plant-based alternatives as inadequate substitutes. But this should not be taken for granted.

Thus, if consumers viewed plant-based meat and cultivated meat as perfect substitutes, cultivated meat would have a net negative effect since plant-based alternatives perform better both environmentally and in terms of animal welfare (albeit marginally for the latter). In my view, several lines of evidence suggest this substitution scenario is quite plausible.

In one of the only, if not the only, study that looks at these substitution effects, Slade (2018) found a strong (although not perfect) correlation between preferences for plant-based alternatives and cultivated meat, indicating substantial overlap in consumer segments interested in both products. Bryant & Sanctorum (2021) found a similar correlation, although their results also suggest there is a segment of potential consumers who might prefer cultivated meat to plant-based meat.

This idea is reinforced by demographic studies showing similar characteristics among consumers interested in both alternatives: they tend to be younger, more educated, urban-dwelling, and environmentally conscious compared to conventional meat consumers. Acceptability studies consistently reveal that the psychological and demographic factors predicting willingness to try cultivated meat, including food neophilia, environmental concerns, and reduced attachment to conventional meat, are remarkably similar to those predicting plant-based meat adoption (Onwezen et al., 2021; Sun et al., 2024; Onwezen & Dagevos 2024). Some differences do emerge, cultivated meat appears to attract more men and self-identified regular meat eaters, but these findings primarily come from studies on willingness to try, which may not reliably predict actual purchasing behavior in real-world settings.

Now, remember also what we said about the cost of cultivated meat: it will likely first appear on our shelves in the form of hybrid products that are primarily plant-based. In this context, we have even more reason to believe there would be a strong substitution effect between plant-based meat and cultivated meat, typically because we would lose consumers with a "carnivore" profile. Unfortunately, we have very few studies on hybrid products and none that look at substitution effects between plant-based meat, cultivated meat, hybrid products, and conventional meat (but this is the subject of one of my working papers). It's concerning that these hybrid products remain understudied despite likely being the first commercially viable offerings. This represents a significant gap in the research literature, which predominantly focuses on products made only of cultivated cells.

I acknowledge that my argument relies on limited data. However this limited data actually underscores my argument: cultivated meat advocates need to demonstrate it will attract different consumers than plant-based alternatives, as this assumption forms the foundation of their strategic justification yet remains largely unexamined.

This echoes a broader concern about replacement assumptions. We often take for granted that alternative proteins will indeed replace meat. But this is not self-evident, as they could just be added to the current consumption basket rather than displacing meat, as some studies suggest. To draw a historical parallel, when industrial chicken farming developed in the second half of the 20th century, people didn't eat less of other meats; they just ate chicken in addition. As Jacob Peacock argued, even if alternative proteins become price-competitive, taste-competitive, and convenience-competitive, this alone would not guarantee they will replace conventional meat rather than simply exist alongside it. Likewise, a YouGov survey in the US found that only 13% expected to prefer eating “lab-grown meat” in a scenario where it was “indistinguishable from animal meat in terms of taste, nutrition, and cost.

Another important consideration is the uncertain timeline for cultivated meat's availability in meaningful quantities, whether as hybrid or 100% cellular products. Meanwhile, the organoleptic qualities of plant-based alternatives are improving at a remarkable pace, even though I acknowledge more progress is still needed. I recall when I became vegan about 10 years ago, I was eating tomato-flavored soy steaks that were absolutely disgusting. Today, we have a plethora of relatively convincing alternatives. By the time 100% cellular cultivated meat reaches market readiness the sensory gap might be negligible. Already, products like Beyond or Impossible burgers are nearly indistinguishable from conventional meat in fast-food settings. Recent innovative products such as La Vie’s ham, Swap’s chicken, and Juicy Marbles’ beef cuts demonstrate the accelerating quality of plant-based alternatives. Given these trajectories, it's reasonable to question what competitive advantage cultivated meat might offer when it finally achieves commercial scale, as plant-based products will have continued improving for years. Especially when considering that few consumers believe cultivated meat will match the taste of conventional meat, which calls into question the supposed inherent superiority sometimes granted to cultivated meat over plant-based alternatives.

Strategic drawbacks of the current focus

Beyond the potential waste of resources that the current focus on cultivated meat constitutes, it's not impossible that it directly has a negative impact on other meat alternatives. I see several mechanisms that could lead to this:

  • Resource competition: while not every investment in cultivated meat directly diverts funding from other alternatives, finite capital and research attention create inevitable trade-offs in the alternative protein space. In a similar fashion, political capital spent securing regulatory frameworks for cultivated meat could instead support various policies that would create a more level playing field for all alternative proteins. Note that there are also strong arguments suggesting resources put into cultivated meat are not fungible; i.e., they would not otherwise go to plant-based meat. While it's true that food scientists working on protein texturization or flavor chemistry might easily transition between different alternative protein technologies, this is not the case for many specialists. For example, a tissue engineer specializing in cell culture media development would be unlikely to switch over to plant-based meat research if cultivated meat were out of the race.
  • Media attention imbalance: cultivated meat captures disproportionate media coverage due to its technological novelty, while impressive plant-based innovations struggle to generate similar interest.
  • "Humane-washing" risk: I've heard from several industry contacts that some companies were considering hybrid products not based on plants, but on conventional meat. In this scenario, there's a risk that cultivated meat serves as greenwashing or "humane-washing," especially if its share remains very small in the finished product.
  • Psychological anchoring effect: cultivated meat's position as an idealized "perfect" solution may unintentionally devalue plant-based alternatives by framing them as inherently inferior interim options.
  • Technological solutionism: the promise of future cultivated products enables moral licensing, with people postponing dietary changes—I've frequently heard statements like: "I'll wait for cultivated meat rather than go vegetarian today," which serves as a responsibility-deferring strategy. That said, it's worth considering that many people using cultivated meat as an excuse to defer making a dietary switch might not have changed their diet anyway, even in the absence of the promise of cultivated meat.
  • Potential reputational spillover: cultivated meat faces significant political challenges and has been preemptively banned in several jurisdictions. This controversial status might possibly influence public perception of other alternative proteins. In the French context for instance, cultivated meat has faced preventive bans in public food services and schools. It is widely perceived negatively as it's associated with a form of interference by American billionaires in French agriculture, making any association with it a significant political and reputational risk.

The evidence that would make me eat my words (and maybe cultivated meat)

A compelling body of research could shift my position on cultivated meat's strategic value. I would reconsider if multiple well-designed studies analyzing substitution effects demonstrated that cultivated and plant-based meats appeal to sufficiently different consumer segments. Some overlap between these segments would be expected and acceptable, but it should be modest enough that cultivated meat would primarily expand the total alternative protein market rather than cannibalize plant-based sales. For this to be convincing, the research would need to examine not just hypothetical 100% cellular products, but also the hybrid products likely to dominate the cultivated meat market initially. Ideally, these studies would identify specific cellular content thresholds that influence consumer preference patterns, revealing whether acceptance meaningfully differs between products containing 3% versus 50% cultivated cells. Most importantly, this research would need to confirm that cultivated meat attracts consumers with specific aversions to plant-based options, people who would not adopt plant-based alternatives regardless of their continued improvement.

I should note that significant questions about scaling and cost reduction would still remain even with favorable consumer data. However, these challenges are already widely discussed, which is why I haven't focused on them in this post.

I should also acknowledge an important counterpoint suggested by some GFI team members with whom I've exchanged: taking a precautionary approach to cultivated meat could be risky because we have no guaranteed backup plan if plant-based alternatives, fermentation, and cultivated meat all fall short. Hybrid products that combine these technologies could potentially reach taste and price parity sooner than either technology alone (plant-based meat has further to go on taste, while cultivated meat has further to go on price). If hybrid products achieve taste parity even just a few years earlier than plant-based alternatives alone, the amount of suffering averted annually would already be immense. This perspective values pursuing multiple protein technologies simultaneously, given the urgency of addressing factory farming.

What I'd like to see change in the Effective Altruism approach to cultivated meat

I propose several changes to how the EA community approaches cultivated meat:

First, we should make the discussion of substitution effects more central when evaluating cultivated meat. We need to directly confront the risk that cultivated meat might primarily or even exclusively displace plant-based alternatives rather than conventional meat. We must understand that this isn't just a minor concern but a potential fatal flaw in the strategic case for cultivated meat.

Second, the EA community should temper its enthusiasm for cultivated meat until we have compelling evidence of low substitution effects between cultivated and other alternative proteins. The current level of support appears disproportionate to the available evidence.

Third, if we have reasons to believe that cultivated meat could reach a different consumer profile, we should develop specific strategies to ensure cultivated products target these right consumer segments if they are to advance our shared goals.

Fourth, resource allocation within the EA movement should reflect expected impact. While I recognize that currently few effective altruists directly financially support cultivated meat as individuals, the community's intellectual resources, attention, and organizational funding should be directed toward the alternatives with the strongest evidence of positive impact.

Finally, this evidence warrants thoughtful discussions about reconsidering resources currently invested in the promotion and development of cultivated meat by EA-aligned organizations like the Good Food Institute and, to a lesser extent, ProVeg.


I would like to thank Antonin Broi, Guillaume Vorreux, Joseph Ancion, and Romain Barbe as well as members of GFI for their valuable feedback and suggestions on earlier drafts of this article.

PS: I would be delighted to discuss this topic with you at EAG London—especially if you disagree with my perspective!

166

4
6
16

Reactions

4
6
16

More posts like this

Comments34
Sorted by Click to highlight new comments since:

Thanks, great post! 

A few follow-up questions and pushbacks:

  • Even if cannibalization happens, here are three questions that "multiple well-designed studies analyzing substitution effects demonstrated that cultivated and plant-based meats appeal to sufficiently different consumer segments" may not answer:
     
    • Would commercially viable cultivated meat more favorably alter consumer preferences over time?
    • A non-negligible portion of veg*ns abandon their veg*nism — would introduction of cultivated meat improve retention of animal-free consumption patterns?
    • How would introduction of cultivated meat affect flexitarian dietary choices? Flexitarians eat a combination of animal- and plant-based meat. When cultivated meat becomes commercially viable, would flexitarians replace the former or the latter with cultivated meat?

      If the answer is a yes to any of these, I think that is a point in favor of cultivated meat. I expect cultural change to be a significant driver of reduced animal consumption, and this cultural change will only be possible if there is a stable class of consumers who normalize consumption of animal-free products.

To draw a historical parallel, when industrial chicken farming developed in the second half of the 20th century, people didn't eat less of other meats; they just ate chicken in addition.

  • Is this true? It seems that as chicken did displace beef consumption by 40% (assuming consumption ~ supply) or am I grossly misunderstanding the chart above?

    • Further, isn't there an upper bound to how much addition can happen? Meat became cheap and widely available, incomes rose, people started eating more of everything, so consumption increased. But there is only so much more that one can eat, so at some point people started making cost-based trade-offs between beef and chicken. If cultivated chicken were to be cheaper than animal-based beef or chicken, shouldn't we expect people to start making similar trade-offs?

Hello Akash and thank you for these pertinent questions! I'll try to answer all of them, but please let me know if you feel I've missed any of your points.

"Would commercially viable cultivated meat more favorably alter consumer preferences over time?"

This is quite difficult to determine! Many studies on consumer attitudes make the assumption that cultivated meat would be priced similarly to other alternatives. Even in this scenario, it remains relatively unpopular and much less favored than plant-based options. For example, a study by Van Loo et al. (2020) attempted to define potential market shares of different meat alternatives through a DCE (Discrete Choice Experiment). This study found that cultivated meat had the lowest estimated market share among the alternatives tested. Interestingly, the study also observed significant variance in willingness-to-pay for cultivated meat, suggesting that some consumers are highly motivated and therefore less price-sensitive, while others want nothing to do with it.

Of course, the insights we can draw are limited: cultivated meat remains relatively unknown today, and even more so in 2020. We know that familiarity with a product influences consumer interest. We also know that people's stated preferences often poorly reflect their actual consumption behavior, with a tendency to overestimate their willingness to try and adopt new products. So my answer would be: we don't know. And it would seem presumptuous to say yes.

"A non-negligible portion of vegns abandon their vegnism — would introduction of cultivated meat improve retention of animal-free consumption patterns?"

This is hard to say. From what we know from certain studies, while veg*ns generally express more favorable attitudes toward cultivated meat than the average population, they exhibit less willingness to try it/pay for it. This suggests they're supportive primarily because they see the environmental and ethical benefits, although they themselves might not be particularly interested. And again, we would need to see whether plant-based meat wouldn't serve just as well as cultivated meat in this case.

"How would introduction of cultivated meat affect flexitarian dietary choices? Flexitarians eat a combination of animal- and plant-based meat. When cultivated meat becomes commercially viable, would flexitarians replace the former or the latter with cultivated meat?"

That's an excellent question and one I'm currently trying to answer in my ongoing research through a DCE! I should have more insights in a few months. :)

"Is this true? It seems that as chicken did displace beef consumption by 40% (assuming consumption ~ supply) or am I grossly misunderstanding the chart above? Further, isn't there an upper bound to how much addition can happen? Meat became cheap and widely available, incomes rose, people started eating more of everything, so consumption increased. But there is only so much more that one can eat, so at some point people started making cost-based trade-offs between beef and chicken. If cultivated chicken were to be cheaper than animal-based beef or chicken, shouldn't we expect people to start making similar trade-offs?"

I'm more familiar with European figures. Looking at France, for example, we don't really observe a substitution effect between chicken and beef. 


Regarding the United States, I'm somewhat surprised by the sharp decline in the mid-70s, which occurred much more rapidly than the increase in chicken consumption during the same period. This suggests an external shock to me – perhaps due to the economic crisis – which would explain why beef was hit particularly hard, being the most expensive meat. This is especially notable given that beef consumption eventually stabilized while chicken consumption continued to increase from the 2010s onward.

However, this would require further investigation on my part. In any case, based on the graph you've provided, it's not obvious that chicken directly substituted for beef; there may simply have been a decrease in beef consumption, possibly due to external factors.

Furthermore, several sources are sometimes inconsistent regarding the evolution of meat consumption by product type, making it difficult to get a clear picture. For instance, in France, there's a discrepancy between World Bank data and data from the Ministry of Agriculture. Similarly here in the US, World Bank data presents a different picture than USDA data.
 

In short, this is all quite complicated and would require an entire post to untangle. However, I maintain my position that the increase in chicken consumption did not lead to a major substitution effect for beef consumption. In my view, the reduction in beef consumption is explained by other factors, particularly economic issues, health concerns, and more recently, environmental considerations.

[comment deleted]1
0
0

I love your clear and concise writing, the arguments come through smoothly and without fuss. I feel like I learned a lot more about this topic in a short time - looking forward to seeing more from you on the forum!

Thank you for your kind message, I really appreciate the feedback!

I often find myself hesitant to contribute to the EA Forum, concerned that my posts might not meet the forum's standards. Moreover as I feel more comfortable writing in French than in English, I tend to publish on my blog instead. Encouragement like yours is very much appreciated and definitely motivates me to share my thoughts more frequently.

My impression has been that plant-based meat is more expensive and tastes worse than current meat - even if PTC is sometimes overrated (though I found this comment persuasive in response) I'd be surprised if a substantially cheaper and similar-to-better tasting option wouldn't cause a pretty large dent in meat consumption over a long enough time horizon. It seems like you think that existing plant based options are close to price/taste competitiveness already, was my above impression incorrect?

I feel like penetration of plant based options has been pretty limited so far, and my impression of cultivated meat is that it's high risk/high reward (may not end up working, but if it does has much greater potential of creating super cheap, great tasting protein than existing methods). My inclination is that I would be happy to gamble a risk of cannibalizing existing plant based success on a shot that we get a cultivated breakthrough, particularly given that I don't think we're on a ~great trajectory at the moment. But I might be wrong! Regardless this was a great post, thank you for sharing!

Thank you for your comment!

To clarify my position regarding your question: "It seems like you think that existing plant-based options are close to price/taste competitiveness already, was my above impression incorrect?"

In my assessment, plant-based meat still has significant ground to cover in terms of both price and taste parity when viewed holistically, despite notable exceptions in the market.

For taste parity specifically, we've made remarkable progress with certain products. Nuggets, for instance, have essentially achieved taste equivalence according to some studies. Fast-food burgers are also approaching this milestone. Additionally, we occasionally see standout products in various categories that come remarkably close to their animal-based counterparts, as exemplified by the examples I mentioned in my post.

Regarding price parity, while still distant overall, the gap continues to narrow, particularly for beef alternatives.

What often gets overlooked in this discussion—and what I'd like to emphasize—is the rapid advancement of plant-based alternatives. The quality improvement over the past decade has been extraordinary. Meanwhile, cultivated meat faces a lengthy timeline before achieving significant market presence (even in hybrid formulations). Therefore, comparing an idealized future cultivated product against today's plant-based options creates a false equivalence.

I'm confident that within the next 10-15 years, we'll achieve near-complete price and taste parity across numerous animal product categories through plant-based innovation. By then, the supposed advantages of cultivated meat may prove far less compelling than currently anticipated.

Excellent perspective.

The most convincing argument I've come across against cultivated meat is from Joe Fassler's 2021 article in The Counter where he notes: "If cultured protein is going to be even 10 percent of the world’s meat supply by 2030, we will need 4,000 factories like the one GFI envisions, according to an analysis by the trade publication Food Navigator. To meet that deadline, building at a rate of one mega-facility a day would be too slow.

All of those facilities would also come with a heart-stopping price tag: a minimum of $1.8 trillion, according to Food Navigator. That’s where things get complicated. It’s where critics say—and even GFI’s own numbers suggest—that cell-cultured meat may never be economically viable, even if it’s technically feasible."

I will take these numbers at face value, but never underestimate the power of learning curves! Bio-reactors, like most other tech, are getting cheaper and more efficient. I will definitely agree that take-off will be slow: I would be surprised if even 1% of meat consumption is from cultivated meat by 2030. But I think once we do hit 1% we will get to 99% quickly (where I am not confident enough to put a number on "quickly").

You mention that 'EA' should temper it's enthusiasm for cultivated meat. I'm not sure I have noticed this on the forum or in conversations, or at least not beyond enthusiasm for the idea of alternative proteins in general. Do you have a sense why you think cultivated meat enthusiasm is too high in EA?

I would also be sceptical of having your mind changed via survey data for dietary preferences when people already consume a lot of food that is manufactured in ways they say they are against. I think it would be more important to see whether alternative proteins (including cultivated meat) can become as tasty, convenient and significantly cheaper than animal products.

Hi David, and thank you for your comment! 

I may have a certain bias since I work in the field of cultivated meat, but I've frequently observed a strong interest in cultivated meat during my interactions with other EAs. This seems particularly pronounced in France, but I've had similar impressions when engaging with EAs at international events like EAG. Truthfully, this wouldn't be surprising, given that the demographic profile of EAs closely aligns with those who tend to be favorably disposed toward cultivated meat. This interest is also visible in the support some EAs provide to organizations such as GFI or ProVeg that advocate for cultivated meat, without the focus on cultivated meat being questionned. 

Regarding the assertion that "it would be more important to determine whether alternative proteins (including cultivated meat) can become as tasty, convenient, and significantly cheaper than animal products," I believe this is far from self-evident. Unfortunately, recent exemples don't necessarily support this perspective. While achieving these qualities represents a necessary step, there's no guarantee it will suffice. Moreover, while I wouldn't be surprised if taste parity becomes less problematic for plant-based products within the next 10-15 years, I expect price will likely remain a significant challenge for cultivated meat.

I imagine if you work in that field people will show interest in the topic, I'd be interested in if you know there is outsized interest in cultivated meat over other alt proteins.

 

I'm not sure I see any data in that LinkedIn post, do we know how sales have changed over time and price points for these products? I find this type of data more convincing. I'd be more interested in seeing global info, and looking at sales of various products, in the retail and business sectors to get a good sense of what is actually happening in plant based margarine vs margarine vs butter vs plant based butter market.


The Jacob Peacock article is about them being the same price, not significantly cheaper, which I think is the wrong way to think about it. Most examples historically of animal products being replaced have been because of big cost differences rather than cost parity (horses/cars, whales/oil, fur/other fabrics). That doesn't mean that people don't still ride horses, hunt whales or use fur, just that it is a much smaller percentage.

As someone involved both in EA and less-EA animal advocacy, I really appreciate this post because it goes into a subject that is sometimes treated in a bit of a handwavey way with nuance and humility. And through pointing out all the caveats and assumptions in your argument in sufficient detail, it allows laypeople like me to learn more about the key issues surrounding cultivated meat. 

Potential reputational spillover

I found this point to be one of the most important things here, and I'm curious to know if there had been reports, or simply articles, written on the impact that anti-cultivated-meat measures and sentiment could has had on alt proteins and even animal advocacy in general. It seems limited for now but these negative reactions could continue into the future.

A point I would also love to read more about is expectations of how the plant-based meat market could grow in the decades to come. I personally don't know what the standard predictions in that space are. It's especially disorienting given that when I talk to non-EA vegans, many seem to believe that plant-based meat is a fast-growing market, while EAs sometimes wave off the whole endeavor as a complete flop.

A few years ago, I made a back-of-the-envelope cost-effectiveness calculation for cultivated meat R&D. https://stijnbruers.wordpress.com/2020/08/10/the-extreme-cost-effectiveness-of-cell-based-meat-rd/

That calculation assumed a tractability of 10%, which can be interpreted as: cultivated meat will enter the market sooner or later, and when it does, it will capture 10% of the animal-based meat market, i.e. replace 10% of animal-based meat by cultivated meat. That 10% represents the animal-based meat that will not be substituted by plant-based meat, but will be substituted by cultivated meat. This is in line with the Bryant-Sanctorum study that you mentioned. Even with this low tractability, corresponding to a small complementarity between plant-based and cultivated meat, funding acceleration in cultivated meat R&D remains highly effective. The reason is its neglectedness: in terms of investments and funding, cultivated meat is roughly 10 times more neglected than plant-based meat. If you are right, and plant-based meat will capture more of the animal-based meat market than cultivated meat, it would mean that the current global allocation of R&D funding between plant-based and cultivated meat seems about right. You may believe ten times more in plant-based meat than in cultivated meat innovation, which means you may allocate more (but not all!) funding to plant-based meat. 

My major concern about cultivated meat innovation cost-effectiveness, is the longer timeline. The types of cultivated meat that could replace animal-based meat and could not be replaced by plant-based meat, are whole tissue cultivated meat, and those will probably take a few decades before development and becoming competitive with animal-based whole tissue meat. It is likely that within a few decades, we will have transformative artificial intelligence (TAI) that could do research 10 times faster. If we have such TAI in say 2035, it could do all the research of the next ten years in only one year. If that happens, we could simply not invest in (whole tissue) cultivated meat R&D for ten years, wait until 2035 and then let the TAI do all that research in one year. Instead of having the results by the end of 2035, we have them by the end of 2036, i.e. 11 instead of 10 years later. That's only a 10% longer timespan. Hence, this consideration would make the cost-effectiveness of cultivated meat R&D 10 times lower. I'm a bit skeptical that TAI will be able to do all cultivated meat research 10 times faster, because much of that research requires lab experimenting with living tissues in bioreactors, and such research cannot easily be accelerated by computers and robots. But who knows: perhaps TAI can quickly calculate the ideal bioreactor design and the optimal cell types and growth medium to use.

[anonymous]*2
0
0

Very interesting and enlightening article on the relationship with plant-based alt-proteins.

I agree with you on the substance but, on the specific point of the acceptance criterion for cultured meat, I have a few points to raise. I believe that cellular meat continues to be a particularly interesting and promising answer, and that our ideas of its popularity and acceptance take on too much importance when we look at how a new market behaves historically.

I should point out that I have no particular knowledge of economics, so I'm particularly open to criticism on the second part of my analysis.

On the figures themselves, first of all

The figures you used, close to 10-20% adoption, are not entirely representative of the whole picture. Current polls in France and Europe give figures on which it's difficult to build solid conclusions, so different are they. In France, one of the countries most hostile to this innovation, the figures range from 11% to 44%. In the rest of Europe, we find polls reaching 40-60% here and here, and even higher figures among younger people. 

Besides that, because of its culinary traditions rooted in pastoral life and easy access to meat, Europe might not even be a good indicator for other markets. China, one of the world's leading meat producers and consumers, is investing in farmed meat, and its population, which accepts what the government presents as good, safe and better for the environment, seems to welcome it.

This already demonstrates that farmed meat is not rejected by the population as a whole, although it is true that conservative political circles in the West often see it as a threat. What's more, a majority of young people in all countries seem to be in favour of this development. We can imagine this trend continuing if we assume that it's novelty that frightens people and that it frightens them all the more the older they are. In this hypothesis, time plays in favour of cultured meat, even if it's more a question of the long term.

On what I consider to be a blind spot in some analyses, i.e. the power of advertising and PR

Investment has already begun, and given the market shares at stake, it's more likely that the race will continue, bringing with it advertising and PR campaigns aimed at creating a new market through the standardization of cultured meat.

Perhaps the most important point about opinion and polls, over and above the nuance about precise figures made just above, is that they are only a snapshot in time. You only have to look at the history of communication (advertising and public relations) to see how public opinion can change radically in a short space of time on a defined and delimited subject, especially when the subject is not really well established. The case of the American breakfast, with mandatory bacon and eggs, is a striking example of how a practice can emerge from ‘nothing’ apart from communication and advertising, rapidly becoming not only a habit but also a symbol. 

In the case of cellular meat, it would certainly be a different trick, particularly as it involves a set of habits and imaginations rather than a specific thing, but I believe that the prospects for rapid evolution continue to exist in the same way. In my opinion, therefore, we must not underestimate the power of the communication when undertaken by groups (individual companies or interest groups, particularly valid here), which could radically change the vision and acceptance of cultured meat in the space of a few years.

Given the commitment of major agribusiness groups and start-ups backed by investment funds, the likely outcome seem to be at the very least a support for cultivated meat. Even groups with a presence in livestock farming and the meat trade (Cargill, Tyson, JBS) or the agro-industry in general (Nestlé) are now involved with millions invested, which makes their commitment a strong signal towards, if not a complete transition, at least a massive diversification which we may assume is inevitable

Thus, if consumers viewed plant-based meat and cultivated meat as perfect substitutes, cultivated meat would have a net negative effect since plant-based alternatives perform better both environmentally and in terms of animal welfare (albeit marginally for the latter).

"Marginally for the latter" -- that still seems like good news for people who care primarily about animal wellbeing. The way I see it, the environment is not that good a thing anyway (wild animal suffering makes it negative according to my values, and even if others care less about it or care more about aesthetic stuff, surely it moves it quite a lot of the way towards being just neutral), plus there are potentially ways to reverse the effect of greenhouse gas emissions. By contrast, you cannot reverse the direct suffering caused in factory farming.

Great post, clear and insightful! I really appreciate how you’ve presented this perspective on the cultivated meat debate. 

Your point about the substitution effect and that this may not replace conventional meat but instead compete with other alternative proteins is striking and not something I had considered before. I had assumed that meat-eaters would be more likely to embrace cultivated meat, but your argument that hybrid products might not attract them, given the reception to things like the Beyond or Impossible Burgers, is compelling.

I love that you're asking such critical questions and admire how you’ve kept the post concise while still offering constructive recommendations for the EA movement. 

My hope is that cultivated meat will enable us to replace animal products for companion animals, but I realise looking at your information on scale and cost I'm being pretty optimistic on that. Do you feel that will be a viable option at some point in the future?

Also, I'm embarrassed to admit I didn't know the reference to Omelas so thank you for introducing me to that story.

Thanks again for such a thought-provoking and well-balanced post!

Thank you for your kind comment!

Regarding pets, I know that the company Meatly has marketed a product with cultivated cells in the United Kingdom. But I'm not sure how widely available it is. My opinion is that products that include small quantities of cells will exist, but will remain in the premium pet food segment, similar to how insect-based products are positioned today.

I think a lot of people use cultured meat not being available as an excuse to keep eating animal flesh, and when it is available, they'd just find a new excuse to not change

Great post, Tom! I strongly upvoted it.

I think the cost-effectiveness of advocating for cultivated meat is also lower due to the possibility of it decreasing the number of farmed animals with positive lives in the future. I guess significant replacement of animal-based products by cultivated meat would only happen in a few decades, and that farmed chickens in some regions will have positive lives then. I estimate broiler welfare and cage-free campaigns increase welfare per living time by 92.9 % and 80.4 %, which are not far from the increase of 100 % that would be obtained for improved conditions respecting neutral lives. For Ambitious Impact's pain intensities, and my guess that hurtful pain is as intense as fully healthy life, I estimate broilers in a reformed scenario, and hens in cage-free aviaries have slightly positive lives.

In addition, I believe decreasing the consumption of animal-based products may be harmful due to effects on wild animals. Brian Tomasik thinks “it’s pretty unclear whether promoting vegetarianism reduces or increases total animal suffering, both when considering short-run effects on wild animals on Earth and when considering long-run effects on society’s values”.

I recommend donating to the Shrimp Welfare Project (SWP) not only because of super high cost-effectiveness ignoring non-target animals[1], but also minor effects on wild animals. Its main intervention only adds electrical stunning before slaughter, which does not change the amount of feed required, which I think would be the main way of impacting wild animals.

  1. ^

    I estimated SWP has been 173 times as cost-effective as cage-free campaigns.

There are several (strong, according to many people) moral objections to have happy animal farming, where farmed animals with a net-positive welfare are slaughtered and eaten. 

See https://stijnbruers.wordpress.com/2022/08/23/mild-welfarism-avoiding-the-demandingness-of-totalitarian-welfarism/

https://stijnbruers.wordpress.com/2016/11/05/can-we-eat-happy-meat/

https://philpapers.org/rec/BRUPEA-5

As for the effects on wild animals, I guess many of the agricultural land that is now used for animal farming (including feed crops), can best be turned into grasslands with large herbivores (wild horses,...). Those types of ecosystems may have lower animal suffering densities (amount of suffering per square mile) than animal farming.

See https://stijnbruers.wordpress.com/2025/03/11/how-to-systematically-reduce-wild-animal-suffering-in-the-near-future/ 

Thanks, Stijn.

There are several (strong, according to many people) moral objections to have happy animal farming, where farmed animals with a net-positive welfare are slaughtered and eaten. 

The most important for me is the perspective of the animals, and they would want to be farmed if they had positive lives. I am wary of going against the will of the most affected beings. The will of the animals has to be inferred by humans, but there are cases where one can confidently say animals would prefer to have existed over not having been born. For example, if their conditions were equivalent to those of well treated pets, or healthy animals in sanctuaries.

As for the effects on wild animals, I guess many of the agricultural land that is now used for animal farming (including feed crops), can best be turned into grasslands with large herbivores (wild horses,...). Those types of ecosystems may have lower animal suffering densities (amount of suffering per square mile) than animal farming.

A lower population density would decrease total suffering, but it would also tend to decrease total happiness. Ideally, one would expand ecosystems with lots of positive lives (for instance, happy arthropods). In any case, it could still be the case that the decrease in cropland resulting from a lower consumption of animal-based products leads to an increase in the number of wild animals with negative lives which makes alternative proteins harmful at least nearterm.

I agree with taking that perspective of the animals. However, in this context it's complicated: if the animal does not exist, it has no perspective and also no preference for existence with a positive welfare. And if you bring an animal into existence, give it a positive live, use that animal for food and slaughter it, it is likely that from that animal's perspective, that animal would prefer a longer, more positive live at an animal sanctuary. So, if the conditions were really equivalent to those of healthy animals in sanctuaries, or pets, that means no slaughtering. You can eat sanctuary animals that died naturally of old age, but not happy farmed animals that are slaughtered.

Arthropods tend to have higher reproduction rates (more offspring per adult) than large herbivores, and I believe high reproduction rates negatively correlate with welfare of the offspring. Also: as the reproduction rate of most farmed animals is higher than those of wild large herbivores, replacing farmed animals by wild large herbivores (when agricultural land is replaced by grasslands with wild horses) would increase animal welfare and decrease suffering.

I agree with taking that perspective of the animals. However, in this context it's complicated: if the animal does not exist, it has no perspective and also no preference for existence with a positive welfare.

You seem to be implying that increasing the population of farmed animals with positive lives is not good because they do not have a preference for existing before existing. I do not see how one can believe this without also thinking that decreasing the population of farmed animals with negative lives is not good because they do not have a preference for not existing before existing. An asymmetry does not make sense to me.

And if you bring an animal into existence, give it a positive live, use that animal for food and slaughter it, it is likely that from that animal's perspective, that animal would prefer a longer, more positive live at an animal sanctuary.

Farmed animals with positive lives would prefer to live longer lives, but they would also prefer to live a shorter positive live over not having lived at all. The same applies to humans. Do you think people preferring to live longer (while they consider their lives worth living) is a reason not to have kids? I guess not because you see death from disease differently than death from slaughter, but none are voluntary, in the sense the human or animal would prefer to continue living for longer if their life was still positive, so I do not know what would be the relevant difference ignoring 2nd order effects. Are these the main reason for you thinking that farming animals with positive lives would be bad?

Arthropods tend to have higher reproduction rates (more offspring per adult) than large herbivores, and I believe high reproduction rates negatively correlate with welfare of the offspring. Also: as the reproduction rate of most farmed animals is higher than those of wild large herbivores, replacing farmed animals by wild large herbivores (when agricultural land is replaced by grasslands with wild horses) would increase animal welfare and decrease suffering.

I want to maximise the additional welfare per $ spent, which is the product between the additional welfare per animal-year improved, and animal-years improved per $ spent. I think the additional welfare per animal-year improved is higher for vertebrates than invertebrates given the larger welfare range of vertebrates. However, I believe one can get more animal-years improved per $ spent on helping invertebrates than on helping vertebrates. I expect this last effect to be stronger, as I estimate invetebrate welfare interventions are much more cost-effective than vertebrate welfare ones, and that invertebrates have a larger welfare range per calorie consumption than vertebrates. So I think it is still worth targeting invertebrates, which have a high reproduction rate, regardless of whether they have positive or negative lives.

I believe that kids having a preference not to be slaughtered, is a very good reason not to have kids, when someone decides to have happy kids in order to slaughter and eat them. Kids having a preference to live longer is not a good reason not to have kids. Note a difference here between slaughtering and not living longer: it is possible not to slaughter a kid, but it may be impossible to have that kid live as long as it wants.

In my opinion, we are allowed to consider the lives of possible people as neutral if that consideration results in those possible people not existing. In other words: we are allowed to discount the welfare of possible people, if the situation with the highest sum of discounted welfare is one where those welfare-discounted people do not exist. The welfare-discounted people cannot complain against their welfare being discounted, because in the chosen optimal situation, those people do not exist. This idea creates the procreation asymmetry: it is ok not to cause the existence of a happy person, but not ok to cause the existence of a miserable person (all else equal). See my theory of mild welfarism: https://stijnbruers.wordpress.com/2022/08/23/mild-welfarism-avoiding-the-demandingness-of-totalitarian-welfarism/ and the asymmetry: https://stijnbruers.wordpress.com/2024/06/17/the-asymmetry-in-population-ethics-and-deontological-ethics/ 

My theory of mild welfarism gives two reasons why breeding happy farmed animals to kill and eat them, or breeding happy slaves, or giving birth to happy kids to slaughter and eat them, are not permissible. Those things violate the rights of bodily autonomy and procreation autonomy. 

I agree with maximizing the additional welfare per $ spent. but I'm skeptical that turning the agricultural land into an ecosystem with many arthropods, or keeping the agricultural land, requires less dollar spending for extra welfare, compared to turning that land into wild grassland with horses. First, the welfare range of a large herbivore is larger than that of an arthropod, second, the fertility rate of a large herbivore is lower, and third, its lifespan is longer. Plus, that grassland with wild horses can have flowers that attract bees and horse manure that attract dung beetles. Of all arthropods, I believe bees and dung beetles are the best in terms of maximizing global welfare. Those insects are most likely to have a positive welfare and a higher welfare range, and are less harmful to other animals, compared to the other arthropods. A grassland can also have more bees and dung beetles than agricultural cropland used for animal feed. Improving the welfare of animals on agricultural land or in other ecosystems is likely more costly than improving the welfare of animals on that wild grassland.  https://stijnbruers.wordpress.com/2025/03/11/how-to-systematically-reduce-wild-animal-suffering-in-the-near-future/ 

I believe that kids having a preference not to be slaughtered, is a very good reason not to have kids, when someone decides to have happy kids in order to slaughter and eat them.

Are you also against abortion? If not, why would it be fine to kill a human right before birth, but not right after it? I do not see a meaningful difference ignoring 2nd order effects, which I agree may be a valid reason for opposing the farming of animals with positive lives, but you seem to oppose this even ignoring such effects.

The welfare-discounted people cannot complain against their welfare being discounted, because in the chosen optimal situation, those people do not exist. This idea creates the procreation asymmetry: it is ok not to cause the existence of a happy person, but not ok to cause the existence of a miserable person (all else equal). See my theory of mild welfarism: https://stijnbruers.wordpress.com/2022/08/23/mild-welfarism-avoiding-the-demandingness-of-totalitarian-welfarism/ and the asymmetry: https://stijnbruers.wordpress.com/2024/06/17/the-asymmetry-in-population-ethics-and-deontological-ethics/ 

If you think future human-years of people who do not exist yet can be discounted, do you believe future human-years of people who already exist can be discounted too? If not, what is the relevant difference between future human-years of current and future people? One's future self can be seen as a future person similar to one's current self.

I'm not against abortion (except very late term abortion, to some degree), because unwanted pregnancy violates a woman's right to bodily autonomy (that trumps the right to live, to some degree). During such pregnancy, the body of the woman is used as a means against her will. That is the difference between abortion and killing a baby after birth. In terms of my mild welfarist ethic: the woman has the right to discount the welfare of the foetus, only during pregnancy, when the body of the woman is used as a means to keep the foetus alive. That right to discount welfare entails the right to bodily autonomy. Rejecting this right would mean that we have to make huge sacrifices, no utilitarian is willing to make.

I wonder, if you say happy animal farming is permissible, what do you think about happy slavery (breeding people to be used as slaves, guaranteeing a net-positive welfare) or happy human cannibalism?

Future human-years can only be discounted (in this context) if that discounting results in choosing the state where those humans do not exist. So, future human-years of humans who already exist, cannot be discounted. If there is a non-zero personal identity over time, then your future self and your current self are the same person and it will be impossible for me to choose the state where that person does not exist. 

I'm not against abortion (except very late term abortion, to some degree), because unwanted pregnancy violates a woman's right to bodily autonomy (that trumps the right to live, to some degree).

Why does women's right to bodily autonomy trump foetuses' right to life? I understand one can have a system where welfare is discounted in such a way that all one's intuitions are preserved, but I do not think this is a good way of figuring out one's moral theory. I prefer starting from the most fundamental intuitions, and then figure out what follows. Increasing happiness is fundamentally good to me, so I am open to the possibility of farming happy animals being good too (depending on the indirect effects).

I wonder, if you say happy animal farming is permissible, what do you think about happy slavery (breeding people to be used as slaves, guaranteeing a net-positive welfare) or happy human cannibalism?

I strongly endorse expectational total hedonistic utilitarianism, so I am in favour of increasing impartial welfare regardness of what it entails. I doubt human slavery or cannibalism would increase welfare, but I would support them if they did (accounting for direct and indirect effects).

Future human-years can only be discounted (in this context) if that discounting results in choosing the state where those humans do not exist.

I feel like this rule is arbitrary, as I do not see any fundamental difference between future human-years of existing and future people.

Most people have the moral intuition that the right to bodily autonomy trumps the right to live. We see that in dozens of moral dilemma's, so it is pretty coherent. That right to bodily autonomy is also special in many other ways, and it can be directly derived from the moral theory of mild welfarism, as the right to discount the welfare of others if those discounted individuals cannot validly complain. The question is how much does that right to bodily autonomy trump other rights? In terms of mild welfarism: how much welfare are we allowed to discount? I suggest for collective decisions, we have to democratically decide how much we are allowed to discount, or how strong the right to bodily autonomy is.

If you endorse expectational total hedonistic utilitarianism, you should be against happy animal farming because those animals would be much better-off on a sanctuary where they live much longer with a higher welfare. Same goes for happy slavery: those happy human slaves would be better-off if they were not treated as slaves. According to total utilitarianism, you may have a duty to sacrifice yourself by bringing into existence huge numbers of (slightly) happy beings and taking care of them. Basically the very repugnant conclusion. That utilitarianism is rather totalitarian utilitarianism: extremely demanding. To avoid this repugnant conclusion, and hence to justify happy animal farming, you should believe that welfare is not interpersonally comparable, i.e. that you cannot sum everyone's welfare. But you believe that the welfare of a shrimp is comparable to that of a human.

The fundamental difference between future human-years of existing and future people is based on the difference between existing and non-existing people. Existing people can complain against their welfare being discounted in those states where they exist, but possible future people who are never brought into existence, will never exist and hence cannot complain against their welfare being discounted in those states where they would exist. Hence, I don't think this difference based on existence is arbitrary. 

Most people have the moral intuition that the right to bodily autonomy trumps the right to live.

Killing a foetus violates their right to bodily autonomy? I agree most people support abortion, but there is still a significant fraction against it. It looks like 36 % in the United States think it should be illegal in all/most cases. A much smaller fraction of the population would be against killing farmed animals for food in all/most cases if they had good lives. So I think farming animals would be good under mild welfarism if the discounts to welfare were determined democratically.

If you endorse expectational total hedonistic utilitarianism, you should be against happy animal farming because those animals would be much better-off on a sanctuary where they live much longer with a higher welfare.

The annual welfare is proportional to the population (N), and welfare per animal-year. None of these factors should be maximised. A sufficiently large population would imply negative welfare per animal-year given a limited pool of resources. Having only a few animals with super high welfare would not be optimum due to implying a tiny population. I assume people would not want to farm lots of animals with super high welfare if they were not being raised for meat.

Here is a toy model about how to think about maximising welfare. If welfare per animal-year was proportional to the logarithm of the cost per animal-year (c = C/N) as a fraction of that for zero welfare (c_0), as self-reported life satisfaction is roughly proportional to the real gross domestic product (real GDP) per capita, the annual welfare would be proportional to N*ln(c/c_0). Note this does not explicitly depend on the lifespan of the animals. The ratio between annual welfare and cost, which is what I would want to maximise, would be proportional to N*ln(c/c_0)/C = ln(c/c_0)/c. This tends to 0 as c increases, which illustrates total welfare is not maximised by maximising the welfare per animal-year. The derivative of ln(c/c_0)/c with respect to c is (1 - ln(c/c_0))/c^2, which is 0 for ln(c/c_0) = 1, positive for ln(c/c_0) < 1, and negative for ln(c/c_0) > 1. So the ratio between annual welfare and cost would be maximum for ln(c/c_0) = 1, when the cost per animal-year is 2.72*c_0.

Eggs from barns cost around 1 $/kg in the European Union (EU), which means their production cost is lower than that (such that selling eggs is profitable), and I estimate hens in barns have roughly neutral lives. So the toy model above suggests the production cost which maximises welfare is lower than 2.72 $/kg. I have little confidence in this. I am just illustrating how I would think about it.

According to total utilitarianism, you may have a duty to sacrifice yourself by bringing into existence huge numbers of (slightly) happy beings and taking care of them.

I fully endorse expectational total hedonistic utilitarianism (ETHU), but I do not think it is that demanding. I think donating more and better is the best strategy to maximise impact for the vast majority of people, even ones working in impact-focussed organisations. Huge sacrifices like donating to the point of becoming extremely poor are a surefire way of not maximising future donations because they greatly decrease future earnings.

The fundamental difference between future human-years of existing and future people is based on the difference between existing and non-existing people. Existing people can complain against their welfare being discounted in those states where they exist, but possible future people who are never brought into existence, will never exist and hence cannot complain against their welfare being discounted in those states where they would exist. Hence, I don't think this difference based on existence is arbitrary. 

You seem to be implying that future human-years of existing people are necessary, and therefore can complain, whereas those of future people are not, and hence cannot complain. If so, what determines whether future human-years are necessary? Saying that future human-years are necessary if they belong to existing people would be assuming the conclusion.

I meant that prohibiting abortion violates the right to bodily autonomy of the mother: her body is required for the pregnancy, and the pregnancy was against her will. So the body of the mother is used as merely a means. Abortion and killing a foetus does not violate the right to bodily autonomy of the foetus, because the body of the foetus is not used as a means to achieve someone else's ends. If the body of the foetus did not exist, there was no pregnancy and then the objective of the mother, not to be pregnant, is automatically achieved. So the presence of the body of the foetus is not necessary. So the body of the foetus is not used as a means.

Those 36% of US population that are against abortion, do not count, because they have an inconsistent ethic that involves unwanted arbitrariness (discrimination). Their ethic is speciesist, whereby human foetuses have a higher moral status than non-human animals. They believe that foetuses should not be killed whereas non-human animals are allowed to be killed. Such speciesist discrimination is arbitrary, and cannot be wanted by non-human animals. Hence unwanted arbitrariness. If such unwanted arbitrariness would be permissible, then we would be permitted to arbitrarily exclude the opinions of those people that are against abortion and arbitrarily exclude those people from democracy. 

How many people would be against killing and eating individuals if those individuals had positive lives? If speciesism is excluded, and hence ‘individuals’ can refer to humans as well, then I expect a vast majority would be against such killing. Even if that means the individuals are not brought into existence. 

About your total utilitarianism: the loss of welfare of a human who loves the taste of meat but is no longer allowed to eat meat, is smaller than the loss of welfare of all the animals who would be prematurely killed and eaten by that human. Hence, breeding animals but not killing and eating them, would increase total welfare. Also: the loss of welfare of a human who gives a bit of money to an animal sanctuary is smaller than the loss of welfare of animals on a sanctuary that lacks money to buy things for the animals. Hence, to increase total welfare, the human should give a bit of money to the animal sanctuary. And by the same reasoning he should give some money to another sanctuary that breeds and helps extra animals. And so, according to total utilitarianism, the human is not allowed to eat meat and is obligated to donate a lot of money to animal sanctuaries. 

You are correct to assume that people would not want to farm lots of animals with super high welfare if they were not being raised for meat. That means those people are not total utilitarians. 

If you want to maximize the ratio of annual welfare and cost, and if annual welfare does not explicitly depend on the lifespan of the animals, then you run into the replacement problem: the belief that killing an animal painlessly and bringing another animal into existence that has the same momentaneous welfare, is morally neutral. That would assume that animals would not have a personal identity over time. But there is evidence that animals are concerned about their future and do not want to be prematurely killed. 

To be honest, I think that you are deluding yourself by believing that expectational total hedonistic utilitarianism is not that demanding. The belief that huge sacrifices would cause you to be less effective in doing good, seems to be like merely a rationalization. I don’t know of any total utilitarian who could not do a little more sacrifice in order to do more good. You can donate to the point that you are very poor and still work as hard, or even harder, to earn as much money, or even more money. I think total utilitarians should at least be honest and acknowledge that they are not doing all the things that would maximize total welfare. All total utilitarians that I know, are able to donate a little bit more on the margin and do more good.

About future human-years: a human who exists today can validly complain today that his/her welfare in the future is discounted. A human who does not exist today and will never come into existence cannot validly complain today that his/her welfare in the worlds where s/he is brought into existence in the future, is discounted. Hence, future human-years of humans who exist today always count at least as much as future human-years of humans who will never exist. Note that most humans believe that they have a personal identity over time, that they do identify themselves with future human-years.  

Hi Vasco,

Perhaps I understand your position. Here is a line of argument that results in your conclusion based on total utilitarianism. Suppose for simplicity every individual can choose between four options:

A: veganism: not buying and eating animal products. This option generates the second lowest total welfare, higher than option B.

B: unhappy animal farming: buying and eating products from factory farms where animals live unhappy lives. This generates the lowest total welfare.

C: happy animal farming: buying and eating products from farms where animals live happy lives. This option generates the second highest total welfare, lower than option D but higher than A and B.

D: animal sanctuary: eating vegan and donating money to a sanctuary that breeds animals and give those animals long and very happy lives. This generates the highest welfare.

In terms of total welfare, we have D > C > A > B. Therefore, if everyone was total utilitarian, everyone should choose D. In extremis, total utilitarianism entails that everyone should sacrifice themselves a lot in order to bring into existence huge numbers of very happy animals that live on a sanctuary. However, if only you are total utilitarian, then according to act utilitarianism it would be wrong for you to choose D when other, non-utilitarian people are extremely reluctant to choose D. Sidenote: if you were a rule utilitarian instead of an act utilitarian, you could have to follow the rule that everyone has to follow, namely choosing option D, even if other people do not follow that rule (i.e. do not choose that option D). So I assume you are an act utilitarian.

There are two things to consider: which option you should choose for yourself, and which option you should choose for other people. I’ll argue that you should choose option A for yourself and, importantly, option C for others.

As a total act utilitarian, you should choose option A for yourself. Sure, option A is dominated by options D and C. But those two options are more expensive: in C you have to pay extra money for the meat, because meat from happy animals is more expensive than vegan products and meat from unhappy factory farmed animals. In option D you have to donate money to the sanctuary. However, it is very likely that donating your money to the most cost-effective animal welfare charities improves total welfare more than donating that money to an animal sanctuary or a farm where animals are happy. In particular, the extra money that you would spend on high-welfare meat when you choose option C, could better be spend on effective campaigns to transition people from option B to C.

This brings me to the second issue: which option should you choose for other people? Most people currently choose option B. Persuading them to choose option C might be feasible with campaigns that require a bit of money, whereas shifting people to option D might be unfeasible, no matter how much money you throw at such a campaign. At first sight, total utilitarianism seems to suggest that the best strategy is to have people switch to option D, but that may be unfeasible or too costly. Note that in terms of total welfare, it is better to persuade people to choose option C instead of option A. 

So there you have it: choose veganism for yourself and happy meat for others. That would be the conclusion of a total act utilitarian. 

Thanks, Stijn!

C: happy animal farming: buying and eating products from farms where animals live happy lives. This option generates the second highest total welfare, lower than option D but higher than A and B.

D: animal sanctuary: eating vegan and donating money to a sanctuary that breeds animals and give those animals long and very happy lives. This generates the highest welfare.

I think C would have higher welfare than D for the reasons I mentioned in my last comment. The welfare per animal-year in D would be higher than in C, but the population in D would be much lower than in C.

I am ignoring effects on wild animals, but I think these are the driver of the overall effect. I think decreasing the consumption of animal-based food tends to increase the population of wild animals due to decreasing cropland, and the counterfactual land having more wild animals. So I believe it is beneficial/harmful if wild animals have positive/negative lives.

So I assume you are an act utilitarian.

I confirm I am an act utilitarian (in terms of my moral theory), although I use rules/heuristic all time to make decisions (for example, being honest).

As a total act utilitarian, you should choose option A for yourself.

I agree I should follow a plant-based diet. I do not know whether this is good or bad for animals due to unclear possibly dominant effects on wild animals. However, it is cheaper and healthier, and therefore allows me to donate more to the most cost-effective invertebrate welfare interventions, which I think is the most important consideration for maximising my altruistic impact.

This brings me to the second issue: which option should you choose for other people? Most people currently choose option B. Persuading them to choose option C might be feasible with campaigns that require a bit of money, whereas shifting people to option D might be unfeasible, no matter how much money you throw at such a campaign. At first sight, total utilitarianism seems to suggest that the best strategy is to have people switch to option D, but that may be unfeasible or too costly. Note that in terms of total welfare, it is better to persuade people to choose option C instead of option A. 

B is the cheapest, and therefore allows for the largest population of farmed animals, and smallest population of wild animals. So, if these have negative lives, B can be the best. I have little idea about whether wild animals have good or bad lives, so I am mostly agnostic about whether decreasing the consumption of animal-based food is good or bad, regardless of whether it comes from farmed animals with positive or negative lives.

I expect animal welfare in D to be higher than in C, almost by definition. In D, the purpose is to have as many animals as happy as possible, without killing them. Whereas in C, the prime objective remains killing and eating the animals. The farmers do not intend to maximize the welfare of the farmed animals. The population in D may be lower than in C, but the population size in D is chosen to maximize animal welfare, whereas the population size in C is chosen to maximize farmers profits. If population size in C is larger than in D, the welfare of the animals in C is suboptimal.

With choosing option C for others, I actually meant not trying to reject option C for others, e.g. not campaigning against option C, not spending money on trying to switch people to option A instead of option C. I agree that the most cost-effective invertebrate welfare interventions are more effective than interventions to switch people from B to C. Or, if you want, you can add another option B’, which is similar to B but with reduced animal suffering. Your favorite invertebrate welfare interventions correspond to switching people from B to B’, and that might at the moment be more effective than switching them from B to C. 

Thanks for the conversation!

Thanks for the conversation!

Likewise!

Curated and popular this week
Relevant opportunities