Imposter syndrome is not always irrational

Self-doubt is natural and logical.

Maybe in our achievement-driven, how-are-you-contributing-to-unrelenless-growth society. Indigenous cultures don't exhibit self-doubt. Neither do Buddhists. I just talked about this on my podcast.
 

In a meeting between the Dalai Lama and a group of American psychologists in 1990, one of the psychologists brought up the concept of negative self-talk. Since there are no words in Tibetan that translate into low self-esteem and self-loathing, it took quite a long time for the psychologists to convey what they meant. But this wasn’t a translation problem. It was a problem of conceptualization. Self-loathing? People do that? The Dalai Lama was incredulous. Once the Dalai Lama understood what they were saying, he turned to the Tibetan monks in the room, and after explaining what the psychologists were suggesting, he asked, “How many of you have experienced this low self-esteem, self-contempt, or self-loathing?”

Complete silence.

Here was a psychological state of mind so ubiquitous in our culture that everyone experiences it from time to time, if not every single day. Yet the Tibetans—trained since childhood in the art of a mental exercise they call meditation—acted like they were being told about some alien life form. The Dalai Lama turned back to the psychologists and asked a simple question:

“Why would you ever let your mind get like this?”

Excerpt from The Awakened Ape

Hi Victor, thanks for writing this. I'm also in a phase of questioning the narrative around IP.

I didn't quite understand a part of you writing, so I gave Claude your article and asked it, "... isn't being irrational (from an instrumental sense) an accurate description of a person who takes an action that is harmful to oneself when there are healthier alternative actions available? Even if these actions were developed as a protective mechanism that were rational and healthy in the past."

This was its response:
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" What the author seems to be arguing against is the approach of simply labeling someone's imposter feelings as "irrational" and expecting that recognition alone to fix the problem. They're suggesting that:

1. Simply telling someone their feelings are irrational often doesn't help because these responses are deeply physiological, not just cognitive
2. These feelings developed for legitimate reasons (past experiences of rejection, criticism, etc.)
3. The person might actually be accurately perceiving real social risks in some contexts

The author's issue isn't with recognizing that imposter syndrome behaviors may be currently harmful, but with approaches that dismiss these experiences as merely faulty thinking without addressing the underlying nervous system responses and real past experiences that shaped them.

So while "instrumentally irrational" might be technically accurate in describing behaviors that no longer serve someone well, the author is advocating for a more holistic understanding of why these patterns exist and how to address them effectively.
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Do you think Claude's interpretation is accurate? What would you change?