longtermism and politics both seem "error bars so wide that expected value theory is probably super useless or an excuse for motivated reasoning or both". But I don't think this is damning toward EA because downsides of a misfire in a brittle theory of change don't seem super important for most longtermist interventions (your pandemic preparedness scheme might accidentally abolish endemic flu, so your miscalculation about the harm or likelihood of a way-worse-than-covid is sort of fine). Whereas in politics the brittleness of the theory of change means you can be well-meaningly harmful, which is kinda the central point of anything involving "politics" at all.
Certainly this is not robust to all longtermist interventions, but I find very convincing for the average case.
Hi smountjoy, I couldn't find the link to David Thorstad's post in this post.
Agreed, I suggest making this a linkpost.
https://ineffectivealtruismblog.com/2023/07/29/epistemics-part-5-the-value-of-cost-effectiveness-analysis/
Oops, thank you! I thought I had selected linkpost, but maybe I unselected without noticing. Fixed!