What if exact copies don't matter but future experiences still do?
I think an ethics resulting from the following two premises is worth exploring:
P1: The total moral value of subjectively indistinguishable observer-moments doesn't scale with the number of copies, i.e. they sum to a constant value.
- This is because subjectively indistinguishable observer-moments, in some sense, happen to the same "someone". One could think of themselves as all their copies. N observer-moments that are subjectively indistinguishable aren't felt N times by that same "someone". Only felt "once".
- E.g. Even if there were multiple exact copies of me, of my current present experience, I might not really care personally because it doesn't seem to change anything for me. "I" don't notice anything.
- See Wei Dai's "The Moral Status of Independent Identical Copies" for the tension this creates with standard utilitarianism.
- We can say that multiple "tokens" of subjectively indistinguishable observer-moments belong to the same "type" of observer-moment.
P2: What matters, and can be changed, for each type of observer-moment is the distribution of its subjectively "future" experiences.
- You can't "un-exist" the type of observer-moment itself, but you can change what it continues into.
- A higher fraction of "future" observer-moments experiencing suffering is dispreferable.
- A higher fraction of "future" observer-moments experiencing happiness/tranquility is preferable, even if only instrumentally to minimize subjectively "future" suffering.
- This is related to thinking about "anthropic immortality" / "quantum immortality" / "multiverse immortality" in which distributions of post-death observer-moments are of substantial concern.
Using these lenses, the moral situation of the world looks like:
- Consider a graph with types of observer-moments as nodes, such that one node is one type.
- Each type of observer-moment (each node) is associated with some value/disvalue attributed to its current experience.
- Importantly, the value/disvalue of the current experience is not something we can change in order to help the observer-moment type. This is already fixed.
- Each type of observer-moment (each node) is also associated with any number of subjectively indistinguishable token observer-moments belonging to that specific type.
- The absolute number of token observer-moments appears to only matter instrumentally insofar as it affects the frequency of expectations of other types of observer-moments.
- Edges represent subjective continuation. An edge from type A to type B exists if an observer-moment of type A can possibly expect to continue as an observer-moment of type B in the next moment.
- The weight of an edge from type A to type B is the frequency at which an observer-moment of type A should expect to continue as an observer-moment of type B.
- These weights are things that we might be able to change in order to help the observer-moment type.
- Perhaps the "future" welfare of each type / node could be considered with equal weight in the aggregate to keep things impartial.
In conclusion... well, I'm still thinking about what the objective function might look like.
There's some scale invariance here. E.g. suppose you duplicated the world. That duplication would multiply all token observer-moments by the same factor. This leaves you with the same types and the same distributions for future observer-moments.
In a small enough world, you can create or prevent the existence of new types of observer-moment. I think it's unlikely (30%) that we live in a small enough world.
On the other hand, in a large enough world, all possible types of observer-moments exist. The only thing you can change is adjusting the distributions for future observer-moments for each type of observer-moment. Try to lead types of observer-moments down paths of non-suffering etc. So, this seems like an ethics of flow (rather than stock).
The world of experience is functionally a Markov process
I'm developing arguments to support the view that the world of experience is functionally a Markov process. This is a claim about how it functionally works for us, rather than a metaphysical claim about what's fundamental about experiences or physics.
One could think of this as a sort of "formalized phenomenology". It has these components:
And all this works out to a tenseless graph of types of experiences over subjective time connected with edges with weights that work as the "probabilities" of "what I see next".
All this suggests adding a functional level to how we understand the world, not simply mind & matter. The levels, top-down, are:
The functional layer is implemented by the measure of experiences. The measure of experiences seems to supervene on physical stuff. I'm not proposing new metaphysics here. The functional layer is how it functionally appears (and perhaps matters) to us. It is an abstraction, but it is the abstraction we live in, because the first-person facts are what we experience and can expect to go on to experience. It's ontologically last but epistemically first.
Functionally, we all exist in a Markov process. There's just us now and we're faced with one or more futures. If there are multiple futures we go into all, but internally experience going into one of the many perspectives, with some weight obtained as relative measure among successor perspectives, with or without conditioning on a causal requirement for continuity.
Closest prior work: Markus Müller’s algorithmic idealism. Müller considers the chances of what an observer sees next as fundamental, and fixed by an algorithmic prior. He sees the physical world emerging from what I call the functional layer. My direction of construction goes in the reverse direction. I think the functional layer is just constructed from the measure of experiences, which seems to supervene on physics. I'm largely metaphysically agnostic about this functional Markov layer we (functionally) exist in.