Ah I missed the "2 states of the world which are exactly the same" part, sorry. Then yeah the EVs would be the same. I'm not sure how this is supposed to support your original comment's argument though.

Depends on the details of what the intervals are supposed to represent. E.g.:

• Say you have a representor (imprecise probabilities) where EV_P(A) = EV_P(B) = [-1, 1].
• On one hand:
  • If:
    • for p1 in P, EV_p1(A) = -1 while EV_p1(B) = 1, and
    • for p2 in P, EV_p2(A) = 1 while EV_p2(B) = -1,
  • then A and B are incomparable.
• OTOH:
  • If for all p in P, EV_p(A) = EV_p(B), then A and B are comparable.
• (Ofc there are lots of other cases.)

Hi Vasco. I think Figure 3 here, and the surrounding discussion of how imprecision works, might answer your objection.

The idea is:

• Suppose two actions have precise EVs. You'll presumably grant that a tiny change in the (expected) location of electrons can flip the difference in EV from +epsilon to -epsilon.
• If so, then a tiny change in the (expected) location of electrons can flip the lower bound of an imprecise difference in EV from +epsilon to -epsilon.
• What makes two actions incomparable, under the imprecise EV model, is that the interval of EV differences crosses zero.
• So, it's unsurprising that a tiny change in the (expected) location of electrons can flip the two actions from "comparable" to "incomparable". 

Can you say which step in this argument you reject, and why?

especially the observation that successful prediction systems across most domains use cluster not sequence thinking. 

I find this "observation" confusing / misleading, given that Holden defines cluster thinking as aggregating decisions from multiple perspectives. This is very different from aggregating the predictions of multiple models. The evidence of "success" he cites only applies to the latter (where "success" is with respect to Brier scores and such), not the former.

And this is practically relevant: If you aggregate multiple models but then maximize EV under the aggregated model, you don't get the "sandboxing" property Holden claims cluster thinking satisfies. The fanatical/Pascalian model will still dominate the EV calculation.

(ETA: As an aside on sequence thinking / cluster thinking generally, I wish these discussions made it very clear whether we're taking ST/CT as (1) different normative standards for good epistemology / decision-making per se, vs. as (2) different procedures for satisfying a given epistemological / decision-theoretic standard. Cf. "criterion of rightness vs. decision procedure" in ethics. This would be helpful for clarifying what's meant by claims like "cluster thinking is how 'successful' prediction systems operate". I've been assuming (2), here, FWIW.)

I think if you're savvy you will probably find a way to make the astronomical thing go better—such as doing strategy/prioritization/deconfusion work, or working on robustly good intermediate desiderata, or building skills/money in case there's more clarity in the future

What do you think about the arguments for cluelessness from imprecision, e.g., here? (I explain more why I think we're clueless even about the things you list, here.)

Thanks for this! For what it's worth, some issues I've found with the "CRIBS" and "EA Epistemic Auditor" reviews for drafts of philosophical blog posts:

• excessively allergic to "hedging", and to sections of posts meant to preempt very important misreadings
• flagging some points as "hidden assumptions" even when they're explicitly addressed in the post, or seem clearly irrelevant to the argument
• critiquing claim X as not empirically supported, when X is the claim "Y isn't empirically supported".

But they're somewhat useful for surfacing what kinds of misunderstandings readers might have.

(Sorry, due to lack of time I don't expect I'll reply further. But thank you for the discussion! A quick note:)

from the subjective feeling (in your mind) that their EVs feel very hard to compare

EV is subjective. I'd recommend this post for more on this.

I don't know exactly what you mean by "feels very hard to compare". I'd appreciate more direct responses to the arguments in this post, namely, about how the comparison seems arbitrary.

I see arbitrary choices as a reason for further research to decrease their uncertainty

First, it's already very big-if-true if all EA intervention candidates other than "do more research" are incomparable with inaction.

Second, "do more research" is itself an action whose sign seems intractably sensitive to things we're unaware of. I discuss this here.

However, by actual value, you mean a set of possible values

No, I mean just one value.

why would weighted sums of actual masses representing expected masses not be comparable?

Sorry, by "expected" I meant imprecise expectation, since you gave intervals in your initial comment. Imprecise expectations are incomparable for the reasons given in the post — I worry we're talking past each other.