The growing threat of fungal pathogens to global agriculture represents one of the most underappreciated risks to food resilience in the 21st century. Recent studies warn that fungal diseases already destroy between 10–23% of global crops annually, with additional post-harvest losses of up to 20%, and climate change is accelerating the spread of these pathogens into new geographic regions. (ScienceDaily) In the era of artificial intelligence and climate instability, safeguarding food systems must therefore extend beyond yield optimization to include fungal biosecurity surveillance, predictive pathogen modeling, and rapid-response agricultural defense systems. AI-driven analytics, satellite monitoring, genomic surveillance, and machine learning could become essential tools for forecasting outbreaks and identifying emerging fungal threats before they devastate staple crops. (arXiv) The recent case involving the alleged smuggling of Fusarium graminearum into the United States further illustrates the biosecurity dimension of fungal pathogens. This fungus, which causes Fusarium head blight in wheat, barley, maize, and rice, has been described in scientific and security literature as a potential agro-terrorism agent because of its capacity to trigger massive economic losses and contaminate food supplies with dangerous mycotoxins. (ABC News) As nations seek to build resilient food systems under climate stress, one plausible and urgent priority is strengthening research, governance, and international policy frameworks around fungi with agro-terrorism potential. This includes expanding fungal genomics research, establishing transnational pathogen-monitoring systems, improving biosurveillance regulations, and integrating AI-enabled early-warning systems into agricultural security strategies.

I’m trying to understand what it would cost to install far-UVC in Nigeria, if a high-quality Care222 lamp is about ₦3.25 million and even a cheaper Aerolamp is around ₦650,000 (about 9–46 times the ₦70,000 monthly minimum wage), then unless there is external funding, this technology is simply too expensive for most people here.

This is a really thoughtful call to grow the biosecurity field. One thing that might deserve a bit more attention is how this work expands beyond the small group of countries where most biosecurity research and institutions are currently concentrated.

In many low- and middle-income settings, pathogen surveillance infrastructure is still quite limited. Because of this, local researchers often have fewer opportunities to engage in biosecurity work, not necessarily due to a lack of interest or talent, but because there are fewer platforms for experimentation and collaboration.

One possible direction could be supporting simpler, lower-infrastructure surveillance pilots that can act both as early-warning systems and as starting points for building local research communities. For instance, pooled nasal-swab sentinel surveillance, indoor air sampling in crowded environments like schools or clinics, or environmental sampling in markets and farms could be practical approaches in places where wastewater monitoring or continuous sequencing systems are not yet feasible.

Programs like these could strengthen pathogen detection while also helping to grow a wider community of researchers working on biosecurity challenges. If biosecurity field-building is meant to be truly global, some of the greatest opportunities may lie in enabling experimentation and community formation in under-surveilled ecosystems, rather than concentrating most efforts in places that are already well resourced.

I am personally very interested in exploring and piloting initiatives along these lines in resource-limited settings. If anyone working in biosecurity field-building, surveillance, or global health is interested in collaborating on efforts in LMIC contexts, I would be very happy to connect. You can reach me at [email protected].

Thank you for this thoughtful and fair assessment. I appreciate the generosity of your reading and, more importantly, the structural lens you bring to the issue. I agree that many of the constraints were environmental rather than individual, and that limited institutional support shapes what is realistically achievable 

While low tax collection clearly constrains Nigeria’s fiscal capacity, I would argue that corruption is a more decisive bottleneck—both analytically and practically—than the tax-to-GDP ratio itself.

First, corruption weakens tax collection in the first place. Leakage, informal exemptions, weak enforcement, and negotiated compliance mean that even existing tax laws are not fully realized in revenue. In this sense, corruption is upstream of the tax problem: improving integrity and enforcement would likely raise effective tax collection without changing nominal tax rates. Many countries with comparable income levels collect more taxes not because their citizens are taxed more aggressively, but because compliance is higher and leakages are lower.

Second, corruption distorts how whatever revenue is collected gets allocated and spent. Even under current fiscal constraints, the marginal naira lost to misappropriation, inflated contracts, or politically motivated spending directly crowds out funding for universities, laboratories, and research grants. This is crucial: the issue is not only that the budget is small, but that within that small budget, research and higher education are systematically deprioritized or underfunded due to rent-seeking incentives that favor short-term, visible projects over long-term capacity building.

 I also think that many of the most tractable biosecurity opportunities sit on the policy and governance side rather than in primary research. I agree that the bar to entry is exceptionally high: the space is tightly regulated, heavily relationship-driven, and often inaccessible without sustained exposure to elite networks. This structure systematically disadvantages capable researchers from resource-constrained settings, even when they have relevant technical expertise and on-the-ground insight.

I agree, Lauren. Beyond attending conferences, I believe researchers in Africa should be given the freedom to pursue high-risk, high-reward science, and be allowed to fail in the process. There should be a dedicated funding system that supports this kind of exploration.

The current mindset among many African scientists is shaped by the need to think in ways that appeal to external funders, who often begin from the assumption that certain ideas are unlikely to succeed. This stifles originality and undermines confidence.

Let me share an example. During my time at the Marine Biological Laboratory (MBL) for a mycology course, I reflected on a major global gap: there is still no approved vaccine for any fungal pathogen and only a few immunotherapies exist. When I returned to Nigeria, I started exploring how available platforms—like phage display or mRNA—could be used to develop antifungal vaccines. Phages, in particular, seemed promising because they require relatively little infrastructure.

However, the challenge quickly became evident—finding anyone willing to support the idea. The absence of local funding and infrastructure meant I had to reshape my proposal to fit the expectations of external funders, rather than pursue the science as I envisioned it. Over time, this kind of adjustment constrains creativity and discourages risk-taking.

If we had funding structures and mentorship programs that allowed African researchers to think freely, take risks, and even fail without penalty, it would create an environment where truly innovative science could flourish. That freedom to think boldly is what is most lacking across the continent.

Hi Jeff,

Thanks for this perspective. I’m very interested in collaborating. Please send the IRB documentation and any sample protocol or consent forms to [email protected].

I’ll review them and adapt what’s needed for local ethics submission here, and I can share practical notes on community engagement and sampling logistics for busy public venues in Jos. I also have prior field experience,  I participated in house-to-house nasal sampling during the SARS-CoV-2 outbreak, so I’m familiar with operational realities.

If that sounds good, I’d welcome a short (20–30 minute) call to align on aims, data-sharing, and next steps. I’m keen to explore a pilot we could co-design and co-author.

Best regards,

Nnaemeka

Thanks, Jeff. Interestingly, I already have access to both a qPCR system and a Nanopore sequencer. I’d be very interested in exploring this idea further. I can also envision expanding the work to include sampling from poultry farmers, abattoir workers, and even members of the general public for broader epidemiological insights

 

An interesting piece. I would like to share a perspective as a scientist working in a resource-constrained setting. Pathogen-agnostic approaches are indeed critical for pandemic preparedness. But how can these strategies be realistically implemented in regions that lack centralized wastewater systems? Another pressing challenge is the cost of sequencing technologies: metagenomic studies remain largely inaccessible in low-resource contexts because sequencing platforms are still prohibitively expensive. What we urgently need are affordable, scalable systems that make pathogen-agnostic surveillance feasible beyond high-income settings.

After attending the Biosecurity Fundamentals course by BlueDot, two key themes stood out to me: the central role of pathogen detection and the importance of vaccines as preventive measures. However, translating these insights into practice has not been straightforward. Building collaborations and partnerships remains a challenge, particularly in regions like Nigeria where little is being done on pathogen-agnostic approaches.

After the course, I sought funding to conduct metagenomic studies in military settings in Nigeria, recognizing that most barracks have centralized wastewater systems. Soldiers, given their mobility and exposure to diverse environments, could serve as important sentinels for pathogen surveillance. I also proposed to study rivers, since much of the population disposes waste into them; however, concentrating pathogens from such diffuse sources poses significant technical challenges. Despite several efforts, I was unable to secure funding for these projects.

In my laboratory, we have access to a nanopore sequencer, which I believe is an excellent tool for real-time pathogen detection. Unfortunately, the high cost of consumables continues to limit its use, underscoring once again the urgent need for affordable solutions and locally adaptable innovations tailored to resource-constrained environments.

Given these realities, I would greatly value candid advice on how to frame biosecurity work in resource-limited settings in a way that not only addresses local needs but also makes it attractive to potential collaborators and partners.

In ecosystems without strong accelerators, it’s hard to find mentors who understand both ambition and local constraints. At the same time, many of the brightest minds in Nigeria leave academia or the nonprofit space due to survival pressures. From your experience, what mentorship structures and co-founder matching practices are most critical to replicate in regions like Nigeria to help leaders retain talent and build resilient organizations?