I think Diana Fleischman was one of the first people in EA to advocate for a “bivalvegan” diet, back in 2013 or so, and has written some blog posts about it (e.g.).

Sure, who could possibly believe that all moral propositions are objectively true? My point was that moral realists typically believe that some axiological and some deontic claims are objectively true, and that if you are an anti-realist about the former and a realist about the latter, calling yourself a “moral realist” may fail to communicate your views accurately.

Morality is Objective

I do not like the expression ‘Morality is objective’, because it comprises both claims I'm very confident are not objective (“You ought not to kill”) and claims I'm very confident are objective (“Suffering is bad”). More generally, I am a moral anti-realist by default, but am forced to recognize that some moral claims are real—specifically, certain axiological claims—because their objective reality is revealed to me via introspection when I have the corresponding phenomenal experiences (such as the experience of being in agony).

This is basically my view, and I think ‘axiological realism’ is a great name for it.

Have you considered translating it in other major languages, especially those with large existing EA communities like German, French or Spanish, or EA potential? 

As it happens, we contacted CEA a few days ago and offered to translate the website into various languages. Some of this material is already translated, but it would be great to have the entire website, with its appealing design, available on dedicated domains for all the main language communities.

Yeah, sorry: it was obvious to me that this was the intended meaning, after I realized it could be interpreted this way. I noted it because I found the syntactic ambiguity mildly interesting/amusing.

If you are like me, this comment will leave you perplexed. After a while, I realized that it should not be read as

Plausibly, best people who have ever lived is a much lower bar than best people who have ever lived.

but as

‘Plausibly best people who have ever lived’ is a much lower bar than ‘best people who have ever lived’.

Scott Alexander introduces the ‘noncentral fallacy’ as follows: “X is in a category whose archetypal member gives us a certain emotional reaction. Therefore, we should apply that emotional reaction to X, even though it is not a central category member."

This post seems like an archetypal instance of the noncentral fallacy.

Intuitively, it seems we should respond differently depending on which of these three possibilities is true:

1. They think that what they are doing is negative for the world, but do it anyway, because it is good for themselves personally.
2. They do not think that what they are doing is negative for the world, but they believe this due to motivated cognition.
3. They do not think that what they are doing is negative for the world, and this belief was not formed in a way that seems suspect.

From an act consequentialist perspective, these differences do not matter intrinsically, but they are still instrumentally relevant.^[1]

1. ^{^}

   I don't mean to suggest that any one of these possibilities is particularly likely, or they they are all plausible. I haven't followed this incident closely. FWIW, my vague sense is that the Mechanize founders had all expressed skepticism about the standard AI safety arguments for a while, in a way that seems hard to reconcile with (1) or (2).

By the way, the name is ‘Jaime’, not ‘Jamie’. The latter doesn't exist in Spanish and the two are pronounced completely differently (they share one phoneme out of five, when aligned phoneme by phoneme).

(I thought I should mention it since the two names often look indistinguishable in written form to people who are not aware that they differ.)