To summarize:
Eating meat -> narrower moral circle not sufficiently valuing the welfare of artificial sentience and/or wild animals -> existential risks (mostly suffering risks)
Animals and longtermism (although not specifically about your own diet):
- Why I prioritize moral circle expansion over artificial intelligence alignment by Jacy Reese
- Should Longtermists Mostly Think About Animals? by Abraham Rowe
- Why I'm focusing on invertebrate sentience by Max Carpendale
- Why Digital Sentience is Relevant to Animal Activists by Brian Tomasik for Animal Charity Evaluators
- The Relevance of Wild Animal Suffering by Tobias Baumann
- Arguments for and against moral advocacy by Tobias Baumann
- Will Space Colonization Multiply Wild-Animal Suffering? by Brian Tomasik
- Risks of Astronomical Future Suffering by Brian Tomasik
- Long-term vs. short-term focus by Sentience Institute
Comparing diet to charity (often older charity cost-effectiveness estimates):
- Four practices where EAs ought to course-correct by kbog
- Don't sweat diet? by Gregory Lewis
- Vegetarianism for Meat-Eaters by Scott Alexander
- When should an Effective Altruist be vegetarian? by Katja Grace
- Revenge of the Meat People! by Rob Bensinger
Animal charities and interventions, with newer estimates:
- See Animal Charity Evaluator's comprehensive reviews on their top charities.
- Corporate campaigns affect 9 to 120 years of chicken life per dollar spent by Saulius Šimčikas for Rethink Priorities
- Corporate Campaigns for Animal Welfare by Marinella Capriati for Founders Pledge
- Charity Entrepreneurship's reports on corporate campaigns
See also the comments.
I think there are also psychological effects of eating meat that might cause people to not give animals the moral weight they would think they deserve upon careful reflection.
I worry that longtermism can be used to justify, or rationalize (depending on your view), too much. Imagine turning back the clock to when many of the things we consider morally wrong and abhorrent were more commonplace and were widely accepted: sexual harassment, marital rape, human slavery, etc., and sticking one's neck out in opposition to any of them would at least cost some social capital if not more.
Does the longtermist in any of these contexts really not have any obligation to engage in any costly opposition to the wrongs because it would detract from their longtermist projects? It seems it would require an awful lot of confidence in the longtermist's ability to affect the future to argue so. And it feels terribly convenient for the longtermist to argue they are in the moral right while making no effort to counteract or at least not participate in what they recognize as moral wrongs.
My view can be boiled down to this: First, we should be wary of arguments that tell us that doing things that we believe to be wrong are fine to do. Second, we should think hard about how much certainty we have about our ability to have longterm effects.
This is only convenient for the longtermist if they do not have equivalently demanding obligations to the longterm. Otherwise we could turn it around and say that it's "terribly convenient" for a shorttermist to ignore the longterm future too.